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RÉSUMÉ 
A Secular Age représente le produit du projet de l'Anthropologie Philosophique de 
Charles Taylor développé tout au long de quarante années. Dans ce travail, Taylor expose 
une narration positive de la modernité qui explique la condition moderne de la croyance 
tout en décrivant la relation contemporaine entre la religion et la sécularité. Sa narration 
compte trois segments: une analyse historique des origines de l'identité moderne; une 
évaluation des représentations contemporaines de la religion et des attitudes envers la 
croyance; et des suppositions sur la présence future des croyances dans la société 
occidentale. 
Taylor affirme que les explications des pratiques humaines reflètent le cadre de 
référence de l'auteur. Ce mémoire démontre l'influence du cadre subjectif de Taylor sur sa 
narration de la modernité, à travers une analyse herméneutique de A Secular Age et des 
autres travaux de Taylor reliés à son projet de Philosophie Anthropologique. Sa définition 
des termes, sa théorie morale ainsi que sa représentation narrative de la relation entre la 
religion et la sécularité sont donc révélatrices de son propre cadre moral personnel. 
Les cadres moraux modernes font plusieurs références à Dieu, même si celles-ci 
sont relativement absentes dans la société séculaire. La théorie morale de Taylor présente 
une connexion importante entre la compréhension de l'agence de l'être et la conception de 
Dieu. Son exposé de la modernité soutien que la connexion entre l'être et Dieu nécessite la 
conception de Dieu pour une vie morale. Taylor prétend que les croyances religieuses sont 
perpétuelles dans la société humaine et que leurs pertinences et leurs significations vont 
devenir plus apparentes dans le futur. 
L'orientation religieuse de Taylor et sa foi catholique sont évidentes dans les 
théories de la religion présentées dans A Secular Age. Ce travail conclut que la présence 
des croyances de Taylor dans ses textes est pertinente. La présence même des convictions 
personnelles tout au long de son exposé quant à la modernité démontre la force de ses 
suppositions sur la nature des théories de modernité. Ces convictions religieuses 
personelles permettent à Taylor d'adresser cet ouvrage à un auditoire qui se situe au cœur 
d'un débat continu, énergique et polarisé sur la légitimité des croyances religieuses. 
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SUMMARY 
A Secular Age represents the product of Charles Taylor's forty-year advancement of 
his Philosophical Anthropology project. In this work, Taylor constructs a positive narrative 
ofmodernity, which explains the modem condition ofbeliefand describes the 
contemporary relationship between religion and secularity. Taylor's narrative involves 
three components: an historical analysis of the origins of modem identity; an assessment of 
contemporary representations of religion and attitudes towards belief; and suppositions 
about the future presence of religious belief in Western society. 
Taylor asserts that the explanations ofhuman practices are reflective oftheir 
author's subjective frame ofreference. This paper demonstrates the influence of Taylor's 
subjective frame on his narrative ofmodernity, through a hermeneutical analysis of A 
Secular Age and the works related to Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology project. Taylor's 
definition ofterms, moral theory, and narrative depiction of the relationship between 
religion and secularity are therefore revelatory of his personal moral framework. 
Modem moral frameworks make numerous references to God, even though such 
references are relatively absent in secular society. Taylor's moral theory presents a strong 
connection between the understanding of human agency and the conception of God. 
Moreover, his narrative of modernity implies that the conception of God is necessary for 
morallife. Taylor contends that religious belief is a perennial feature ofhuman society, 
whose relevance and significance will become more apparent in the future. 
Taylor's religious orientation and Catholic faith are evident in the theories of 
religion presented in A Secular Age. This paper conc1udes that the influence and 
transparency of Taylor's beliefs are both unavoidable and purposeful. The presence of 
Taylor's personal convictions in his narrative ofmodernity is demonstrative ofTaylor's 
suppositions about the nature oftheories ofmodernity. In acknowledging his religious 
beliefs, Taylor directs his narrative at an audience caught in the middle of the ongoing, 
energetic and polarized debate over the legitimacy of belief in Western Culture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1 General Presentation 
Charles Taylor is a prolific contemporary, Canadian philosopher. He is recognized 
for his contributions to the fields of moral and political philosophy, in addition to his 
advancement ofPhilosophical Anthropology: the interpretive study oftheories ofhuman 
agency and selthood. 1 Taylor's 1989 book Sources of the Self, which presents an historical 
analysis of the modem identity, was critically appraised and has been widely commented 
by philosophers, theologians, and sociologists.z In 2007, Taylor published his most recent 
manuscript: A Secular Age. In 2007, Taylor was also awarded the Templeton Prize, which 
honors research in the field of spirituality and religion, in recognition ofhis lifelong 
achievements. 3 
Prior to A Secular Age, religion represented a secondary, yet consistent, theme in 
Taylor's body ofwork. Varieties of Religion Today and A Catholic Modernity? were 
originally presented as lectures and later published as independent works. Considered a 
secondary theme to Taylor's philosophy ofmorality and identity, his views on religion and 
secularity have been greatly overlooked by academics. Taylor, however, offers an 
interesting perspective into the modem condition ofbeliefinA Secular Age. His narrative 
explanation of secularity and modemity is unparalleled in the fields of philosophy and 
religious studies, and deserves greater critical attention from scholars of modemity, 
religion, and secularity. 
This thesis presents a hermeneutical analysis of Taylor's narrative ofmodemity, 
articulated in A Secular Age. His narrative involves three components: a description of the 
past, an analysis of the present, and suppositions about the future. Taylor states that his 
1 Smith, Nicholas iL Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity. (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) 1-9. 
2 See Morgan, Michael L. "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the 
philosophy of Charles Taylor in question. Ed. James Tully. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
n.50 
3The Templeton Prize Home.Ed. John Templeton Foundation 29 June 2009. 
<http://www.Templetonprize.org/> 
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2 
narrative is an alternative to the prevalent "anti-religious negative narratives of 
modernity", which explain modernity as the result of the regression of religious belief and 
the shedding of manipulative, illusory ideas about hum an nature and society. Central to 
Taylor's narrative is the discussion ofhow the conception ofGod has changed overtime, 
corresponding with changes in the conceptions of nature and human agency. Taylor asserts 
that modem secularity represents neither the dec1ine ofbelief, nor the regression of religion 
from the public sphere. He demonstrates that the conception of God remains significant in 
the modem West as it is deeply intertwined with the modem identity. He consequently 
demonstrates the relevance of religious belief in modem, Western, secular culture through 
an historical account of the re1ationship between religion and secularity. 
This paper will demonstrate that Taylor's narrative ofmodernity implicates the 
necessity of God and religion for modem morallife. The first chapter will situate A Secular 
Age within the body of Taylor's work and explain the significance of narratives in Taylor's 
moral theory. The second chapter will examine Taylor' s definitions of secularization, 
secular, secularity, religion and transcendence. The third chapter will explore Taylor's 
description of past and present conceptions of God, and their relation to the moral and 
spiritual condition of Western society. Finally, the fourth chapter will examine Taylor's 
solution for the ethical dilemmas of modernity and his own conception of God. 
II Contextualization of the Research Question 
Il.1 Research Question 
The purposes ofthis thesis is to contextualize Taylor's narrative ofmodernity 
within his project ofPhilosophical Anthropology, to c1arify the definitions of the concepts 
involved in this narrative, to explain the significance of historical changes to the conception 
of God for understanding modernity, and to elucidate Taylor's analysis of the 
contemporary, modem condition ofbelief. 
Il.11 Pertinence of the Question 
Secularity, religion, and modernity are consistent themes in Taylor's work; as is 
Taylor's criticism of the mainstream, academic approach to these topics. Taylor explores 
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the plurality of religious practices in democratic societies, and the implications of freedom 
for the modem condition ofbelief in "Religion in a Free Society.,,4 He criticizes the 
hermeneutical approach of the social sciences towards modemity, in "Inwardness and 
Culture of Modemity," he contends that this approach results in singular, linear descriptions 
of plural phenomenon. 5 Taylor also expresses an unresolved sense of dissatisfaction with 
existing scholarship related to secularization in Sources of the Self6 Taylor explores the 
multiple forms of secularism, each of which implies a different relationship between the 
state and religion, in "Modes of Secularism." 7 He proposes that the plurality of secularism 
rend ers the phenomenon unsuitable for singular theories. 
The theories expressed in A Secular Age are evidently the product of Taylor's long 
and focused deliberation, which must be considered in relation to his previous publications. 
Academic analysis of Taylor's explanations of secularity, God, and religion, however, is 
severely lacking. The research question presented in this paper is therefore highly pertinent 
to future scholarship and analyses of A Secular Age, and the topics of secularity, religion, 
God and modemity. 
II III State of the Research Question 
Taylor is known for his work on language, identity, morality, modemity, religion, 
secularity, politics, communitarism, multiculturalism, and the history of theory in the 
human sciences. Associating Taylor with a particular field of study presents a difficult task, 
in part, because his works address such a wide variety ofthemes.8 Furthermore, Taylor 
do es not fit comfortably within a philosophical tradition. Taylor received philosophical 
4 Taylor, Charles. "Religion in a Free Society" Articles of Faith, Articles ofPeace. Ed. J Davison Hunter et O. 
Guinness (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1990) 
5 Taylor, Charles. "Inwardness and the Culture of Modemity" Philosophieal Interventions in the Unfinished 
Projeet of Enlightenment. Ed. Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Weil mer. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992) 88-108. 
6 See Taylor, Charles. "Fractured Horizons" in Sources of the Self(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989) 305 -320. 
7 Taylor, Charles. Modes of Secularism" Seeularism and its Crities. Ed. R. Bhargava. (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 
8 Smith writes: "None ofthese works is easy to c1assify. They are ail philosophical, yet none ofthem is pure 
'philosophy', as that term is used by bureaucrats of knowledge at least in the English-speaking world." Smith, 
Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, Il. 
training in the Analytic tradition at McGill University and Oxford University.9 This 
orientation to Analytic themes is evident in his interest in language, and his usage of 
ordinary language to express philosophical theory. Taylor, however, is often critical of the 
Analytic tradition. 10 Moreover, his work is strongly influenced by phenomenology and 
hermeneutics, which are staples of the Continental tradition. 1 1 Taylor's philosophical 
approach, however, avoids exhaustive theorizing and, as Ian Fraser contends, there are 
many Marxian e1ements in Taylor's philosophy.12 The combination of Analytic and 
Continental perspectives is an example of Taylor's multidisciplinary approach to 
philosophy, which incorporates political theory, history, sociology, and theology. 
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Sources of the Selfreveals Taylor's penchant for theology and religious faith. In this 
work, Taylor addresses the negative opinion of religion among academics, who suggests 
that modem persons "have to choose between various kinds of spirituallobotomy and self-
inflicted wounds.,,13 He contends that the supposed connection between violence, tyranny, 
and religious faith, should be reconsidered, as "there is a large element ofhope [ ... ] that I 
see implicit in Judaeo-Christian theism (however terrible the record of its adherents in 
history), and in its central promise of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than 
humans can ever attain unaided.,,14 This strong affirmation ofthesis was highly criticized 
by commentators. Many consider Taylor' s professed faith 15 as in conflict with the object of 
his philosophy, the modem human identity.16 
Michael L. Morgan denies the accusations that Taylor's work is corrupted by 
theism. He contends that Taylor's theistic assertions are limited to the proposition that the 
explanation of modem cultures must consider their religious heritage. 17 In contrast to critics 
who maintain that Taylor is advocating for the retum of unilateral theism, Morgan writes: 
9 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 10. 
10 Ibid., 19. 
Il Ibid., 10. 
12 Fraser, Ian. Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor. (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007) l. 
13 Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) 520. 
14 Ibid., 521 
15Taylor, Charles. "Reply and re-articulation". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the philosophy of Charles 
Taylor in question. Ed. James Tully. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 226. 
16 Fraser, Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor, 31-32. 
17 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the philosophy of 
'Charles Taylor in question, 49-50. 
5 
"Taylor's enterprise encourages tolerance, receptivity and pluralism, and hence in one 
sense, the dismissive and ev en angry criticism ofhis skeptical readers ought to surprise 
him, for one ofhis goals is to discredit such one-sidedness.,,18Morgan suggests that the 
retrieval of Christianity proposed by Taylor is for the purposes ofunderstanding the 
modem identity. Morgan concludes the article by stating: "to develop his project in the 
direction of religious advocacy [ ... ] would be beyond his goals, which, in the present 
circumstances, are ambitious enough.,,19 His article was published in 1994, four years 
before the publication of A Catho/ic Modernity? and thirteen years before A Secular Age. In 
these texts Taylor defends the prevalence of religion in modemity, and presents the moral 
benefits ofbeliefin the transcendent. Morgan's comments should therefore be considered 
only in relation to work prior to Sources of the Self. 
Morgan's defense of Sources of the Selfretlects the negative association between 
faith and academia prevalent in the humanities. In commentaries and analyses ofTaylor's 
work, his theories of modemity, religion and secularity are generally sterilized of any 
religious or theistic content. Moreover, Taylor's theistic-driven works, such as A Catho/ic 
Modernity? and "Une Place Pour La Transcendance", are often treated in isolation from the 
main body ofhis work. Interpretations ofTaylor's perspective ofCatholicism, presented in 
A Catho/ic Modernity?, abound. Ian Fraser,20 George Marsden,21 Jean Bethke Elshtain,22 
William Shea,23 and Rosemary Luling Haughton,24 have all commented onA Catho/ic 
Modernity? Few such commentators, however, connect Taylor's interpretation of 
Catholicism and God to his wider philosophy, specifically his analysis of the modem 
identity. 
18 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age ofPluralism: the philosophy of 
Charles Taylor in question, 50. 
19 Ibid., 66. 
20 Fraser, Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor, 30 -60. 
21 Marsden, George. "Matteo Ricci and the Prodigal Culture". A Catholic Modernity? Ed. James L. Heft. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 82-93. 
22 Elshtain, Jean Bethke. "Augustine and Diversity". A Catholic Modernity? Ed. James L. Heft. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) 95-103. 
23 Shea, William M. "A Vote of Thanks to Voltaire" A Catholic Modernity? Ed. James L. Heft. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) 39-64. 
24 Haughton, Rosemary Luling. "Transcendence and being modern". A Catholic Modernity? Ed. James L. 
Heft. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 65-81. 
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Fraser's commentary is highly critical of A Catho/ic Modernity? He argues that 
. Taylor chooses a poor exemplar in Matteo Ricci to present a modem interpretation of 
Catholicism, as Ricci is un-accepting of difference.25 Fraser also contends that Taylor's 
interpretation is "far more restrictive as an orientation to the good than he realizes.,,26 He 
further states that Taylor's "theism is the Achilles heel ofhis moral theory.,,27 Fraser 
suggests that Taylor's theistic beliefs restrict his philosophy and reduce the relevancy ofhis 
moral theory. 
In contrast, George Marsden praises Taylor' s efforts at merging contemporary 
moral issues with Catholic tradition.28 He suggests that secularist academics are less likely 
to address the concems of average Canadians, the majority ofwhom affirm sorne form of 
Christian belief.29 Marsden states that Christian scholars should not deny their Christian 
beliefs in order to appear unbiased. He writes: "Christians who are scholars also need to be 
parts of Christian communities. [ ... ] there is a danger that our identification with modem 
academia may become our primary identification. [ ... ] Good arguments are essential to the 
Christian case, especially for clearing away the impression that such arguments do not exist 
[ ... ].,,30 Marsden proposes that the anti-religious view ofChristianity as antiquated and 
irrelevant is perpetuated by scholars who distance themselves from their beliefs. He 
maintains that Taylor represents a positive role model for other religious academics, 
including J ews and Muslims, who must negotiate the tension between religion and 
secularity in their fields of study. 31 
This brief discussion of commentaries demonstrates the overwhelming presence of 
moralist critiques aimed at Taylor's work. His views on religion, morality, theism, and 
Catholicism attract evaluative opinions and statements normally avoided academic writing. 
25 Fraser, Dialectics of the Self Transcending Charles Taylor, 51. 
26 Ibid., 59. 
27 Ibid., 59. 
28 Marsden, "Matteo Ricci and the Prodigal Culture". A Catholic Modernity?, 88. 
29 Ibid., 89. 
30 Ibid., 90. 
3\ Ibid.,-91. 
Moreover, comprehensive analyses ofTaylor's philosophy, such as Ruth Abbey32 and 
Nicholas H. Smith/3 generally overlook the theistic or religious aspects ofhis work. 
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Identifying the reasons for the apparent avoidance of these themes in academic 
critics of Taylor's work is beyond the scope ofthis paper. So stated, this paper will present 
an unbiased analysis ofTaylor's views on religion, modemity, secularity, and Catholicism, 
with the intent of advancing the general understanding of Taylor' s moral theory and 
philosophy ofidentity. More specifically, this paper will provide a detailed examination of 
A Secular Age, which is currently an understudied area of Taylor's work. 
III Methodology 
Taylor's career spans over 50 years. 34 His bibliography35 inc1udes over 20 books 
and a plethora ofartic1es, chapters, reviews, and even contributions to an on-line blog. 36 
This thesis provides an explanation of Charles Taylor's narrative ofmodemity through a 
hermeneutical analysis of a wide selection ofhis works. The selection of material for this 
paper is determined by the themes and topics addressed in A Secular Age, as well as the 
background information required to explain, contextualize, and c1arify the relevance of 
Taylor's narrative ofmodemity. 
111.1 Justification of corpus 
My research began with A Secular Age, in which Taylor articulates a narrative of 
modemity that explains the contemporary condition of religion and secularity in the modem 
West. In comparisons with other Taylor works on the subject of religion, such as Modern 
SocialImaginaries, Varieties of Religion Today, and A Catholic Modernity?, 1 became 
32 See Abbey, Ruth. Charles Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 31-33 
33 See Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 199-236. 
34 Taylor's first publication appeared in 1957: "Can Political Philosophy be Neutral?" Universities and Lefi 
Review (Spring:1995) 68-70. 
35 For a complete bibliography of Charles Taylor, visit Ruth Abbey's online bibliography. It is routinely 
updated with new publications and includes a comprehensive list of secondary and tertiary sources, and 
dissertations. Charles Taylor Bibliography. Ed. Ruth Abbey, 14 June 2009, 28 June 2009 
<http://www.nd.edu/-rabbeyl/index.htm> 
36 See The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion, and the Public Sphere Ed. Ruth Braunstein , Social 
. Science Research Council, 20 Jan. 2009. <http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanentjrame/> 
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aware that large portions of A Secular Age duplicate these other texts. 1 had previously 
assumed that Taylor's analysis of secularity was connected to his political theory; however, 
Taylor reveals in A Secular Age that secularity is by and large a moral issue.37 1 therefore 
directed my investigation into Taylor' s moral theory, his philosophy of identity, and his 
Philosophical Anthropology project. 
The articles and books involved in this analysis represent a selection ofmaterial 
related to Taylor's moral theory, philosophy ofidentity, Philosophical Anthropology 
project, and narrative analysis of modemity and secularity. A Secular Age, Sources of the 
Self, Modern Social Imaginaries, and A Catho/ic Modernity? feature heavily in this paper. 1 
consulted many ofTaylor's articles and books, which contributed to my general 
understanding of Taylor' s perspective, but did not advance my research. A fulllist of all 
consulted texts appears in the bibliography. Moreover, the first chapter provides a more 
complete justification of the texts 1 selected for this paper. 
Over the course ofTaylor's career, an overwhelming number ofthinkers, 
philosophers, and scientists have had an influence on his work. Taylor avoids mentioning 
his sources and references within the main body of A Secular Age relegating them to the 
extensive notes section at the back ofhis book. In terms of Taylor's concept of religion, 
Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Emile Durkheim, Robert Bellah, William James, and Karl Jaspers 
all had a marked influence.38 Similarly, for his understanding of secularity, Walter 
Benjamin, Benedict Anderson, José Casanova, David Martin, Steve Bruce, and Peter 
Berger emerge as prominent.39 While Taylor quite readily identifies thinkers that support 
his view ofnaturalist theories, such as John Milbank, H. Frankfurt, and Catherine 
Pickstock,40 he seldom identifies his intellectual opponents. Stephen Jay Gould, Daniel 
Dennett, the infamous Richard Dawkins,41 and Ludwig Wittgenstein42 represent the few 
37 Taylor associates "secularism" with politics and bureaucracy, and "secularity" with moral theory. Due to 
the brevity ofthis thesis, Taylor's views on "secularism" will not be discussed here. See Taylor, Charles. 
"Modes of Secularism" Secularism and its Critics. Ed. R. Bhargava. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
38 Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2007) n.781; n.793; n.829 
39 Ibid., n.815-823. 
40 See Taylor, "What is Human Agency". Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 15; Taylor, A Secular Age, n.851. 
41 Ibid., 561-562; n.835. 
scholars whose theories Taylor directly contests. He frequently refers to his intellectual 
opponents as nameless "proponents" of x, or y, theory. 
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As my research aims to situate the significance of Taylor's narrative ofmodemity 
within his philosophical career, l will not embark on an analysis of Taylor's own sources. 
Taylor presents his conclusions as his own, though he borrows many ideas, terms, and 
concepts from other authors; l have consequently deemed it more pertinent to contextualize 
his narrative within his own body ofwork, than within the corpus of Taylor's secondary 
sources. In the following chapters, l will therefore consider Taylor's ideas independently. 
AlI secondary sources consulted in this work were published after A Secular Age. 
Taylor' s theory of religion and secularity has been neglected by the majority of analyses 
and commentaries. The majority ofthis thesis thus represents new scholarship. Texts 
frequently referenced include: Nicholas H. Smith's Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morais and 
Modernity; Ruth Abbey's Charles Taylor; Michael L. Morgan's "Religion, History and 
Moral Discourse"; and the commentaries by William Shea and George Marsden, published 
inA Catho/ic Modernity? 
111./1 Research objectives 
The research objectives ofthis thesis are to situate Taylor's narrative ofmodemity, 
elucidated in A Secular Age, within his greater Philosophical Anthropology project, by 
demonstrating continuity between Taylor's polemic against naturalist theories and his 
polemic against anti-religious negative narratives ofmodemity, and to clarify the historical 
relationship between the conception of God and the understanding of human agency 
presented in Taylor's narrative ofmodemity, in order to demonstrate that, from Taylor's 
perspective, God is necessary to morallife. 
To accomplish these objectives, l will clarify the moral significance of narratives for 
Taylor's philosophy of identity and narrative of modemity, and demonstrate the application 
of Taylor's hermeneutical approach inA Secular Age. Furthermore, l will describe Taylor's 
42 Taylor, Charles 'Theories of Meaning" in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1. 
248-292 
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definitions of secularization, secular, secularity, religion and transcendence, in reference 
to his polemic against anti-religious negative narratives of modernity, in order to explain 
his choice vocabulary employed in A Secular Age. Additionally, 1 will recount Taylor's 
narrative of the changing conception of God and explain how these changes have 
contributed to form the modern understanding ofhuman agency and selfhood. Finally, 1 
will examine Taylor's analysis of the contemporary conditions ofmorality and religious 
belief. l will describe Taylor's solution for the ethical prob1ems ofmodernity with regards 
to his interpretation of Catholicism and demonstrate the practical application of this 
solution, through a brief discussion ofTaylor's life experiences. 
CHAPTERI 
Contextualization of A Secular Age: Philosophical Anthropology, 
narratives of modernity, and hermeneutical analysis 
Il 
In this chapter, l will trace the development of Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology 
project, which involves two, interrelated, polemics: one, against naturalist theories in the 
human sciences, and another against negative narratives ofmodemity. These polemics 
define Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology project and are deeply interrelated. l will 
explain how Taylor counters naturalist theory with his own moral theory of agency and 
identity. Additionally, l will explain Taylor's critique ofnegative narratives in light ofhis 
concept of narrative identity. Finally, l will explore the hermeneutical approach underlying 
Taylor's project, which, l shall argue, pre-determines the structure of Taylor's own positive 
narrative of modemity. 
Taylor introduces Philosophical Anthropology in his first book: The Explanation of 
Behaviour. Following works - Human Agency and Language, Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences~ Sources of the Self, and, his most recent publication, A Secular Age, demonstrate 
Taylor's dedication to this project. Taylor explains Philosophical Anthropology as "the 
study of the basic categories in which man and his behaviour is to be described and 
explained.,,43 Nicholas H. Smith identifies two tasks ofPhilosophical Anthropology: to 
disprove the c1aims of naturalist theories, and explain how these theories have become 
normative in the human sciences.44 Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology is defined by 
polemics against naturalist theory45 in the human sciences and anti-religious, negative 
narrative explanations of modemity. 
InA Secular Age, Taylor opposes negative narrative explanations ofmodemity, 
specifically those that are characterized by an anti-religion perspective. Negative narratives 
explain the genesis of modemity through epistemic losses, or the shedding of illusory ideas. 
43 Taylor, Charles. The Explanation of Behaviour (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1964),4 
44 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 7. 
45 Under the banner ofnaturalist theories, Taylor includes behaviourist theories ofhuman agency, 
instrumentalist explanations of society and culture, and naturalist theories of identity. 
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Anti-religious negative narratives explain modernity in terms of the dec1ine ofreligious 
faith. Taylor maintains that such narratives ignore the prevalence of new ideas, social 
constructions, and religious behaviour in the modem age, and are thus inappropriate as 
explanations ofmodernity. These narratives are highly valued in naturalist discourse. 
Negative narratives assume that hum an beings are motivated by instrumental 
concerns and that religion and spirituality misdirect modem pers ons from these goals. 
Taylor argues, however, that human agency is purpose driven; frequently, the purpose of 
human action is to realize moral goods. A good is something that a person values, or finds 
meaningful and significant. Moral goods are mutually recognized by human beings, and 
transmitted in society through moral frameworks of meaning. Taylor further proposes that 
selfhood is defined by an agent's moral vision. Explaining hum an identity, Taylor 
contends, thus requires the elucidation of the moral frameworks which inform an agent's 
moral vision. 
J 
Taylor maintains that selfhood is also constituted by narrative identity, as a person's 
sense of self must carry sorne thread of continuity over time. By composing a narrative 
identity, agents assess the progression of their lives in reference to their moral vision. 
Taylor proposes that narratives ofmodernity influence an individual's understanding of the 
term "modern", thereby affecting their identity as modem persons. In A Secular Age, 
Taylor constructs an alternative positive narrative of modernity, which defends the 
significance and relevance of modem religious belief, to counter the harmful influence of 
anti-religious negative narratives of modernity. 
ln constructing this narrative, Taylor adopts a hermeneutical approach, which 
supposes that human practices are only comprehensible through an examination of 
contemporary understandings of human agency and selfhood. Taylor thereby defends the 
relevance of religion in modernity by demonstrating that religion is a fundamental feature 
of the modem conception of selfhood and human agency. 
1 argue that A Secular Age differs from Taylor' s other works of philosophical 
anthropology by his engagement of diachronic, causal explanations. Taylor proposes an 
account of the historical genesis ofmodernity, which considers the religious and spiritual 
condition of modem Western society. 1 thus propose that A Secu/ar Age represents a 
third, distinct task: the elaboration of an explanatory, narrative of modernity intended to 
replace anti-religious negative narratives of modernity. 
1.1 Philosophical Anthropology and the Polemic Against Naturalist Theories 
13 
At several points during his career, Taylor reveals that his Philosophical 
Anthropology is motivated by a desire to discredit naturalist, or behaviourist, explanations 
of the human agent. He argues that naturalist theories of hum an agency and selfhood are 
problematic becausethey are altogether dismissive of the multiple understandings ofwhat 
it means to be a person in the context of different cultures. These theories present only one 
view ofhuman agency and apply this view to a host ofhistorical and cultural contexts.46 
According to Taylor, naturalists purport that human beings ought to be studied and 
understood from a scientific perspective and that human behaviour is driven by innate, 
biological needs such as reproduction and survival. In other words, human agency has no 
deeper meaning and no greater purpose than the fuI filment of instrumental goals. 
Taylor argues these theories obscure and encourage a reductionist view of all 
expressions of meaning and worth in human culture, language, and society. From the 
perspective of naturalism, meaning does not influence human practices. Smith explains: 
"For naturalism, the meaning-dimension ofhuman existence is ultimately a realm of 
subjective illusion. It assumes that the layers ofpragmatic, linguistic, moral, social and 
religious meaning that appear to constitute human agency are really something else, 
something that is only properly understood when considered from the point ofview 
developed by modem natural science.,,47 According to Taylor, this view is a denial of the 
fact that "hum an beings are self-interpreting animals.,,48 They analyse and interpret their 
own subjectivity. Human beings routinely question the meaning oftheir experiences, their 
lives, and their selfhood. Taylor writes: "the daim is that our interpretation of ourselves and 
46 Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol. l, 3. 
47 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 6-7. 
48 Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1,45. 
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our experience is constitutive ofwhat we are, and therefore cannot be considered as 
merely a view on reality, separable from reality, nor as an epiphenomenon, which can be 
by-passed in our understanding ofreality.,,49 To ignore the significance ofthese questions --
and their responses -- in favour ofmechanistic and instrumental explanations ofwhat a 
human being is, is to ignore the very activity which distinguishes human beings from other 
animaIs. 
According to Smith, Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology involves two tasks. The 
first task involves investigation into transcendental arguments for the study ofhuman 
nature. This investigation entails questioning "whether we are not only entitled but required 
to account for human reality in terms of the meanings made manifest in it.,,50 The second 
task, which concems the historical analysis of explanations ofhumanity, explains the 
popularity of n aturali st explanations in modemity.51 Smith writes: 
[Having] shown that meaning is a constitutive component ofhuman reality it remains to show how it 
is. But this question, Taylor maintains, can only be given a historical answer. Transcendental 
analysis must be refracted through historical understanding [ .... ] These two principles provide the 
framework for Taylor's investigations of the particular meanings that help shape the modem 
identity.52 
One of Taylor's main goals for his Philosophical Anthropology is to prove that the 
naturalist perspective is embedded in the modem moral framework, such that naturalist 
explanations ofhuman behaviour are accepted as foregone conclusions by the majority of 
modem society. Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology is representative of"a positive or 
constructive project,,,53 which advances an explanation ofmodemity through a 
demonstration of particular epistemological gains in human history.54 
1.1.1 The Explanation of Behaviour and Philosophie Papers (Vol. 1 and 2) 
Taylor begins his career in the late 1950's with the aim of exploring a Philosophical 
Anthropology of the human agent. In his first published book, The Explanation of 
49 Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Ph ilosophical Papers Vol. 1, 47. 
50 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 7. 
51 Ibid., 7. 
52 Ibid., 7. 
53 Ibid., 7. 
54 Ibid., 214. 
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Behaviour, Taylor provides a defence of teleological arguments for human behaviour. In 
this book, Taylor accomplishes the first transcendental task ofPhilosophical Anthropology: 
to demonstrate that human reality can only be explained by examining the significance and 
meaning that drives human behaviours and defines personhood. Taylor contests the 
behaviourist theory which proposes that human beings are motivated by instrumental and 
mechanistic concerns. He maintains that human agents are driven by purpose and are 
distinct from other agents because they use a language of significance and meaning to 
explain their motives. Human beings are "persons" precisely because things matter to them, 
not because they possess consciousness. Therefore, Taylor proposes that human behaviour 
is only comprehensible through an examination of the values that define our motives. 55 
With the compilation of Human Agency and Language and Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences 56 , Taylor embarks on the second transcendental task ofPhilosophical 
Anthropology: the historical analysis of explanations about humanity. In these books, 
Taylor explores the moral motivations behind naturalist and behaviourist explanations of 
humankind, and reveals their prevalence in the field ofhuman sciences. 57 For Taylor, this 
process necessarily involves an historical analysis of the background of naturalist theories: 
"Apart from the negative side of the argument, the case that naturalism makes a bad philosophy of 
science [ ... ], the positive thesis can only be established in an historical account. [ ... ] This would 
mean placing the history of our scientific and philosophical consciousness in relation to the whole 
development of modern culture, and particularly of the underlying interpretations of agency and the 
self.,,58 
Taylor contends that the popularity of naturalist theories in modem western culture is 
revelatory of the contemporary understanding of the human agent. Comprehending the 
55 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity.,7. 
56 Smith notes that the project ofPhilosophical Anthropology is unclear. He writes, "perhaps amore apposite 
name for the investigation of historically specifie features of subjectivity would be 'philosophical history' 
[ ... ]. While there is no reason in principle why transcendental and historical analysis must be at odds with 
each other, there is clearly a danger of coilf1ict here. In following through his project, Taylor runs the risk of 
'anthropologizing' or 'ontologizing' historically contingent features of subjectivity. Taylor is fully aware of 
this risk; indeed he is an adept at diagnosing the ontologizing fallacies ofhis naturalist opponents. But it is 
questionable whether he takes sufficient steps to avoid it himself'. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais 
and Modernity. 8 
57 Taylor writes: "It is also that the very nature of the claim 1 am putting forward, that we ail as human agents 
defme ourselves against a background of distinctions of worth, requires that we explain in these terms what 
people are doing who espouse a naturalist outlook." Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers Vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985),4. 
58 Ibid., 7 
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moral motivations of the human agent, Taylor maintains, is necessary to understand why 
these explanations are appealing and difficult to challenge. This polemic against naturalist 
explanations of hum an agency and selfhood remains the motivating factor throughout 
Taylor's philosophic career, appearing frequently and in various guises. 
1.1.2 Sources of the Self 
In Sources of the Self, Taylor presents the analysis ofnaturalist the ory in the form of 
a coherent, historical narrative. Taylor traces the development of the modern moral 
frameworks, or the idea of the good, which, he argues, define the understanding of human 
agency and selfhood. As Smith explains, Sources of the Se(fsatisfies the task of 
demonstrating the historical genesis ofnaturalist thinking, but "it neglects the are as of 
modern culture that can be understood neither as part ofnaturalism nor as part of the 
Romantic reaction to it."S9 According to Smith, Taylor's quest to refute naturalism, by 
demonstrating that it too is a subjective construction, creates a problem for his account of 
the modern self. His diagnosis is limited to those elements of the selfthat either uphold or 
contradict naturalism; there is little else outside this spectrum that is taken into 
consideration. 
Taylor explains that one of the weaknesses of naturalist theories is that they obscure 
the religious, or ideological, roots of modern society. Naturalist theories portray modernity 
as the result of scientific and technological innovations motivated by instrumental goals. 
Within this school of thought, secularization is understood as the de cline in religion, and 
considered an inevitable consequence of scientific rationalism, technological innovation, 
industrialization, and education.60 This perspective neither adequately address the religious 
roots of the purported factors of secularization, nor the continued growth of religious belief 
in countries such as the United States. 
For Taylor, the ec1ipse of religion in historical explanations ofmodernity is 
symptomatic of the wider push to deny the moral sources ofhuman behaviour. Taylor 
59 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Marals and Modernity. 214 
60 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 403. 
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contends that the consequences of such an eclipse are particularly striking as "it involves 
stifling the response to sorne of the deepest and most powerful spiritual aspirations that 
humans have conceived.,,61 Taylor reveals in his conclusion to Sources of Selfthat much of 
his polemic against naturalist explanations of identity were actually motivated by a desire 
to renew the academic view of religion. He writes: "The intentions ofthis work was one of 
retrieval, an attempt to uncover buried goods through rearticulation - and thereby to make 
these sources again empower, to bring the air back again into the half-collapsed lungs of the 
spirit.,,62 Many academics actually interpreted this statement as a positive argument for 
theism, seemingly forgetting Taylor's polemic against aIl naturalist explanations of the 
human agent that do not take into consideration the importance of morality for our self-
conception.63 While Taylor defends theistic belief as a legitimate moral perspective in the 
modem age, he does not portray theism as the only legitimate moral framework. 
Taylor cautions that though his description of the modem self takes the form of a 
linear historical narrative, it should not be read as a causal explanation ofmodemity, or an 
account ofhow, when, or where the elements of the modem self arise. He writes "what l'm 
doing has to be seen as distinct from historical explanation, and yet relevant to it. I1's 
distinct because l'm asking a different question. The question to which an explanation is 
the answer would be, e.g., what brought the modem identity about.,,64 Taylor maintains that 
his question is entirely different, though related to the latter question, and that this crucial 
difference is what prevents his work from falling into the many pitfalls of diachronie causal 
explanations ofmodemity. He writes: 
"But there is a second, less ambitious question. It is an interpretive one. Answering it involves giving 
an account of the new identity which makes clear what its appeal was. What drew people to it? [ ... ] 
What this question asks for is an interpretation of the identity [ ... ] This can, up to a point, be 
explored independently of the question of diachronic causation. We can say: in this and this consists 
the power of the idea/identity/moral vision, however it was brought to be in history.,,65 
61 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 520. 
62 Ibid., 520. 
63 Lane, Melissa, "God or Orienteering? A Critical Study of Taylor's Sources of the Self'. (Ratio (New 
Series) 5: 1 (1992): 46-56) ; O'Hagan, Timothy. "Charles Taylor's hidden God". (Ratio (New Series) 6: 1 
(1993): 72-81) 
64 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 202. 
65 Ibid., 203. 
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The historical changes to the concept of good have produced new and unprecedented 
understandings of the self and agency; understanding this change requires an historical 
account of the development of the modem, western moral background. Though this 
description is related to the story of the genesis of the modem self, Taylor maintains that it 
is quite different. The latter project would be too difficult within the scope of a single book 
to achieve as it would involve an analysis of every area ofhuman life, society, and 
culture.66 
1.1.3 Articles, Lectures and Books: 1990-2007 
Between 1990 and 2007, Taylor published a number of articles and short books 
about various topics related to modernity, many ofwhich dealt specifically with the role of 
religion or transcendence in modem society.67 These texts explore many aspects of 
modernity not directly covered in Sources of the Seifincluding politics, the public sphere, 
the culture ofindividua1 expression, and religion. Many ofthese articles and books address 
the subject ofidentity and mora1ity, and advance the po1emic against naturalist theories of 
human agency and modernity.68 During this period of publication, Taylor develops a more 
detaited perspective ofmodernity, addressing many political and social issues routinely 
taken for granted by proponents ofnaturalist theory. Tay10r's research also demonstrates an 
increasing interest in secularity: a topic that touches upon many seemingly divergent 
features of modernity such as the self, the public sphere, the culture of expression, 
transcendence and religion. 
In April and May of 1999, Taylor gave a series of 10 lectures entitled "Living in A 
Secular Age" at the University of Edinburgh as part of the Gifford lectures. Transcripts of 
these lectures were never published, though Ruth Abbey's 2001 work on Charles Taylor 
66 Taylor, Sources of the Self 207. 
67 See Taylor, "Religion in a Free Society" Articles of Faith, Articles of Peace; "inwardness and the culture of 
mode mit y" Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment; The Malaise of 
Modernity(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991) ; "Modes ofSecularism" Secularism and its 
Critics; "A Catholic Modemity?". A Catho/ic Modernity?; "Une place pour la transcendance" Mutations 
Culturelles el Transcendence. Ed. Pierre Gaudette (Quebec: Université Laval, 2000); Varieties of Religious 
experience today: William James revisited. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), Modern social 
imaginaries (London: Duke University Press, 2004). 
68 See discussion of acultural vs. cultural theories of modemity in Taylor, "Inwardness and the Culture of 
Modemity", 88-110. 
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summarizes much of the content of this lecture. Based on this summary, much of the 
content ofthese lectures evidently was incorporated into Varieties of Religion Today, 
Modern Social Imaginaries, and A Secular Age. In the Gifford lectures, Taylor explores the 
meaning of the tenn secularity, the marginalization of theism, and the rise of exclusive 
humanism.69 Once again, Taylor adopts an historical approach that counters the naturalist 
views of modemity and, as Abbey remarks, "[promotes] cultural self-awareness in 
Westemers.,,70 
1.1.4 A Secular Age 
A Secular Age furthers Taylor's polemic against naturalist explanations of 
humanity, specifically the "negative narratives ofmodemity". These narratives explain 
modemity and secularity: 
"[ ... ] by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, 
confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge. What emerges from this process -
modernity or secularity- is to be understood in terms ofunderlying features ofhuman nature 
which were there aH along, but had been impeded by what is now set aside.,,71 
Taylor's concem is that naturalist explanations ofmodemity ignore the moral and 
epistemological changes that have contributed to the modem identity. He argues that they 
focus on the ideas and practices that society has moved away from and ignore the new ideas 
and practices that we have adopted in their place. These theories portray modemity as a 
retum to, or a re-discovery of, basic human nature, unencumbered by manipulative and 
illusory ideologies. 
Taylor's attack on naturalist theory, in A Secular Age, is precisely aimed at anti-
religious negative narratives, which portray religion as declining in popularity and suggest 
that society can only progress in the absence offaith and religious belief. To counter the 
anti-religious negative narratives, Taylor attempts to construct his own positive narrative 
that demonstrates the continuing prevalence of religion in modem society. He writes: 
69 Abbey, Charles Taylor, 195-198. 
70 Abbey writes: "Taylor's historical approach stems from his persistent concem with promoting cultural self-
awareness in westerners .... In tracing the history of secularity, Taylor is showing that what is seen as natural 
and taken for granted is actually historical and particular." Ibid., 199. 
71 Taylor, A Secular Age. 22 
"[ ... ] by ignoring or flattening out aIl these changes, a subtraction story makes it hard to conceive 
the changes in human experience. It is left only with an account in terms of altered beliefs. This is 
one kind of account of the rise of modem secularity, and my attempt in this book has been to offer 
another, 1 think more convincing one."n 
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l contend that A Secular Age represents a third and final task of Taylor's Philosophical 
Anthropology: the positing of Taylor's own theory ofmodemity. Taylor bases much of the 
content of A Secular Age on his earlier research, specifically the transcendental argument 
that human beings are motivated by morality and the historical analysis of the explanations 
ofhumanity. Furthermore, l propose that as an historical explanation ofhumanity, A 
Secular Age also reveals the moral orientation of its author. . 
Taylor's narrative account of the deve10pment ofmodemity involves three 
components: an analysis of the past, an analysis of the present, and a perspective on the 
future. Having a narrative identity, he argues, is constitutive of our selfhood. As he reveals 
in Sources of the Self. 
"to state another basic condition of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a narrative. 
[ ... ] our lives exist also in this space of questions, which only a coherent narrative can answer. In 
order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of who we have become, and of where 
we are going.,,73 
In A Secular Age, Taylor argues that narratives are not only a constitutive element of our 
personal identity; they also provide a greater understanding of what it means to be human. 
Personal and historical narratives influence our moral outlook; they analyse the past and 
present in light of our current moral frameworks and suggest the direction we ought to take 
in the future to better meet these standards. Thus in positing his own narrative, Taylor 
offers an historical analysis of the past and the present, as well as moral prescriptions for 
the future. 
12 Taylor writes: "By ignoring or flattening out aIl these changes, a subtraction story makes it hard to conceive 
the changes in human experience. It is left only with an account in terms of altered beliefs." Taylor, Sources 
of the Self 573. 
73 Ibid., 47. 
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1.2 Negative Narratives 
Taylor identifies several negative narratives, or subtraction stories, at work in the 
collective social consciousness of modem persons; which explain the advent of modemity 
through a series of 'losses'. In qualifying them as 'negative', Taylor reveals not only his 
opinion of these stories, he is highlighting their inclination to see the past as clouded by 
illusory ideas and concepts that have gradually fallen away to reveal realit/4. Many 
examples of negative narratives to which Taylor accords sorne degree of merit exist, 
including Max Weber's infamous notion of "disenchantment". In fact, Taylor notes that 
Weber's thesis, which proposes that modem society has lost a sense of a meaningful order 
in the cosmos,75 serves as the basis for multiple negative narratives. As Taylor explains: 
"A common "subtraction" story attributes everything to disenchantment. First, science gave us 
'naturalistic' explanations of the world. And then people began to look for alternatives to God. 
But things didn't work that way. The new mechanistic science of the seventeenth century 
wasn't even as necessarily threatening to God. It was to the enchanted universe and magic. It 
also began to pose a problem for particular providences. But there were important Christian 
motives for going to (the?) route of disenchantment. Darwin was not even on the horizon in the 
eighteenth century.,,76 
Taylor's main point is that people did not suddenly stop seeing the world as a magical and 
meaningful place c. 1500 A.D. A change in their general perception of the world, morality, 
and human agency occurred that drew them to a disenchanted view. 
Taylor's discussion of disenchantment is revelatory ofhis esteem for positive 
narratives. He suggests that an examination of the opposite of disenchantment, the 
"enchanted world", is necessary to understand how modem society differs from societies of 
the past. 77 Taylor discusses this world at length and his insistence on reversing the 
colloquial concept of disenchantment is a demonstration ofhis efforts to provide a positive 
theory ofmodemity. 
74 Taylor, A Secular Age, 22. 
75 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 17 
76 Taylor, A Secular Age, 26. 
77 According to Taylor, the enchanted world corresponds to the "world of spirits, demons, and moral forces" 
Ibid., 25 -26. 
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1.2.1 Anti-Religious Negative Narratives 
In A Secular Age, Taylor' s specifically targets "anti-religious narratives of 
modemity". These narratives explain modemity primarily through the process of 
secularization and the purported decline in religious belief and practice. According to 
Taylor, these narratives are the product of the "secularist spin": an attempt to present 
modemity as incompatible with religious belief. 78 The secularist spin presents a "closed" 
reading of modemity, or a "closed world structure," as normative. The closed world 
structure blocks off any notion of a reality beyond immanent reality, which we experience 
as impersonal, ordered by 'natural' laws, and devoid of supra-human powers or agencies.79 
Taylor's strong disdain for the secularist-spin can be felt in the following passage. He 
writes: 
"What 1 am calling 'spin' is [ ... ] a way of convincing oneself that one's reading is obvious, 
compelling, allowing of no cavil or demurral. 1 invoked in the previous paragraph the 
accusation of intellectual dishonesty often hurled at believers from Weber on down to today. 
My concept of spin here involves something of this kind, but much less dramatic and insulting; 
it implies that one's thinking is clouded or cramped by a powerful picture which prevents one 
seeing important aspects of reality. 1 want to argue that those who think the closed reading of 
immanence is 'natural' and obvious are suffering from this kind of disability.,,80 
According to Taylor, the closed world structure is defined by four facets: (1) the claim that 
science has disproven God, which is supported by (2) subtraction stories that announce the 
'death ofGod', and the portrayal of (3 and 4) the current social and political order, and the 
conception ofselthood, autonomous selfhood, as the result ofhumanity's progression or 
maturation. 81 AlI four ofthese facets underline the anti-religious negative narratives Taylor 
combats in A Secular Age. 
Taylor argues that explanations of modemity that posit atheism as 'progressive' and 
suggest that religious individuals are scientifically "backwards" or less intelligent than non-
believers are false. He argues that unbelief is not a more rational or intellectually accurate 
choice; "there are no more naïve theists, just as there are no naïve atheists". 82 In other 
78 Taylor, A Secular Age, 550. 
79 ' Ibid., 553. 
80 Ibid., 551. 
81 Ibid., 589-590. 
82 Ibid., 30. 
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words, everyone is aware, believer or non believer, that they can choose their position. In 
belittling this choice, the proponents of the "c1osed" anti-religious negative narratives label 
all theists as weak, less intelligent, or wilfully delusional. 
For Taylor, a person's orientation towards religion and the divine is revelatory of 
their se1f-understanding. Anti-religious negative narratives fail to consider this 
relationship. By ignoring the most frequent articulation of goods in human history, these 
narratives disregard how the concept ofhuman agency and identity has changed over time. 
According to Taylor, the evolution of religion and spirituality must be contemplated in the 
analysis ofmorality and human identity. As Ruth Abbey notes, Taylor's version ofmorality 
is actually a mixture ofwhat sorne thinkers refer to as separate concepts: ethics and 
morality. His notion of the good comprises both "what is right to do and what is good to 
be".83 A person's sense of morality and the good is culturally and historically specific; 
whereas the capacity for moral judgement, or "strong evaluation", 84 is univers al to all 
human beings. 85 Taylor also maintains that the shared understanding of the origins of this 
capacity influences the conception ofhuman agency. Taylor argues that with any change in 
the perception of the source of qualitative discriminations the idea of the "good itself is, of 
course, reinterpreted.,,86 
In the modem age, God is detached from the notion of the good. Taylor insists that 
negative narratives are unable to correctly explain the genesis ofthis detachment, because 
they can neither identify modem forms of the good, nor their sources. These stories are 
concemed with explaining the demise of religion and belief at the hands of secularization, 
and as such they ignore the effects ofthis shift on all other modes oflife. Taylor writes: 
"Belief in a unilinear process called 'secularization' is the belief that the crisis only affects 
religious beliefs, and that the invariable beneficiaries are the secular ones. But this is not an 
83 Abbey, Charles Taylor Il. 
84 Strong evaluation refers to our ability to discem the inherent value in certain actions, behaviours, or 
notions. As Abbey remarks: "the term refers, therefore, to distinctions of worth that individuals make 
regarding their desires or the objects of their desires. One of the entailments of strong evaluation is that 
although there are al ways multiple goods clamouring for attention in a person's life, they do not aU appear in 
the same light." Abbey, Charles Taylor 17. 
85 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 85. 
86 Ibid., 319. 
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adequate view of our situation.,,87 For Taylor, an adequate view of secularization and the 
place of religion in society must examine how society functions, relates to religion, and 
envisions morality in the context of modemity. Modemity cannot be explained through 
subtraction stories that only focus on the loss of a sense of magic, the shaking off of sexual 
and social taboos, or the overcoming of ignorance about the natural world. Instead, Taylor 
argues that we must look at the past to construct a "positive" narrative of modemity, one 
which would be complementary to the negative narrative. 88 This narrative reconstructs the 
past, identifying the movements, ideas and events that have impinged on modemity. 
1.3 The Moral Sources of Identity and Agency 
Naturalists attribute instrumental, biological motivations to aIl human behaviour, 
suggesting that aIl acts can be shown to adhere to a circumscribed set of principles. 
Morality and the expression ofmeaning are not viewed as constitutive of hum an agency. 
This idea finds expression in anti-religious negative narratives through the concept of a 
perennial "hum an nature", which transcends cultural contexts and social constructions. 
These narratives argue that, having shaken off or abandoned false understandings of the 
world and the transcendent, the modem selfhas retumed to its natural state. Taylor argues 
that this understanding of human behaviour is based on a moral framework that developed 
only recently. Proponents of such theories are reticent to acknowledge this fact as it 
contradicts their daim that modemity has resulted from abandoning ideological and social 
constructions. 
In Explanations of Human Behaviour, Taylor argues in favour of teleological 
explanations ofhuman behaviour, which argue that human actions are purpose driven. The 
defence ofteleological theories is the source of Taylor's argument that the modem 
understanding of selfhood and human agency are based on moral frameworks of meaning. 89 
87 Taylor, A Secular Age, 413. . 
88 Taylor writes: "So much for the negative story as master narrative. But we could also add a complementary 
narrative which emphasizes the positive features of the present spirituality of search. By 'positive', 1 don't 
mean features that we necessarily want to endorse; just that we focus not on what our Age has displaced, but 
on what characterizes it." Ibid., 532. 
89 Taylor articulates such an idea in Philosophy and the Hurnan Sciences with the concept of inter-subjective 
meanings, which "are the background of social action ... whether there is consensus or not, the condition of 
Taylor's entire investigation into hum an identity, religion, secularity, and modemity rests 
on this argument. The following sections shaH briefly explore Taylor's defence of 
teleological explanations and the proposition that personal identity and the conception of 
human agency are based on moral sources. 
1.3.1 The Teleological Argument 
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In Explanations of Human Behaviour, Taylor proposes animal and human 
behaviour are distinct from acts of nature because they are purpose driven. To possess 
agency implies that an agent's actions are purpose driven, not that the agent is aware ofits 
actions. He writes: 
"for something to be an action in the strong sense, it is not only necessary that it end in the 
result or meet the criterion by which action ofthis kind are characterized, but it must also be the 
case that the agent's intention or purpose was to achieve this result or criterion. In other words, 
the agent must not only make the appropriate movements, it must also be his intention or 
purpose to do so." 90 
Natural forces -such as the weather- are not considered agents because their movements 
lack preconceived motives. The weather behaves spontaneously and erratically, without 
intent. 
The acts ofhuman beings are commonly understood to be directed towards meeting 
pre-conceived goals, or ends. Taylor maintains that this understanding is reflected in the 
"common understandings of concepts like action, desire, intention, and responsibility. AH 
ofthese presuppose a beliefin hum ans as purposeful beings.,,91 Taylor is adamant that 
, 
these generalized descriptions ofhuman behaviour should not be overlooked in favour of 
behaviourist theories that aim for impersonal and instrumentalist explanations of agency. 92 
there being either one or the other is a certain set of common terms of reference. A society in which this was 
lacking would not be a society in the normal sense of the term, but severa!." Taylor, Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences: Ph ilosophical Papers Vol. 2. 36. 
90 Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour, 29. 
91 Abbey, Charles Taylor. 64. 
92 Taylor writes: "Our ordinary language account is teleological, then, because at the basis of much of our 
everyday explanation of action is the notion of desire. This notion is involved whenever we attribute a 
'motive'. For attributing a motive is often stating the end which was wanted in undertaking the action." Taylor, 
The Explanation ofBehaviour, 38. 
He contends that hum an beings are just as motivated by ideas and thoughts, as 
impersonal biological needs and impulses. 
1.3.2 Human Agency 
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Moreover, human beings are distinguished from animaIs because their sense of self 
and agency are grounded in morality. Humans are by nature moral beings; they grasp their 
identity through articulating the ideas, ideals, and objects that are significant to them. As 
Taylor writes: "What 1 am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things 
have significance for me, and the issue of my identity is worked out, only through a 
language of interpretation which 1 have come to accept as a valid articulation of these 
issues.',93 Selfhood is defined by a person's moral choices. How a person orients their life 
in relation to that which is deemed good, and their pursuit of goodness, is evident in the 
articulation oftheir identity. While all agents are purpose driven and are capable of 'weakly 
evaluating' the desired ends oftheir actions, Taylor contends that human beings possess the 
capacity for 'strong evaluation'. Weak evaluation involves the weighing of multiple desires 
with regards to an agent's particular situation. Taylor defines weak evaluation by the 
following two characteristics: "(1) in weak evaluation, for something to be judged good it is 
sufficient that it be desired [ ... ]. It follows from this that (2) when in weak evaluation one 
desired alternative is set aside, it is only on grounds of its contingent incompatibility with a 
more desired alternative.,,94 Articulating the reasoning behind a weak desire is not 
necessary for the action to be comprehended by others. For instance, 1 want to see a movie, 
but the show time is quite late. So as not to be tired the next day 1 pick a different film. This 
decision constitutes a weak evaluation, and is not revelatory of my identity, morals or 
values. However, in chose not to see a particular movie because it has a lot of violent 
content and 1 feel strongly that violent images are a negative influence on society, such a 
decision is revelatory of my identity and values; my actions were determined by strong 
evaluation of the moral implications of the movie's content. Taylor explains that strong 
evaluation means that "[sorne] desired consummation may be eschewed not because it is 
93 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 34. 
94 Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, 18. 
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incompatible with another [ .... ] [b ]ut rather because it is base. ,,95 For others to understand 
this decision requires the articulation of my particular vision of morality. An action that 
involves strong evaluation for one individual may not necessitate the same level of 
consideration for another. Strong and weak evaluations are not limited to one type of 
action. Altematively any action may involve either forms of evaluation. The circumstances 
that surround moral evaluation are influenced by personal, social, ideological and cultural 
norms. 
Taylor argues that all human agents consider sorne goals to be qualitatively higher, 
worthier, nobler, or superior than others, which may be base, abhorrent, or polluting. As 
Taylor writes: 
"To characterize one desire or inclination as worthier, or nobler, or more integrated, etc. than 
others is to speak of it in terms of the kind of quality oflife which it expresses and sus tains [ ... J. 
Motivations or desires do not only count in virtue of the attraction of the consummations but 
also in virtue of the kind oflife and kind of subject that these desires properly belong tO.,,96 
The choices made on the basis ofthis evaluation determine human identity. Human beings 
are defined by this ab il it y to distinguish between different goods and desires on the basis of 
their perceived value or worth, not just their convenience for fulfilling basic biological 
needs or goals. A person is therefore not only an agent for whom things matter in a general 
sense, but an agent who recognizes and follows moral standards.97 
Human beings are moral agents and "moral agency requires sorne kind of reflex ive 
awareness of the standards one is living by (or failing to live by).,,98 Morality is constituted 
by a "kind ofreality", or a "constitutive goOd.,,99 This constitutive good may be "the order 
ofthings", or "the will of God", or the human capacity for "courageous disengagement."IOO 
Despite these differences, the function of a constitutive good is always the same. As Taylor 
writes: "the constitutive good is a moral source [ ... ] it is a something the love ofwhich 
95 Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, 19. 
96Ibid., 25. 
97 Ibid., 102-103. 
98 Ibid., 103. 
99 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 92. 
\00 Ibid., 94. 
empowers us to do and be goOd."IOI Human beings value moral sources above all other 
goods; their respect and admiration for the source of goodness inspires them to maintain 
such standards. Taylor states: "loving [the constitutive good] is part ofwhat it is to be a 
good human being.,,102 Without a sense of respect or love for the constitutive good, their 
lives would have no moral orientation. 
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The understanding ofwhat grounds morality will influence the conception of hum an 
agency. Questioning moral sources is particularly difficult, as they are so deeply embedded 
in background frameworks that human beings frequently forget that moral sources even 
exist. Individual agents come to think oftheir love for particular constitutive goods as 
natural, or innate. Therefore, when we think ofwhat it means to be a human agent, we 
implicitly articulate a conception ofthese goods. Taylor writes: 
"We have a sense ofwho we are through our sense ofwhere we stand to the good. But his will 
also means [ ... ] that radically different sense of what the good is go along with quite different 
conceptions ofwhat a human agent is [ .... ]. To trace the development of our modem visions of 
the good, which are in sorne respects unprecedented in human culture, is also to follow the 
evolution of unprecedented new understandings of agency and selthood.,,103 
Therefore, whether or not we acknowledge non-human moral sources will influence our 
understanding ofwhat it means to be a human. For instance, we may form a conception of 
our agency as entirely self-sufficient: the inspiration for our own moral order or we might 
find that in order to be 'good human beings' we must recognize something beyond hum an 
agency as the greatest good. We may even conc1ude that there is nothing which grounds 
morality but our natural instincts for survival and reproduction. 104 Ultimately, Taylor's 
argument suggests, we cannot question the source of our moral intuitions without 
articulating what it means to be a hum an being. 
1.3.3 Personal Identity and Moral Frameworks ofMeaning 
According to Taylor, hum an beings are defined by their possession of a moral 
orientation: to have an identity is to be able to articulate what is meaningful and worthwhile 
101 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 93. 
102 Ibid., 93. 
103 Ibid., 105. 
104 Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Ph ilosoph ical Papers Vol. 1, 105-114. 
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- i.e. moral goods. In order to live in orientation to a sense of the good, human beings 
must be capable of evaluating their behaviours, thoughts, and feelings. Taylor writes: "To 
know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about 
what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance 
for you and what is trivial and secondary.,,105 Individuals thus rely on their capacity for 
strong evaluation, which "prevents us from experiencing all our choices equally,,106 in order 
to determine their identity.107 
Taylor presents the capacity to discriminate between goods as intrinsic to humanity. 
Ruman beings use this ability not only to evaluate their actions, but to discem between 
different goods. Abbey writes: 
"[Taylor] believes that in any person's life there is always a multiplicity of goods to be 
recognized, acted upon and pursued. [ ... ] they are of qualitatively different types from one 
another and because ofthis, cannot always be harmoniously combined, rank-ordered or reduced 
to sorne more ultimate or foundational goOd.'''08 
To live with an irreducible pluralism of goods poses difficulties that all human beings must 
face. Persons recognize that sorne goods must be sacrificed in order for others to be 
satisfied. 109 ln order for their lives to have significance and worth, all human beings must 
make such moral choices. While all individuals are capable ofranking which goods have 
more meaning for them, they do not determine what constitutes a good on their own. 
Ruman beings discem their notion of the good from common frameworks of 
meaning. These frameworks are equally essential to their sense of self, though they are not 
explicitly personal. Taylor writes: 
"Frameworks pro vide the background, explicit or implicit, for our moral judgements, intuitions or 
reactions [ ... ]. To articulate a framework is to explicate what makes sense of our moral responses. That 
is, when we try to spell out what it is that we presuppose when we judge that a certain form of life is 
truly worthwhile, or place our dignity in a certain achievement or status, or define our moral 
105 Taylor, Sources of/he Self, 28. 
106 Abbey, Charles Taylor. 25. 
107 Ibid., 21. 
108 Ibid., 12. 
109 Ibid., 24. 
obligations in a certain manner, we find ourse Ives articulating inter alia what 1 have been calling 
here 'frameworks. ",110 
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Frameworks may be theistic or non-theistic, particular or general. Regardless oftheir 
content, frameworks are the bases for aIl qualitative discriminations. Frameworks serve as a 
common pool of goods, out ofwhich individuals discem by strong evaluation those which 
are more valuable or integral to their lives. 
Taylor distinguishes between two types of frameworks in the modem world: 
immanent frameworks and transcendent frameworks. They are each defined by their 
representation of the constitutive good, or the type of goods they value. Taylor writes that 
an immanent frame "constitutes a 'natural' order, to be contrasted to a 'supematural' one, 
an 'immanent' world, over and against a possible 'transcendent' one.,,111 In an immanent 
framework, the constitutive good is immanent: su ch a good exists within the limitations and 
boundaries of existing reality. An example would be the hum an ability for rational control. 
In contrast, transcendent frameworks are grounded by the idea of a good that is higher or 
greater than existing reality from which our capacity for strong evaluation originates. 112 An 
example would be God or Dharma. 
According to Taylor, the conception of the constitutive good does not necessarily 
limit the type of goods represented by moral frameworks. An immanent framework may 
contain a transcendent good and vice versa. For example, though we might believe that the 
source of morality cornes from rational control, we might still aspire to achieve a 
transcendent love for aIl beings. This example corresponds to what Taylor caIls an 'open' 
immanent framework 113• These should be seen in opposition to 'closed' immanent 
frameworks, which refute any notion ofa transcendent goodl14 . The choice between closed 
and open immanent frameworks has important consequences for religion in modemity. 
Taylor writes: "What emerges from aIl this is that we can either see the transcendent as a 
threat, a dangerous temptation, a distraction, or an obstacle to our greatest good. Or we can 
110 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 26. 
III Taylor, A Secular Age, 542. 
112 Ibid., 544. 
113 Ibid., 545. 
114 Ibid., 546. 
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read it as answering to our deepest craving, need, and fulfilment of the goOd.,,115 The 
presence of open and closed frameworks, in addition to transcendent frameworks, 
represents one of the greatest dilemmas, or opportunity, for achieving hannony in modern 
society. 
Where do these multiple frameworks come from? lndividuals do not invent moral 
frameworks; they are culturally inherited. As D.P. Barker explains, we gather frameworks 
from dialogue with others: this "web of interlocution is the delivery system for the goods 
that make up the moral framework, but it is not itselfthe moral framework." 1 16 Taylor 
argues that what is unique about the modern era is that the web of interlocution is so vast 
that there is no framework which can be said to function as "the framework tout court." 1 17 
Immigration and the spread of globalization have only increased exposure in the modern 
West to multiple frameworks. 
Regardless of the multiple frameworks which populate the horizon, Taylor insists 
that frameworks are necessary to aIl human beings. He writes: "doing without frameworks 
is utterly impossible for us [ ... ] [Living] within such strongly qualified horizons is 
constitutive of human agency, [ ... ] stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to 
stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human 
personhood." 118 In other words, the unit y of a self requires that we be able to detennine 
which experiences are significant to us and which are not, without constantly questioning 
the legitimacy oftheir meaning. Choosing between multiple goods and frameworks 
demonstrates that certain ideals have greater meaning for me than others. While we rnay 
hold in cornmon the sarne goods as a society, the way 1 discern between thern and navigate 
rny life around the goods 1 find to be more significant defines my sense of self as an 
individual. 
115 Taylor, A Secular Age, 548. 
116 Baker, D.P "Morality, Structure, Transcendence and Theism: A response to Melissa Lane's Reading of 
Charles Taylor's Sources o/the Self' (International Journal/or Philosophy o/Religion 54 (1993), 39-40. 
117 Taylor, Sources o/the Self, 17. 
118 Ibid., 27. 
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1.3.4 The Importance ofNarrativefor Identity 
Additionally, Taylor maintains that a human being's sense of self necessarily 
incorporates a narrative dimension. This dimension serves to contextualize a person's moral 
choices and personalize their sense of the good. Taylor explains that situating ourselves in 
moral space involves not only the identification of the good, but "this sense of the good has 
to be woven into my understanding ofmy life as an unfolding story. [ ... ] [We] grasp our 
lives in narrative. [ .... ] In order to have a sense of who we are we have to have a notion of 
who we have become, and ofwhere we are going.,,119 He argues that this narrative identity 
is not optional; a person' s sense of self must carry sorne thread of continuity over time. 
As Nicholas Smith explains, human beings must locate themselves in unfolding 
time, just as they locate themselves in moral space. 120 Identity is a reflection of an 
individual' s past, as well as their present and future; it changes and evolves during an 
individual's life span. Narrative identity personalizes common moral frameworks by 
relating a person's experiences to the concept of good. As Taylor notes, "we cannot but 
strive to give our lives meaning or substance, and that this means that we understand 
ourselves inesc~pably in narrative.,,121 Narrative identities may be linear, or fractured, or 
even multiple. Regardless of their form and content, Taylor maintains that all human 
identity requires contextualization in temporal space 
In A Secular Age, Taylor suggests that narrative is not only necessary for a person's 
sense of self, but for their collective identity as a human being. In tracing the roots of a 
modem human identity, Taylor demonstrates how this sense of self is intimately linked 
with subtraction narratives, particularly the one which supposes that science and reason has 
overcome the "enchanted,,122 worldview of the past. He writes: 
"The buffered self feels invulnerable before the world of spirits and magic forces, which still can 
haunt us in our dreams, particularly those of childhood [ ... :1 [a ]nd then the colossal success of modem 
119 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 47. 
120 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Marals and Modernity. 97 
121 T If, aylor, Sources of the Sel, 51. 
122 T aylor, A Secular Age, 25. 
natural science and the associated technology can lead us to feel that it unlocks ail mysteries, that 
it will ultimately explain everything [ ... ].,,123 
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This passage reveals that not all narratives that orient our sense of self in unfolding time are 
personal. In the case of narratives of modernity, which inc1udes the one discussed above, 
Taylor argues that they are "essential to our thinking. We all wield them, inc1uding those 
who c1aim to repudiate them.,,124 To describe ourselves as modem is to give temporal 
significance to our identity as human beings. The term modem draws implicit comparisons 
to the past, while suggesting that we are constantly looking towards the future. 
1.4 Taylor's Hermeneutical Approach 
Taylor suggests that refuting a misleading narrative of modernity -such as an anti-
religious negative narrative- is not sufficient; a person must al ways possess a narrative 
identity. Consequently, the construction of a positive narrative of modernity is an essential 
component of Taylor's polemic against naturalist theories and his Philosophical 
Anthropology. Taylor must provide an alternative account of modernity should he 
accomplish the goal ofterminating the perpetuation of anti-religious negative narratives in 
modem Western Culture. The narrative of modernity Taylor presents in A Secular Age thus 
represents the culmination of the third task of Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology. 
This narrative is constructed to satisfy two distinct, though related goals: the first is 
to explain how the belief in God became an option in the modem age; and the second is to 
demonstrate that religion is still relevant in modernity. Both goals serve to disprove the 
fundamental c1aims of anti-religious negative narratives. In constructing this narrative, 
Taylor adheres to a hermeneutical approach outlined in Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences. In this text, Taylor contends that human practices and culture is only 
comprehensible through the analysis of categories ofhuman self-understanding. 
Taylor proposes that the human sciences are better served by a hermeneutical 
reading ofhuman practices, which involves the interpretation ofhuman conceptions of 
selfhood and moral frameworks of meaning. He argues that the natural sciences are 
123 Taylor, A Secu/ar Age, 548. 
124 Ibid., 573. 
incapable of adequately comprehending humanity, because human beings are self-
interpreting animaIs. 
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Modernity is a human construction: an amalgam ofhuman practices that have 
significance and meaning to the human beings who engage in them. Taylor explains that a 
practice refers to "any stable configuration of shared activity, whose shape is defined by a 
certain pattern of dos and don'ts.,,125 He explains that our understanding of agency, 
selfhood, and morality are embedded in these practices; they are a reflection of everything 
which constitutes a human being. Taylor writes: 
"What we see in human history is ranges ofhuman practices that are both at once, that is, 
material practices carried out by human beings in space and time, and very often coercively 
maintained, and at the same time, self-conceptions, modes of understanding. These are often 
inseparable [ ... ] just because the self-understandings are the essential condition of the practice 
making the sense that it does to the participants. Because human practices are the kind of thing 
that makes sense, certain ide as are internai to them; one cannot distinguish the two in order to 
ask the question Which causes which?,,126 
Taylor argues that modem human practices are incomprehensible as abstractions. He 
explains that "implicit in these [modem] practices is a certain vision of the agent and his 
relation to others and to society;" moreover, "these practices require that one's actions and 
relations be seen in the light ofthis picture and the accompanying norms,,127, which are 
conveyed through moral frameworks. 128 Without a clear view of the moral frameworks that 
motivate people to engage in the specifie practices which constitute modernity, the 
significance and purpose of these practices is incomprehensible. Comprehending modernity 
thus requires the understanding of modem moral frameworks and the modem conception of 
human agency and selfhood. 
125 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 204. 
126 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 31-32. 
127 Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2,35. 
128 Taylor writes: "The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are notjust in the minds of the actors 
but are out there in the practices themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual 
actions, but which are essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action [ ... ] These must be the common 
property of the society before there can be any question of anyone entering into negotiation or not. Hence they 
are not subjective meanings, the property of one or sorne individuals, but rather inter-subjective meanings, 
which are constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and act" Taylor, Philosophy 
and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2,36. 
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For Taylor, the human identity is a product ofits environment in all dimensions: 
moral, physical, social, imaginary, and structural. Taylor wams that explaining how the 
modem self originated is a challenging task, which involves an analysis of each ofthese 
dimensions. 129 However, Taylor contends that the modem self can be comprehended 
through the moral frameworks that motivate human agency. A person' s sense of self, or 
identity, is a reflection of the moral dimension oftheir environment. This dimension, 
Taylor proposes, may be subjected to historical analysis. Taylor writes: "One has to 
understand people's self-interpretations and their visions of the good, if one is to explain 
how they arise; but the second task can't be collapsed into the first, even as the first can't 
be elided in favour of the second.,,130 As Michael L. Morgan remarks, explaining the moral 
motivations of the selfrequires situating the modem identity and the understanding of 
human agency within the historical and religious development of moral fnimeworks. 131 To 
understand modemity the historical evolution ofboth moral frameworks and the concept of 
a human agent must be explored. 
Taylor's hermeneutical approach means that the reasons for the continued 
prevalence of religion in modemity must be located within the modem conception of 
human agency and modem moral frameworks. Taylor's historical narrative ofmodemity 
thus takes the form of an analysis of the changing conception ofhuman agency. By 
demonstrating that the modem identity, though constituted by an immanent frame is not 
innately closed to the transcendent, Taylor establishes religion as a legitimate modem 
practice. 
1.5 Conclusion: Personal Frameworks and the Third Task of Ph ilosophical 
Anthropology 
In A Secular Age, Taylor describes his narrative as motivated by the polemic against 
anti-religious negative narratives. This polemic is a continuation of Taylor's polemic 
129 Taylor writes: "The modern identity arose because changes in the self-understandings connected with a 
wide range ofpractices -religious, political, economic, familial, intellectual, artistic - converged and 
reinforced each other to produce it". Taylor, Sources of the Self, 206 
130 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 204. 
131 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age ofPluralism: the philosophy of 
Charles Taylor in question,49. 
against naturalist theory, which originates in his earliest work. Taylor thereby draws on 
the totality ofhis fi ft y year career in producing A Secular Age, even reprinting large 
sections of previously pub li shed works as whole chapters. 
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A Secular Age differs from Taylor's other works in that his personal agenda -the 
defence of religious belief in modemity - is c1early elucidated. Taylor' s entire narrative is 
structured so as to defend the relevance of religion and spirituality. He presents c10sed 
moral frameworks as the cause of social instability and religious conflict in the modem 
world, generally ignoring the role of ardent theists and proponents of orthodox religion in 
the conflict. 
A Secular Age contributes to Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology project by 
offering a causal, diachronic explanation of modemity. As such, A Secular Age bares the 
traces of Taylor's own personal moral framework. In the foHowing chapters, l shaH 
therefore conduct a herrneneutical interpretation of this narrative - beginning with his 
terrninology - to reveal Taylor's personal moral vision. 
CHAPTER2 
Taylor's Polemic and the Definition of Secularity and Religion 
ln this chapter, 1 will examine Taylor's definitions of the terms "secularization", 
"secular", "secularity", and "religion" in Source of the Self, Modern Social Imaginaries, 
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Varieties of Religion Today, and A Secular Age. 1 will demonstrate that Taylor's choice of 
vocabulary and his definitions are motivated by the polemics against naturalist theories and 
anti-religious negative narratives. 132 Moreover, 1 will argue that Taylor constructs both 
substantive and functional definitions of each term to thoroughly disprove the anti-religious 
negative narratives on an etymologicallevel. l33 
ln A Secular Age, Taylor relies on a specifie terminology to convince the reader of 
his narrative ofmodemity. He challenges the implicit understandings of "secularization", 
"secular", and "secularity" ·often used by anti-religious negative narratives to present the 
dec1ine of religion as inevitable and normal. Taylor maintains that both substantive and 
functional definitions are necessary to understand these four terms; however, mainstream 
negative narratives of modemity frequently ignore substantive definitions aH together. 
Taylor argues that the substantive definitions of these four terms indicate that the meaning 
ofbelief and the conditions ofbeliefhave changed over time. The significance of religious 
belief is not static as functional definitions of these terms would suggest. The plurality of 
religious behaviour and practice in modemity is a direct consequence of such historical 
changes. 
Taylor c1aims that a single definition of religion is insufficient to explain the 
variety ofreligious behaviour. He therefore presents eight distinct forms of religion, which 
reflect the changing social and epistemic condition ofhuman beings. The plurality of the 
132 1 will not use the concepts of "anti-religious narratives" and "naturalist theories" interchangeably. 
Naturalist explanations of modernity are almost aIl anti-religious in Taylor's view because they obscure the 
significance of religion and they ignore the impact of any expression of meaning on human behaviour and 
society. Taylor's concern is the proposition that the ability to live without religion has always been a 
possibility for humanity. According to Taylor this assertion is fa Ise - the ability to live a full and functional 
life without religion is a modern phenomenon and must be understood within the scope and limits of western 
modern moral frameworks. 
133 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 22-23; Taylor, A Secu/ar Age, 549. 
modem religious context is reflected in the multiple definitions of religion Taylor 
presents in A Secular Age. 
2.1 Theories of Secularization 
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In Sources of the Self, Taylor expresses discomfort with the definition and usage of 
the term "secularization" in the hum an sciences. According to Taylor, secularization should 
explain how modem society has "moved from a horizon in which belief in God in sorne 
form was virtually unchallengeable to our present predicament in which theism is one 
option among others.,,134 However, the common definition of secularization as the decline 
or regression of religious faith overlooks this shift. According to Taylor, while this 
understanding of secularization is commonl y considered an explanation of modemity, "to 
invoke secularization here is just to re-describe the problem, not to offer an answer.,,135 
Taylor maintains that secularization is a feature of modemity; however, theories of 
secularization only account for the shift in the condition ofbelief, and thus should not be 
considered causal explanations of the modem age. 
Taylor contests the validity of the theories of secularization, which attribute a 
decline in religious faith to the industrial revolution, the rise of scientific rationalism, and 
technological advancements of the late 17th century.136 Taylor maintains that the proposed 
causal connection between these factors and the regression of religion in modemity is 
unsubstantiated. 137 Rather than offer his own explanation of secularization, Taylor 
addresses the social and moral changes to which these theories allude: the shift in the 
condition ofbelief. 
In A Secular Age, Taylor furthers the analysis of secularization. He again contests 
the association between secularization theory and explanations of modemity. Taylor also 
discredits the propositions of "mainstream secularization theory," which posits the decline, 
134 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 401. 
135 Taylor is also referring to the shift in the condition ofbelief in modemity. Ibid., 309-310. 
136 Ibid., 432. 
137 Ibid., 310. 
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or disappearance of religion, as the end result of the process of secularization. 138 The 
proposition of main stream secularization theory is widely accepted as fact in modern 
Western society. Taylor demonstrates that these theories are a form of negative narrative; 
they disregard the actual effects of secularization of society, prematurely dec1aring the end 
of religion. Taylor argues that mainstream secularization theory neglects to validate their 
c1aims with evidence, focusing solely on identifying the historical causes of the proposed 
dec1ine of religion. 139 Taylor writes: "a di fficu ltY in this whole discussion is that there is 
sorne unc1arity as to what exactly the 'secularization' thesis amounts tO.,,140 According to 
Taylor, mainstream secularization theory lacks substantive understanding of the process of 
secularization. Mainstream secularization theory concentra tes on the function of 
secularization in modernity, disregarding what secularization actually is. Mainstream 
secularization theory proposes that religious faith and practice has dec1ined in the modern 
age as a result of secularization, or described differently, that religious faith is undergoing a 
regression in modernity because there has been a dec1ine in religion. Evidently such a 
proposition is unintelligible; Taylor therefore maintains that proponents ofmainstream 
secularization theory presuppose that modernity is incompatible with religious faith. He 
writes: "The accusation thrown at orthodox theorists is that they must somehow believe that 
these modern developments ofthemselves undermine belief, or make it harder; rather than 
seeing that the new structures indeed, undermine old forms, but leave open the possibility 
ofnew forms which can flourish.,,141 Taylor argues that many examples ofreligious, 
industrialized, and scientifically advanced countries can be found in existence today. 
Moreover, the factors credited with generating secularization were historically motivated 
by religion: the expansion of capitalism and the industrialization of European society were 
encouraged by Protestant ethics, and the development of the natural sciences was inspired 
by the religious desire to know and understand God's creation. 
138 Taylor writes: "The basic insight underlying the 'orthodox' modes of theory in this dornain is that 
'rnodemity' (in sorne sense) tends to repress or reduce 'religion' (in sorne sense)." Taylor, A Secu/ar Age, 
429. 
139 See: Taylor, A Secu/ar Age, 431-433 
140 Ibid., 431. 
141 Ibid., 432. 
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According to Taylor, disregarding the possible ways religion can prosper in 
modernity requires the adoption of a narrow and limited understanding of religion, which is 
incongruent with history and the present context. Taylor insists that before speculating 
about the causes ofreligion's decline, one must first demonstrate that such an event has 
occurred. Academic consensus that religion willlikely be rejected by modem western 
society in the future, Taylor maintains, does not justify the claims of mainstream 
secularization theoryl42. He notes that if the definition of religion is broadened to "include a 
wide range of spiritual and semi-spiritual betiefs; or ifyou cast your net even wider and 
think of someone's religion as the shape oftheir ultimate concern, then indeed, one can 
make a case that religion 1S as present as ever.,,143 Taylor maintains that the primary step in 
developing a theory of secularization is to identify the contemporary changes in the 
condition ofbelief; once the substantive understanding of secularization is determined, it is 
possible to suggest the sources ofthese changes. Mainstream secularization theory 
incorrectly assumes certain changes in the religious environment have occurred without 
verifying their presumptions. 
Taylor attempts to identify the changes in religious belief that are evident in 
modernity. He isolates the two major components oftraditional Christian belief, which he 
identifies as: (l) the belief in a supra-hum an power, and (2) the belief in personal and 
societal caUs to transformation, which involves moving beyond purely immanent concerns 
such as human flourishing. The latter belief is also known as the transformation 
perspective. 144 Taylor reveals that both components were strongly emphasized in pre-
Reformation Christian culture. In these cultures, the spiritual and mundane needs of the 
society were met by two separate vocational classes that were hierarchicaUy related. 145 Lay 
members of society were expected to maintain a belief in God, whereas the clergy were 
additionally responsible for responding to God's caU to transformation. 
142Taylor does not identify the so-called 'experts' and 'academics' that support Mainstream Secularization 
Theory. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 437. 
143 Taylor, A Secular Age, 427. 
144 Ibid., 430. 
145 To ensure the spiritual weIlbeing of aIl members of society, sorne individuals would devote their entire 
lives, as ascetics, to the calI to transfonn, and eschew the cornrnon pleasures of life. The physical, 
reproductive, and economic needs of the community were met by the lait y, who could not afford to devote 
their lives exclusively to religious practice. 
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The Refonnation equalized the social hierarchy by affinning ordinary life as the 
sole locus of Christian worship and fulfilment. 146 This new affinnation meant that those 
occupied solely with the call to transfonn were no longer needed; one could experience the 
pleasures of ordinary life, in moderation, while devoting oneself fully to God and God's 
purposes.147 Taylor notes that though the Refonnation intended to "fight back the demands 
of the 'world', and then make it over [ ... ] [the] irony is that it somehow turned into 
something quite different; in another, rather different sense, the 'world' won after all.,,148 In 
sanctifying ordinary life, refonned Christianity posited hum an flourishing as the highest 
goOd. 149 Any pursuit of a goal beyond that of hum an flourishing was negated. 
The development of atheistic and agnostic interpretations of the Refonnation 
perspective during the l8 th and 19th centuries, which separated the call to transfonnation 
from the notion ofhuman flourishing, initiated a rift in society. On one side of the divide 
were persons who continued to adhere to the transfonnation perspective, while on the other 
were individuals who affinned an exc1usively humanist interpretation ofhuman 
flourishing. 150 According to Taylor, the latter group is much stronger in the modern age. He 
therefore suggests "zero[ing] in on the following proposition as the heart of 
'secularization': modernity has led to a dec1ine in the transfonnation perspective.,,151 Taylor 
proposes that the belief in God has remained prevalent in the modern age, while the 
transfonnative component of Christian faith has diminished in significance. He thus 
contends that though the focus of Christian faith has shifted towards human flourishing, 
this is not representative of a dec1ine in religion. 
Taylor's definition is c1early substantive: it focuses on what secularization is, as 
opposed to the function of secularization. According to Taylor, secularization is a product 
of a shift in moral frameworks initiated by the Christian Refonnation, not the result of 
scientific development or intellectual maturation. Instead of correcting the mainstream 
146 Taylor, A Secular Age, 144. 
147 Ibid., 152. 
148 Ibid., 158. 
149 Taylor writes: "[ ... ] a new relation to God, as designer [ ... ] will in fact tum out to be dispensable, because 
the Design underlying the moral order can be se en as directed to ordinary human flourishing" Ibid., 157. 
150 Ibid., 430-431. 
151 Ibid., 431. 
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secularization theory, Taylor constructs a new narrative that begins with the protestant 
Reformation. He calls this narrative "the Reform Master Narrative (RrvIN)", noting that, in 
conjunction with changes in theoretical understandings of the world, "RMN is c1early 
important, and obviously provided the framework for eighteenth-century break-out" 1 52 that 
made belief in God no longer absolute. The Reform Master Narrative demonstrates how the 
focus of religion may change without causing a loss offaith or a regression ofbelief. To 
best describe Taylor's point, 1 propose the following analogy. Ifwe wanted to understand 
how religion had changed in the Reformation, and we only examined the traditionalloci of 
religious life - the monastery and church - then we would fail to notice all the religious 
activity now taking place in the home. Consequently, we would argue for a dec1ine in faith 
or practice. The mainstream secularization theory demonstrates a similar approach to the 
study of religion - employing antiquated information in the search for modem religious 
behaviour. The mainstream secularization theory' s definition of secularization will not 
reveal the new modes of religious life in modemity; it will only reveal empty monasteries. 
Taylor avoids using the word secularization to describe modemity or society in A 
Secular Age; favouring instead the term 'secularity'. The general understanding of 
secularization is functional, and detracts from the substantive definition Taylor provides. 
Without a commonly shared substantive understanding of secularization, explanations of 
modemity through secularization risk incomprehension. As Taylor's own substantive 
definition reveals, secularization is too specific a phenomenon to properly account for all 
aspects ofmodemity, or even the role of religion in society. For these reasons, 1 contend 
that Taylor avoids mentioning secularization in his description of modemity in A Secular 
Age and instead uses the term 'secularity', which do es not have the same functional 
connotations as secularization. Before tuming to his understanding of "secularity", it is 
necessary to first examine his definitions of "secular." 
2.2 Definitions of Secular 
In A Secular Age, Taylor reveals that he has struggled between using the terms 
"secular" and "secularity" to describe modemity. He writes: "It seems obvious before 
152 Taylor, A Secular Age, 774. 
you start thinking about it, but as soon as you do, all sorts ofproblems arise.,,153 The 
tenn "secular" is often used as a synonym for irreligious. The historical origins of the 
tenn, however, illustrate the irony of such definitions. The tenn "secular" did not 
originate from a perspective opposed to religion; rather, the word was coined by early 
Christians to describe a dimension of time. As Taylor explains, the word secular derives 
from the Latin word saeculum, which means age or century. In early Christianity, 
saeculum was used to refer to ordinary, profane time, as opposed to, sacred, or etemal, 
time. 154 These two temporal dimensions were seen as distinct, yet intimately connected 
and complementary. The lait y of Christian society was occupied with the concems of 
secular time: birth, death, marriage, maturity, etc. At certain times of the year, however, 
contact with higher time was critical for the renewal of social hannony and cohesion: 
Saint's Days, feasts, Camival, Christmas. 155 The tenn "secular" was also used to 
c1assify religious vocations ultimately concemed with matters of profane time; the 
secular c1ergy, for instance, were religious individuals who served the quotidian needs of 
villages and peasants. Other c1ergy, such as monks, nuns and the ecc1esiastical c1ergy, 
were concemed with higher time. 156 
Taylor explains that he uses the tenn "secular" in his positive narrative, despite 
the anti-religious connotations of the tenn, "because it marks in its very etymology what 
is at stake in this context, which has something to do with the way human society 
inhabits time.,,157 For Taylor, the tenn "secular" refers to a change in the time-
consciousness ofmodem society.158 Modem persons do not understand society as 
needing to be renewed through sorne common action or ritual connected to an event 
marked by sacred time. This change is visible in the modem celebration of Christmas, 
Mardi-Gras, and Easter; they are no longer holy days, marked by acts of collective 
ritual, but commercial holidays, observed by families, individuals, or communities, but 
not society as a whole. 
153 Taylor, A Secular Age. 14-15. 
154Ibid., 54. 
155 Ibid.,,45-54; 58. 
156 Ibid., 61-62. 
157 Ibid., 192. 
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158 Taylor's reasoning sustains our previous argument that he abandoned the term "secularization" because it 
can only be made to stand for an epistemic loss. 
According to Taylor, this change in the common understanding of society and 
time can be attributed to the development of the public sphere in the eighteenth century. 
The public sphere is a communal space, grounding in common action and agency, 
existing purely in secular time, wholly independent from transcendent powers. 159 This 
notion of the public sphere has permanently altered the conception oftime for modem 
persons. The foundation of modem society is attributed to the public sphere; communal 
rituals and festivals corinected to higher time have been rendered irrelevant to the 
continuation of society. 
Taylor's proposition that the term secular signifies a shift in the time-
consciousness of Western society represents a substantive definition. However, he also 
provides a functional definition in his discussion of the public sphere. Evidently, the 
development of the public sphere has displaced the religious connotations oftime, 
replacing etemal time exclusively with secular time in the collective social imaginary. 
Taylor suggests that the connection between higher time and modem society has been 
irrevocably severed. Future societies will always be grounded in the public sphere and 
thus in secular time. For Taylor, this shi ft marks an epistemic gain, rather than a loss. He 
writes: "Foundations are now seen to be common actions in profane time, ontically on 
the same footing with all other such actions, even though they may be given a special 
authoritative status in our national narrative or our legal system.,,160 According to 
Taylor, being secular signifies the possibility of participating in all aspects of society, 
and sustaining a complete moral framework of meaning, without reference to God or the 
transcendent; this possibility was not available to human beings before the hegemony of 
secular time, and the recognition of immanent moral goods. 161 Taylor's assessment of 
the practical implications of the shift to secular time represents a functional definition of 
the term "secular." 
159 Taylor, A Secular Age, 194-195. 
160 Taylor, Modern Sociallmaginaries, 187. 
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161 Taylor writes: "A secular age is one in which the eclipse of aIl goals beyond human flourishing becomes 
conceivable; or better, it faIls within the range of an imaginable life for masses of people." Taylor, A Secular 
Age, 19. 
2.3 Three Forms of Secularity 
For Taylor, the description of modernity as secular is insufficient, as this term 
does not address the contemporary spiritual and moral condition of Western society. To 
address this condition, Taylor employs the term "secularity". Taylor identifies three 
distinct meanings associated with secularity. To differentiate between the multiple 
understandings of secularities, he identifies each of them with a number: "secularity 1 ," 
"secularity 2." and "secularity 3." 162 The definitions of secularity 1" and "secularity 2" 
are often used by the anti-religious negative narratives. Indeed, they reflect these 
narratives' basic proposaIs about the role of religion in the modem age. Taylor' s 
definition of secularity, "secularity 3," refutes both secularities 1 and 2 by offering, in 
Taylor's estimation, a more accurate account of the current condition ofbelief. From 
this point onwards, "secularity 3" will simply be referred to as secularity. 
2.3.1 Secularity 1 
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According to Taylor, "secularity 1" refers to the removal of, or absence of 
references to God, or transcendence, from the public sphere. 163 He notes that this definition 
is the most prevalent in the human sciences. As a description of the modem age, Taylor 
concedes that this definition is relevant in specific contexts, such as France or Turkey, 
though it is altogether inaccurate in the United States and the United Kingdom. During the 
past century, many western countries have attempted to increase the separation between 
religion and the state. Modem society, he writes, is experiencing "the end of an era when 
political authority, as well as other metatopical common agencies are inconceivable without 
reference to God or higher time.,,164 Religion, however, remains active in the public sphere, 
influencing politics and social causes. 165 Taylor suggests that "secularity 1" is unable to 
162 Taylor, A Secular Age, 1-4. 
163 Ibid., 2. 
164 Ibid., 187. 
165 Ibid., 186. 
consider the continued presence of God in public life,166 as it ignores the new fonns of 
spirituality and religious behaviour which take place outside of Churches. 167 
2.3.2 Secularity 2 
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Like "secularity l," "secularity 2" proposes a description of the modem religious 
condition, without considering the contemporary context of religion. According to Taylor, 
"secularity 2" "consists in the falling off of religious belief and practice, in people turning 
away from God, and no longer going to Church." 168 Taylor maintains that the applicability 
of this definition in the modem western world is quite limited; in sorne countries of 
Western Europe, where references to God still occur in the public realm, a dec1ine in 
religious faith and practice is demonstrable. 169 However, Taylor warns that equating a 
waning belief in supernatural agencies, or a drop in church attendance, with a general 
dec1ine in the belief in God or the transcendent is somewhat of an exaggeration. 170 
2.3.3 Secularity 3 
Taylor contends that an appropriate definition of secularity must consider the place 
of religion in modernity, as well as the moral orientation of society and the modem sense of 
identity. He notes that the significance ofbeliefhas drastically changed in the modem era, 
such that new fonns ofbelief no longer resemble their predecessors. According to Taylor, 
secularity describes "a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and 
indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and 
frequently not the easiest to embrace.,,171 "Secularity 3" can best be understood as the 
conditions of the possibility ofbelief in the modem era, which in turn affects the ways in 
which modem persons experience and engage in religion. Understanding the changes which 
166 Taylor, A Secular Age, 186. 
167 Ibid., 193 
168 Ibid., 2. 
169Ibid., 2. 
170 Taylor provides the example of a doctor who is motivated by her faith, yet does not advise her patients to 
touch a relie. He writes: the "mistake in this latter case [ ... lis to identify secu1arization with disenchantment." 
Ibid.,426. 
171 Ibid., 3. 
have contributed to the modem condition ofbelief, Taylor suggests, wi11lead to a 
comprehension of the role of religion in modemity.172 
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Modem society no longer considers belief in God as necessary to their sense of self 
or morality. Individuals can choose between unbelieving, c10sed frameworks, or open, even 
theistic frameworks of morality. The availability and accessibility of a plurality of 
frameworks is one of the causal factors ofmodem secularity.173 Taylor contends, however, 
that secularity is not the product of a linear path, rather, the conditions which brought about 
secularity are diverse and numerous. Taylor's contention contradicts the story proposed by 
anti-religious negative narratives, which suggest that "secularity 1" is an inevitable 
condition, resulting from scientific and technological progress. 
Taylor suggests that one factor which contributed to secularity was the exponential 
increase in moral frameworks that began in the lSth century and continues to this day. He 
caUs this increase "the nova-effect.,,174 According to Taylor, "we are now living in a 
spiritual super-nova, a kind of gaUoping pluralism on the spiritual plane.,,175 Exposure to 
these multiple frameworks has abolished naive belief. Modem persons are aU aware that 
moral/spiritual options exist, and therefore cannot use ignorance to protect their beliefs 
from outside influence. 176 As Taylor explains: 
"The fact is that this kind of multiplicity of faiths has little effect as long as it is neutralized by the 
sense that being like them is not really an option for me. [ ... ] [This] changes when through increased 
contact, interchange, even perhaps intermarriage, the other becomes more and more like me, in 
everything el se but faith: same activities, professions, opinions, tastes, etc. Then the issue posed by 
d ·ffi b .. h d h ?"I77 1 erence ecomes more InSistent: w y my way, an not ers. 
The nova-effect is self-sustaining in the modem age. Secularity preserves the frameworks 
and moral orders that effectively prevent the nova from coUapsing; the notion that belief 
and unbelief are equaUy valid positions prevents a single framework from gaining 
172 Taylor, A Secular Age, 423. 
173 The ability to choose between a variety of moral/spiritual positions, was once a luxury possible only for 
the elite class, who were exposed through travel and education to a vast web of interlocutors. In the latter half 
of the twentieth century, immigration and education extended thispossibility to the masses. See: Ibid., 299. 
174 Ibid., 299. 
175 Ibid., 300. 
176 Ibid., 304. 
177 Ibid., 304. 
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hegemony. Seeularity thus represents a meta-framework ofmeaning: a framework that 
makes sense ofthe human agent's relationship to other frameworks. Seen from this angle, 
Taylor' s definition of seeularity is both substantive and functional. It describes what 
secularity is - the condition of belief in society - and how it funetions in society-
determines the parameters for aU modern moral frameworks -. 
In identifying seeularity as the condition ofbelief in modernity and positing it as a 
meta-framework, Taylor establishes epistemic circumstances necessary for artieulating a 
positive narrative ofmodernity. Frameworks are affirmations ofwhat human beings hold as 
valuable, meaningful, or good, and as such they do not articulate epistemic absences or 
losses. In defining secularity as meta-framework, Taylor avoids employing the negative 
dialogue of the anti-religious negative narratives. Secularity may never be absent of 
meaning, nor of significance. The shift to a seeular age must therefore be explained through 
epistemic gains. Without substantive and functional explanations of secularity, Taylor 
demonstrates that the anti-religious negative narratives are incapable of explaining 
secularity and the religious condition ofmodernity. Aceepting Taylor's definition of 
seeularity thus engages the reader in Taylor's projeet of eonstrueting a positive narrative. 
2.4 Taylor's Varieties of Religion 
An three forms of secularity, Taylor notes, deseribe the perceived place of religion 
in modern society. Contrary to the seeularist, anti-religious assertion that religion has no 
meaning in modernity, this commonality demonstrates that what it means to be seeular is 
ineomprehensible without referenee to religion. But what is religion? Its meaning is at onee 
familiar and diffieult to articulate. As Taylor demonstrates, the substantive definition of 
religion is uneertain. Does religion refer only to historie traditions or the belief in 
supernatural beings; eould unorganized spiritual betiefs and praetiees not also be under the 
heading of religion? 178 
Taylor ad dresses this problem ofmultiplieity in A Secular Age by not reducing the 
definition of religion to a single understanding. Rather, Taylor presents two distinct models 
178 Taylor, A Secular Age, 427. 
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of religion, the Durkheimian model and the Axial model, in addition to a third definition 
of religion that satisfies his pUl-pose of constructing a positive narrative of modemity. Note 
that these models were first introduced in Varieties of Religion Today and Modern Social 
Imaginaries, and that Taylor chose to include both in A Secular Age without combining 
them into a single model. 
2.4.1 "Durkheimian " Model of Religion 
In Varieties of Religious Experience, Taylor introduces four social forms based on 
Emile Durkheim' s definition of religion, 179 which are characterized by their orientation to 
religion. He labels these forms: "paleo-Durkheimian"; "Durkheimian"; "neo-Durkheimian" 
and "post-Durkheimian". In each ofthese social forms/ 80 the function ofreligion is 
distinct, and a different understanding of religion may be inferred. 
The paleo-Durkheimian social form was most prevalent in Catholic states during the 
enchanted era of the middle ages. This form is characterized by "a sense of ontic 
dependence of the state on God and higher times.,,181 The religion of the paleo-Durkheiman 
societies is not centred on the church so much as on society as a whole. Religion is seen as 
preceding organized authority; thus, collective action and religious engagement of society 
affects the flow of divine power on which alliife is dependent. 182 
In contrast, with the Durkheimian social form everyone must belong to a singular 
Church, which wields all authority in matters of state, religion, and society.183 In 
Durkheimian religion the Church mediates divine power, restricting the flow such that "the 
Church alone retains the role of guide in a society otherwise based on complementary 
equality." 184 As with the paleo-Durkheimian social form, the Durkheimian social form is 
179 Durkheim: "A religion is a unified system ofbeliefs and practices relative to sacred things - i.e. things set 
apart & forbidden -, beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community called a Church, all 
those who adhere to them." See: Durkheim, Emile. Readingsfrom Emile Durkheim. Ed. Kenneth Thompson. 
(New York: Routledge, 2004) 300. 
180 Taylor also refers to social forms as "dispensations". Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today. 75. 
181 Taylor, A Secular Age. 76. 
182 Ibid., 438. 
183 Taylor, A Secular Age. 442; Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today. 75. 
184 Taylor, A Secular Age. 442 
most prevalent in Catholic, or Orthodox states, that only recognize the authority of a 
single church. 
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The principle of denominationalism presents a direct challenge to the Durkheimian 
social form and forms the basis of the neo-Durkheimian social form in which "God is 
present because it is his Design around which society is organized.,,185 In this social form, 
religious sentiment is central to political identity; however, state authority remains 
independent from religious authority. Neither a social sacred, nor a singular church that 
must be followed exists. Rather, society works unaided bydivine power to bring about 
God's design. In these societies, the legal and ethical systems are often inspired or based on 
religious mores; however, they are given independent justification. 186 The best example of 
this society would be the United States of America, where personal faith is an integral 
aspect of the American identity. 
The post-Durkheimian social form exaggerates the notion ofindividualism 
encouraged by the principle of denominationalism. 187 In this social form, religion is viewed 
as a personal choice that has little to do with the social cohesion of the state. Taylor 
hypothesizes that the post-Durkheimian social form represents a dramatic departure in 
terms of the relationship between religion and society. Religion is no longer seen as 
something significant to the maintenance, structure, or identity of society. 188 He argues that 
in certain cases this social form can have a destabilizing effect on the other Durkheimian 
dispensations. 189 
2.4.2 Functions of the Durkheimian Model 
Taylor discusses the various Durkheimian social forms at length in Varieties of 
Religion Today, as well as A Secular Age, and yet, he c1early resists associating modemity 
with one of the four, as he insists that they are all still existent. What then is the purpose of 
the Durkheimian model? l contend that the Durkheimian model serves to reinforce the 
185 Taylor, A Secular Age, 455; 75-77. 
186 Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today, 79. 
187 Taylor, A Secular Age. 486-487. 
188 Ibid., 490. 
189 Ibid., 492. 
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plurality of religion and social reality in modemity. The geographical and cultural area 
identified as the modem world by Taylor does not apply to a single homogeneous society. 
Rather, modem society consists of numerous countries, nationalities, religious heritages, 
etc. Taylor insists that all four Durkheimian social forms are present in this broad North 
Atlantic society. 
In positing four such social forrns, Taylor once again attacks the foundations of 
unilinear, secularist narratives ofmodemity which only seem to recognize the post-
Durkheimian social form as compatible with modemity. These narratives suggest that given 
enough time, everyone would abandon religious attachments, identities, and morals to forrn 
a secular humanist nation, and thus, humanity will be forever liberated from 
"claustrophobie relations, involving excessive control and invidious distinctions." 190 
According to Taylor, these narratives interpret the post-Durkheimian destabilizing effect as 
a natural progression. He writes: 
"So the story of the rise of modern social spaces doesn't need to be given an anti-religious spin. 
But there are motivations to go this way; and like any spin, we can easily see how the wide 
acceptance of one such, and the relegation of religion which this involves, could harden into a 
'picture', which appears obvious and uncha11engeable. The point of tracing this fact of the 
narrative ofmodernity is that [ ... ] [it] shows how once a secularist spin has been taken, this anti-
religious story has a11 the force and moral power which attach to the inauguration ofthese 
spaces of citizen sociability.,,191 
In spinning the rise of the post-Durkheimian social form, the authors ofthis narrative 
portray religion as corrupting to society. Any connection between the religion and society is 
considered potentially damaging. Taylor argues, however, that the connection between 
religion and society will not spontaneously disappear. Until the 1960's, the Durkheimian 
social form was prevalent in Quebec and continues to arouse sentiment. Furtherrnore, 
United States may be considered a neo-Durkheimian social fotm, as the idea of electing an 
atheist president remains inconceivable for many. Taylor' s contents that for many people 
religion is still a fundamental part of modem society even in secular environments. l92 The 
spun, secularist narratives fail to consider the experiences of communities that exhibit 
190 Taylor, A Secular Age, 575 
191 Ibid., 579 
192 Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today, 112. 
Durkheimian or neo-Durkheimian social forms; denying these communities a legitimate 
place within modemity. 
2.4.3 Axial Religions 
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In Modern Social Imaginaries~ and again in A Secular Age, Taylor introduces a 
second method of classifying religion loosely based on Karl Jaspers' notion of the "Axial 
Age.,,193 The Axial Age refers to the last millennium B.C.E., a period when many founders 
of the CUITent world religions and notable ancient philosophers lived; including Siddhartha, 
Socrates, the Hebrew prophets, and Confucius. 194 According to Taylor, the innovation 
attributed to Axial religions is the conception of a good "higher" than human flourishing, 
namely salvation, as the ultimate goal ofhumankind. 195 Taylor refers to the Axial period as 
a revolution: the beginning of the "Great Disembedding" for pre-Axial religions. He argues 
that this disembedding reaches a conclusion with the development of post-Axial 
religions. 196 
In this section, 1 shall examine the three religions of the axial model, beginning 
with a brief explanation of the concepts of embeddedness and disembeddedness. 1 shall 
then summarize Taylor's description ofthese religions and compare the Axial and 
Durkheimian models. Finally, 1 will explore how this model may be used to understand 
Taylor' s third definition of religion. 
2.4.4 Embedding versus Disembedding 
Taylor introduces the concept of embeddedness in Modern Social Imaginaries and 
reprises the subject in A Secular Age. Taylor refers to these dimensions of embeddedness as 
society, cosmos, and existing reality. 1 have equated these dimensions with social, physical, 
and moral spaces to better explain Taylor's categories of embedding. 
193 Taylor, A Secular Age, 762. 
194 Ibid., 151. 
195 Ibid., 152. 
196 Ibid., 146. 
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The notion of embedding refers to the way in which human beings imagine 
themselves as existing and acting within social, physical, and moral spaces. An embedded 
agent is one whose entire agency is ontically dependent on their imagined reality. Taylor 
explains: "what l'm calling [ ... ] embeddedness is thus partly an identity thing. From the 
standpoint of the individual's sense of self, it means the inability to imagine oneself outside 
a certain matrix.,,197 A socially embedded agent understands their every action as having an 
effect on the whole of society, and the actions of society to have a direct effect on them. In 
other words, they only have meaning as a selfwithin a society. In contrast, a disembedded 
agent is one whose agency is not ontically dependent on society; they understand 
themselves to be an individual, distinct from the society to which they belong. 
Similarly, to be embedded in physical space implies that the meaning ofhuman 
agency is connected to the definition ofthis space. Taylor refers to the physical space 
inhabited by an embedded agent uniquely as the "cosmos". For him, "cosmos" is a 
generalized term that refers to the idea of a physical reality imbued with an ontically 
independent meaning; the "cosmos" do es not signify a specifie conception of the world. 198 
To be disembedded from this dimension would be to understand the human agent as 
occupying an empty universe, which does not define or limit their actions in any 
meaningful way. 
The final dimension of embeddedness is a little more difficult to grasp. Taylor 
labels this dimensions "embedding in existing reality," by which he means that these 
individuals find the fullness oflife in the pursuit ofhuman flourishing, or ordinary life. 
Taylor notes that this form of embedding does not preclude the idea that God has other 
goals for humanity. Indeed, the embedded agent may have a sense that God does not have 
their best interests at heart. Persons embedded in existing reality have no ability to attain 
these other goals through their own means; their highest achievable good is an immanent 
good, and their agency is restricted to existing reality. Persons disembedded from existing 
reality consider a transcendent good as the highest achievable good; their agency is not 
197 Taylor, Modern Sociallmaginaries, 55; Taylor, A Secular Age, 149-150. 
198 Taylor writes: "We can even say that sorne features of the world, an animal or plant species, for instance, 
is central to the identity of a group. If may even be that a particular geographical terrain is essential to our 
religious life" Taylor, A Secular Age, 150. 
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restricted to existing reality as they possess the capacity to achieve transcendent goals. 
ln the following sections 1 will explore how Taylor uses these dimensions of embeddedness 
to form his Axial mode1 of religion, and 1 will demonstrate that this model is necessary to 
understand Taylor's definition ofre1igion that he advances inA Secular Age. 
2.4.5 Pre-Axial Religion 
Pre-Axial religions are characterized by their embedding of the human agent in each 
of the three dimensions of society, the cosmos, and existing reality.199 Taylor explains that 
the pre-Axial person is incapable of seeing himself as a self that is separate from the society 
to which they belong. God relates to humankind through society, making collective ritual 
an important part of religious life. Another aspect of this religious life is the significance of 
the physicallandscape. In pre-Axial religions the entire cosmos is seen as imbued with 
meaning, capable of affecting people physically and emotionally. Therefore, the pre-Axial 
agent sees themselves as embedded in the cosmos, constantly connected to the seen and 
unseen world that surrounds them. As part of the meaningful cosmos, ordinary human 
existence has a sense of purpose and value. The pre-Axial agent has no other goal than the 
betterment of this condition. They are thus embedded in reality as it exists for human 
beings. Divine purposes beyond that of hum an flourishing are not present in pre-Axial 
religion. 
2.4.6 Axial Religion 
Taylor contends that the three dimensional embedding of the agent found in pre-
Axial religions, which posits that "Human agents are embedded in society, society in the 
cosmos, and the cosmos incorporates the divine", are present in Axial re1igions;2oo; 
however, these religions break the chain of embeddedness at several points. In terms of 
Western religion, this break hinges on the conception of the divine as part of the cosmos. 
For example, with the Jewish idea of a creation ex nihilo God is projected outside the 
cosmos; the relationship to God is independent of the cosmos. Consequently, "God can 
199 Taylor, A Secular Age, 147-150. 
200 Ibid., 152. 
become the source of demands that we break with 'the way of the world' .,,201 It is 
possible to entertain goals other than that ofhuman flourishing. For the pre-axial agent, 
who was embedded in existing reality and concerned with their ordinary life, the axial 
revolution initiates a disembedding from this dimension. 
2.4.7 Post-Axial Religions 
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In contrast to Axial and pre-Axial religions, post-Axial religions disembed the agent 
from the social dimension. According to Taylor, the impetus for this form of disembedding 
was "the drive to reform" experienced in Europe during the16th and 17th centuries,z°2 The 
Reform movement brought a new individuality to religion, thus disembedding the agent 
from society. In addition, the Reform encouraged the conception of a meaningless universe, 
devoid of sacred locations, further disembedding the agent from the cosmos.203 
Taylor notes that while firmly disembedded from both society and the cosmos, these 
religions partially re-embed the agent in existing reality. In affirming ordinary life as the 
locus of spiritual fulfilment, the Reformation re-imbued this dimension with meaning and 
significance. Moreover, later theological movements that posited God as design and human 
beings interpreters ofthis design allowed for the positing ofhuman flourishing as an 
ultimate good. Taylor writes: 
"This new relation is eclipsable, because the design underlying the moral order can be se en as 
directed to ordinary human flourishing. This transcendent aspect of the axial revolution is partly 
rolled back [ ... ] only partly, because our notions offlourishing remain under surveillance in our 
modem moral view: they have to fit with the demands of the moral order itself: of justice, 
equality, non-domination, ifthey are to escape condernnation. Our notions offlourishing can 
thus always be revised. This belongs to our post-Axial condition.,,204 
To summarize post-Axial religions, they are frameworks which posit the agent as firmly 
disembedded from society and the cosmos, and partially re-embedded in existing reality. 
Post-Axial moral space stands open to both the immanent and the transcendent. 
201 Taylor, A Secular Age, 152. 
202 Ibid., 156. 
203 Taylor, Modern Sociallmaginaries, 65. 
204 Ibid., 65 
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The language Taylor uses to describe the Axial model of religion seems to 
support ofnegative explanation ofmodemity. Human beings are disembedded - freed-
from imaginary - illusory - social constructions that constrain or restrict their agency. 
Taylor thus seemingly contradicts himself; however, the categories of embedding and 
disembedding represent epistemic shifts, rather than losses or gains. The social imaginary is 
involved in both states ofbeing. Disembedding do es not imply the discovery ofultimate 
reality, only a change in the way pers ons imagine themselves to inhabit social, physical and 
moral space. 
2.4.8 Axial and Durkheirnian Religions: Sorne Cornparisons 
In total, Taylor defines seven different classifications of religion based on the ideas 
of Karl Jasper and Emile Durkheim. As illustrated above, these classifications are separated 
into two different models. Significant overlap between the models is evident, most 
strikingly between the paleo-Durkheimian social form and the pre-Axial varieties of 
religion. However, it can also be argued that the paleo-Durkheimian and Durkheimian 
religions are both forms of Axial religion, and that the neo-Durkheimian and post-
Durkheimian religions represent variants of post-Axial religion. The perception of 
similarities between the two models may be attributed to the fact that both models classify 
religion based on its representation or interactions with society. l contend, however, that 
these models are quite dissimilar: the Durkheimian model focuses on the social functioning 
of religion; whereas, the Axial model identifies religion based on its implications for human 
identity. 
The models represent two distinct of definitions ofreligion: a functional definition 
and a substantive definition. The Durkheimian model is functional: religion is explained in 
terms of its role, or lack thereof, in maintaining, structuring, or defining society. In contrast, 
the Axial model is substantive: religion is presented as a reflection of the human identity, 
which involves an understanding not only of social space, but also of physical and moral 
space. 
By describing seven distinct classifications of religion, Taylor equates religion with 
plurality and proposes that both the functional and substantive understandings of religion 
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are malleable. Taylor's models demonstrate that a single substantive or functional 
definition of religion cannot account for the sheer variety of religious phenomenon, both 
past and present. Instead, he suggests that as the understandings ofhuman society, agency, 
and selfhood evolve the function, and meaning, of religion changes. As 1 shall clarify 
below, perennial features of religion are virtually non-existent. Taylor thus employs 
multiple definitions of religion in A Secular Age, and utilizes both models of religion in his 
historical narrative, as no single definition wou Id suffice.205 
2.5 Religion as a Distinction 
The third definition of religion is briefly mentioned in the introduction of A Secular 
Age. Taylor employs this definition throughout the text in reference to modem religion. He 
writes: 
"[If] we are prudent (or perhaps cowardly), and reflect that we are trying to understand a set of 
forrns and changes which have arisen in one particular civilization, that of the modern West ... 
we see to our reliefthat we don't need to forge a definition which covers everything 'religious' 
in ail human societies in ail ages. [ ... ] [A] reading of 'religion' in terrns of the distinction 
transcendent/immanent is going to serve our purposes here [ ... ] It is far from being the case that 
religion in general can be defined in terrns ofthis distinction.,,206 
1 propose that Taylor's definition of religion as the "distinction transcendencelimmanence" 
is another formulation of the post-Axial religious form, which relies on a particular 
understanding of the term 'transcendence'. 
2.5.1 The Significance of Transcendence 
According to Taylor, transcendence has three dimensions: (1) the "notion of a 
higher good"; (2) "beliefin a higher power"; (3) the recognition oflife "as going beyond 
the bounds of its 'natural' scope between birth and death," such as the idea of the afterlife 
or reincamation.207 The idea oftranscendence, in any ofthese forms, is the only shared 
205 Both models serve discrete purposes in Taylor's works, which is why he never considers combining them 
into a single system. In Varieties of Religious Experience Today, Taylor uses the Durkheimian model to 
critique and modernize William James' view ofpersonal religion, and inA Secular Age, as we shall argue 
below, he relies on the existing Axial model to advance an third definition of religion that serves his specific 
purposes of exploring the new modes ofreligious life in modernity. 
206 Taylor, A Secular Age, 15. 
207 Ibid., 20. 
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feature Taylor identifies in aIl forms ofreligion.208 Taylor contends that aIl religions 
recognize both an immanent and transcendent dimension, in sorne form or another, as part 
ofhuman reality. 
Taylor uses "transcendence" interchangeably with "God" in both A Secular Age and 
A Catholic Modernity?; however, he recognizes that not aIl religions are centred on a deity. 
God and transcendence are interchangeable terms - in at least one direction - because the 
beliefin God necessarily implies beliefin at least one dimension oftranscendence. In his 
conclusion to A Catholic Modernity?, Taylor explains that his decision to use the term 
transcendence stems from a desire to reach a greater audience. He writes: 
"[How] could 1 ever have used such an abstract and evasive terrn, one so redolent of the flat and 
content-free modes of spirituality we can get ma no eu vred into in the attempt to accornrnodate 
both modem reason and the promptings of the heart? 1 remember erasing it with particular 
gusto. Why ever did 1 reinstate it? What pressures led in the end to its grudging rehabilitation? 
Well, one was that 1 wanted to say something general, something notjust about Christians .... 1 
needed a terrn to talk about aU those different ways in which religious discourse and practice 
went beyond the exclusively huma n, and in exhaustion 1 feU back on 'transcendent' (But 1 
haven't given up hope of finding a better terrn).,,209 
As a blanket term, transcendence may refer to anything, and everything, non-immanent or 
etemal, including God. However, a belief in the transcendent is not equal to a belief in God. 
For instance, you may believe in an afterlife or in sorne continuation of consciousness after 
death without believing in God. Altemately, you may believe in a higher power that runs 
through aIl beings and connects us to the fabric of the uni verse without labelling this power 
God. You may ev en feel that there is a far greater good than the fullness of ordinary life 
and yet not identify God as the source of an internaI calI to pursue this goal. To believe in 
God, Taylor suggests, is to believe in at least one of the three dimensions of transcendence 
ofwhich God is absolute source. 
2.5.2 Post-Axial Religion and the Transcendence/lmmanence Distinction 
The implications of Taylor's definition oftranscendence and his definition of 
religion as a distinction between transcendent and immanent are relevant for the 
208 Taylor, A Secular Age, n78l. 
209 Taylor, Charles. "Concluding Reflections and Cornrnents". A Catholic Modernity? Ed. James L. Heft. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 105-106. 
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understanding of morality in modemity. According to Taylor, a person need not adhere 
to a transcendent framework, in which the constitutive good is transcendent, to be 'open' to 
transcendence. This person may approach transcendent goals, or the belief in a transcendent 
power, or a higher life, from an immanent framework. This idea is reflected in post-Axial 
religion, in which the agent is partially re-embedded in existing reality due to the dec1ine in 
the transformation perspective. Post-Axial agents approach the world from an immanent 
frame, though they may recognize transcendent goods. As a reflection of this condition, 
post-Axial religions teeter on the edge of open and c10sed attitudes towards transcendence; 
while these religions may discredit the transformation perspective, they nevertheless 
articulate an open stance towards the transcendent in other areas, such as the belief in God 
or in an afterlife. 
1 propose that the definition of religion as the distinction between transcendent and 
immanent represents an articulation of the post-Axial religious form. In identifying modem 
religion as a distinction, Taylor is highlighting the duality between open and closed 
perspectives as the defining feature of religion in the modem age. This definition allows 
consideration of any movement or perspective that recognizes any form of transcendence as 
a type of religion in modemity. Such a definition once more reinforces his argument that 
religion has not declined in modemity, though its function and meaning have considerably 
changed. 
2.6 Conclusions: Universality and Plurality 
Taylor's multiple definitions of secularization, secular, secularity, and religion 
reveal a fascination with etymology and terminology. As his deconstruction of the 
mainstream definition of secularization demonstrates, the meaning associated with specifie 
terms is revelatory of an individual's presumptive views. This observation is equally 
applicable to Taylor's own definitions. For example, his polemical attitude towards anti-
religious negative narratives of modemity and his positive estimation of religion is evident 
in his definition of secularization, and his definitions of secularity and religion display an 
attempt to render his narrative universally applicable. 
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Taylor's explanation ofsecularization ultimately amounts to a rigorous defence 
ofhis proposition that religious faith is relevant to modemity, though little else. He avoids 
insinuating a qualitative difference between modem and traditional faith, by maintaining an 
equal-yet-different analysis of the conditions ofbelief. 1 argue that Taylor's equal-yet-
different approach is an attempt to generalize his narrative of modernity to the modem 
West. 
1 propose that Taylor characterizes the modem West with the term "secularity" in 
order to inake his narrative explanation universally applicable. The suffix "ity" signifies 
that secularity may refer to the state, quality, or degree ofbeing secular. Secularity suggests 
that the shift in time-consciousness has affected Western society in multiple, divergent 
ways. Taylor is thus able to refer to secularity in the singular, while proposing the 
recognition of multiple modemities throughout the world. Taylor suggests that the North 
Atlantic, Western world of Christian Heritage is by and large undergoing one form of 
modernity, which itselfis the site multiple interpretations of the immanent frame that 
connects aIl inhabitants of the modem West to each other. The multiplicity of definitions of 
"secularization," "secular," "secularity," and "religion," in A Secular Age para1lels the 
multiplicity of interpretations of the immanent frame in the modem West. 
By equating his definitions with plurality, Taylor pre-emptively defends his 
narrative from accusations ofhomogeneity and avoids the pattern ofunilinear theories of 
modernity perpetuated by the anti-religious negative narratives. Indeed, the case could 
be made that Taylor's definitions are more self-serving than informative. They are 
constructed so as to undermine the anti-religious negative narratives and support 
Taylor's narrative account of the development of the modem self and modem moral 
frameworks, which 1 will explore in the following chapter. Irrespective ofthe 
subjectivity of Taylor's writings his discussion ofterminology reveals the dearth of 
adequate substantive definitions of religion, secularization, secular and secularity in the 
hum an sciences, and the necessity of establishing both substantive and functional 
definitions of these phenomenons. 
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CHAPTER3 
Past and Present Conceptions of God 
Tay10r's narrative ofmodemity majntains that religion is a relevant human practice 
in a context defined by secu1arity. According to Taylor, secu1arity signifies a condition of 
belief, in which the belief in God, or transcendence, is optional. He a1so defines religion as 
the be1ief, or acceptance, oftranscendence in any ofthree manifestations: higher power, 
higher rea1ity, or higher good. Tay10r's hermeneutica1 approach dictates that his 
proposition, that religion is a relevant and meaningfu1 modem human practice, must be 
demonstrated through an ana1ysis ofhuman se1f-interpretations. 
To defend his thesis, Taylor must demonstrate that the practice of religion is 
relevant in modemity because the conception of transcendence, or God, is imp1icit in the 
modem understanding ofhuman agency and se1thood. This argument is never explicitly 
articu1ated in Tay10r's phi10sophy ofidentity, or narrative ofmodemity. l contend that the 
connection between transcendence and human identity is embedded in Taylor' s moral 
theory, his concept of Axial religions, and his narrative account of modemity. 
Tay10r's narrative ofmodemity revea1s that changes to the conception ofhuman 
agency accompany changes to the conception of the divine, and vice versa. In this chapter, l 
will articu1ate the connection between the concept of transcendence, or God, and hum an 
identity in Tay10r's moral theory and Axial model. l will a1so examine the changing 
conception ofGod and human agency in Tay10r's narrative ofmodemity. My investigation 
will focus on the four phi10sophica1/theo10gica1 movements which Taylor identifies as the 
main contributors to the modem identity: (1) The Protestant Reformation, (2) Deism, (3) 
Naturalism, and (4) Exclusive Humanism. Finally, l will explore the implications of the 
modem identity, the "buffered self', for contemporary conception ofGod. 
3.1 Human identity and the Conception of Transcen den ce in Taylor's moral theory 
Taylor's philosophy ofidentity suggests that conceiving of the transcendent is 
innate to Western culture because the conception of selfhood and agency is connected to 
the conception ofboth God/transcendence and nature. This connection means that any 
articulation of hum an agency or selfhood conveys, either implicitly or explicitly, 
conceptions ofboth God and nature. Through this connection, Taylor suggests that the 
belief in God/transcendence -i.e. religion- is prevalent in modernity, because God-
references are implicit in the conception ofhuman agency. 
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According to Morgan, Taylor presents the belief in God as a perennial feature of 
western culture. He writes that Taylor's philosophy: "caUs for the moral ontology that in 
principle incorporates diverse constitutive and life goods which make sense of our moral 
se1fhood, and it describes the moral ontology that in fact inc1udes God, reason, nature and 
much e1se.,,210 In other words, Taylor's moral ontology presents God, reason, and nature as 
perennial features ofhuman morality, though he denies such features exist. 
Morgan suggests that Taylor's moral theory is designed to legitimize the moral 
authority ofreligion.211 His observation is validated by Taylor's weak explanation of the 
continued relevance of the transcendent to modern persons. Taylor presents the foUowing 
justifications for this relationship: a nostalgic view of religion and belief that is prevalent in 
modernity,212 the thn~at ofmeaninglessness which accompanies c10sed frameworks,213 and 
the possibility that faith can facilitate the achievement ofmoral goals.214 However, these 
reasons are only further proof of the significance of transcendence for modern persons; they 
do not explain why individuals who live in societies that are constituted independently of 
the transcendent continue to find meaning in this dimension. 
210 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the philosophy of 
Charles Taylor in question, 52. 
211 Morgan writes: "[Taylor's] understanding of our morallife, its development and its structure, provides 
religion with a kind of legitimacy that opens up once again an old avenue, the moral avenue, to the 
authenticity of the religious life and to religious belief." Ibid., 50. 
212 Taylor, A Secular Age, 563-564. 
213 Ibid., 303. 
214 Ibid., 673. 
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Morgan provides one possible answer for the prevalence of God in the modem 
identity. He explains that God is a part of the Western moral ontology and is thus 
considered a 'reality'. He writes: "Whatever the best account of our moral experience 
invokes is real, and since that account calls for self-independent goods or moral sources -
nature, reason, God - then these are objectively real.,,215 God, nature and reason are 
depicted in Taylor's narrative ofmodernity as existing; they are not merely abstract ideas 
which can be easily refuted or replaced by other ideas. As Morgan writes: 
"God is one of those entities that has figured in our moral ontology, has provided a standard or 
ground of value, and has given our beliefs and actions meaning and significance. Indeed, God and 
the believer's relation to God are conceived in ways that facilitate this configuration of moral 
selfhood. ,,216 
Taylor's moral theory contends that hum an agents necessarily project the source oftheir 
morality - be it God, reason, or nature - as 'objectively real', and thus possessing 
characteristics which can be described and articulated. Taylor suggests that Western culture 
has inherited an understanding of hum an moral ontology from Christian culture, in which 
the God-human relationship is recognized as a reality. As a result ofthis heritage, God is 
projected as a reality by modem believers and non-be1ievers alike. The conception of God 
is thus implicit in modem moral frameworks and, by extension, the modem identity. 
3.2 Products of the Axial Revolution: an undeniable God-reference 
In Sources of the Self, Taylor presents a theory of morality which suggests that the 
creation of new moral frameworks leads to new understandings of hum an agency and 
selfhood, as well as, new understandings of God and nature. Taylor also alludes to this 
relationship in Modern Social Imaginaries through the Axial model of religion, which 
implies that hum an self-understanding is determined by the conception of 
transcendence/immanence, cosmos/nature, and society/individual. Taylor explains in 
Sources of the Selfthat the notion of the constitutive good has shifted dramatically over the 
past 500 years from the understanding that moral goods are determined by God's will to the 
idea that hum an beings determine meaning for and by themselves. He writes that "to trace 
215 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the philosophy of 
Charles Taylor in question, 53. 
216 Ibid., 53-54. 
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the developments of our modem visions of the good, which are in sorne respects 
unprecedented in human culture, is also to follow the evolution ofunprecedented new 
understandings ofagency and selthood.,,217 New understandings of the good, however, do 
not occur on their own. The displacement of God as the source of morality required the 
development of new understandings of God and human agency. 
The genesis of Axial religions is one such example of a pre-modem shift in the 
conception of God and human agency. These religions, Taylor writes, "calI into question 
the received, seemingly unquestionable understandings ofhuman flourishing, and hence 
inevitably also the structures of society and the features ofthe cosmos through which this 
flourishing was supposedly achieved. [ ... ] Both the transcendent and the human good are 
reconceived in the process.,,218 Taylor explains the creation of a transcendent good in 
theological terms. He argues that by placing God above the cosmos, the early Judeo-
Christian worldview radically altered the relationship between human beings, God, and 
nature for aIl future generations. 
Redefining the relationship between God and nature ultimately changes our 
conception of the good and the parameters by which human beings define themselves. The 
shift from transcendent to immanent goods during the Axial revolution prompted a new 
understanding of the human agent as directed towards fuifilling divine goals. The axial 
person' s sense of meaning and significance is dependent on the understanding of these 
divine goals; their identity and human agency is contingent on the interpretation of God's 
purposes. 
The link between human identity and the conception of God and nature is a feature 
of the modem western world, not a univers al attribute ofthe human condition. The modem, 
Western hum an identity is a social construct specifie to a geo-cultural context that is highly 
influenced by a Judeo-Christian religious heritage.219 The significance of the concepts of 
217 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 105 
218 Taylor, A Secular Age, 152. 
219 Taylor writes: "1 will steadily be arguing that Western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of 
new inventions, newly constructed self-understandings and related practices, and can't be explained in terms 
ofperennial features ofhuman life." Ibid., 22. 
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God and nature are embedded in the modem western frameworks; the meaning of these 
tenus finds expression in common language. Even for those who identify themselves as 
atheists, the concept ofGod must have significance for the repudiation ofbeliefto have 
meaning. As Taylor notes, "there is an inescapable (though often negative) God-reference 
in the very nature of our secular age.,,220 Taylor suggests that God-references are an 
undeniable feature of the modem human identity. To posit a conception ofhuman agency 
independent of the conception of God would require a complete break with the Judeo-
Christian worldview and all contemporary modem frameworks. 
The Axial model of religion further suggests that human identity is always defined 
in relation to moral, social, and physical space. Embedded and disembedded agents 'possess 
different conceptions ofhuman agency, God, nature, and constitutive goods. The notion of 
embeddedness affects an agent's identity, as "it means the inability to imagine oneself 
outside a certain matrix.,,221 An agent's selfhood is defined by the limits of the dimensions 
in which they are embedded; whereas to be disembedded from a given dimension me ans 
that an agent's sense ofselfis defined independently ofthose dimensions. The religions 
created by these agents are a reflection oftheir self-understanding and moral frameworks. 
Taylor's definition suggests that religious theology is always defined by the description of 
moral, physical, and social space, and that these ontological categories are innate to human 
self-understanding. 
Taylor' s Axial model definition further implies that the theological conception of 
God and God' s purposes is influenced by the human understanding of morality, identity 
and human agency. For agents embedded in existing reality - pre-Axial and post-Axial 
agents changes to the definition of a hUn1an being imply changes to the definition of God. 
For agents disembedded from existing reality - Axial and sorne post-Axial agents the 
reverse relationship is also valid: changes to the conception of God and God' s purposes 
affects these agents' self-understanding as they are capable of defining their agency in 
tenus of transcendent moral goods, in addition to immanent goods. 
220 Taylor, A Secular Age, 29. 
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Reinterpreting God's goals not only alters the notion ofhuman selfhood, it also 
changes the conception of God and nature. Taylor writes in Sources of the Self that "any 
theology inc1udes sorne notion ofhow we can come in contact with God or his purposes;222 
a radical change in this latter doctrine means an alteration in our understanding of God and 
creation as well.,,223 Taylor contends that to describe or interpret God's purposes is to 
articulate a conception of the divine. His moral the ory proposes that, as a moral source, 
God is a reality. Taylor suggests that God's agency can be explained or described similarly 
to human agency: to explain either agent's moral motivation is to articulate something of 
their identity. 
3.3 A God Narrative 
Taylor's narrative ofmodemity demonstrates the connection between 
understandings of human agency and the conception of God. His master narrative of the 
modem identity focuses on four areas: the Protestant Refonnation, the Deist Movement, the 
inception ofNaturalism, and the rise of Exc1usive Humanism. Each ofthese epistemic 
developments, Taylor explains, introduced new understandings of the good that radically 
changed the understanding ofhuman agency and selfhood and the conception of God. 
Taylor's narrative begins with the Protestant Refonnation, in the late lS th and eady 
16th century, and extends to the early twenty-first century. The period referred to as 
"modemity" begins at the beginning of the 19th century. As Taylor refers to Victorians as 
contemporaries, 1 will use the Victorian era as a marker for the start of contemporary 
modemity. 
3.3.1 The Protestant Reformation 
According to Taylor, the modem age is the product ofvarious changes in 
consciousness and human understanding that occurred around the time of the Protestant 
Refonnation, in the early 16th century. At this time, the Catholic Church was the centre of 
222 In this passage Taylor is discussing the shift from deism to expressivism and romanticism - where the 
good is still conceived as God's purpose for humanity. 
223 Taylor, Sources of the Self 370. 
all religious life in Western Europe, though pre-modern beliefs in spirits, magic, and 
malignant forces lingered.224 Taylor writes: 
67 
"[ ... ] cette presence de Dieu passait par la texture sociale. Car qui créait d'une autre façon 
l'impossibilité de la non-croyance: la défense contre le mal supposait la solidarité nécessaire au 
maniement de cette force positive. Faire intervenir la force de Dieu contre la foudre, c'était un acte 
de paroisse, et tout le monde devait y concourir. L'abstention était trahison. "225 
Traditional society was divided into religious and lay vocations, each with its own 
understanding of the demands of Christian faith. While sorne practiced an ascetic or 
monastic way oflife, the majority of the population worked to sustain the economic and 
reproductive needs oftheir communities. Such a dichotomy eventually created two forms , 
within Western Christianity that were both distinct and complementary to one another. 226 
The Reformation profoundly altered these ways oflife across much of Western and 
Central Europe, not only in countries which converted to Protestantism; but also in Catholic 
countries, where more rigorous religious demands were placed on lay society?27 As Taylor 
writes: 
"Briefly summed up, Reform demanded that everyone be real, 100 percent Christian. Reform 
not only disenchants, but disciplines and re-orders life and society. Along with civility, this 
makes for a notion of moral order which gives a new sense to Christianity, and the demands of 
the faith. This collapses the distance of faith from Christendom. It induces an anthropocentric 
shi ft, and hence a break-out of the monopoly of Christian faith.,,228 
Taylor explains that for Reform to occur, new and unprecedented frameworks ofmeaning 
had to become available to a wide range of people?29 Taylor notes that itinerant friars, who 
224 Taylor, A Secular Age, 34-37. 
225 Taylor, "Une place pour la transcendance" Mutations Culturelles et Transcendence. Ed. Pierre Gaudette. 
(Quebec: Université Laval, 2000), 7 
226For the ordinary lay person, life as a Christian meant partaking in Church activities at specific sacred times 
of the year and praying for the flourishing ofhis/her community. For the monk or nun, being a Christian 
meant renouncing profane goods and mundane pleasures for their etemal salvation and the salvation of their 
entire community. Taylor, A Secular Age, 62-63. 
227 Ibid 62 
228 Ibid:: 774. 
229 Indeed, there had been several aUempts to make over society before the 16th century; these included a 
growing emphasis since the first millennium on devotion and the Passion, and greater requirements for the 
confession of the lait y imposed by the Church. 
wamed of the illusory pleasures of the flesh and the everlastingjudgement ofGod after 
death, were largely responsible for changing the consciousness of the laity.23o 
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Changing the religious behaviour of the elites and the lait y involved not only the 
preaching ofbrimstone and hellfire, but the introduction of a new conception of the divine 
and of the human relationship to God. In enforcing a more rigorous Christianity, the 
Church made efforts to disenchant society of spirits and magic, which could be understood 
as a challenge to the hegemony ofGod's power.231 The polemic against black magic 
eventually included any attempts to control the power of God in an object, including 
sacraments or relics.232 In emphasizing the sovereignty ofGod and the hegemony ofGod's 
power, the Reformation sought to eliminate all pagan or pre-Christian spiritual elements 
from society. Furthermore, the Reformation initiated a new understanding of our primary 
mode of interaction with God: not through the manipulation of sacraments and relics, but 
through individual prayer.233 
The Reformation emphasized salvation solely through God's grace, which meant 
that one should be confident in God's saving power alone, yet not "flatly complacent" that 
such salvation is certain.234 Inward prayer and piety were encouraged as the authentic 
means of connection to God, while public prayer and communal rituals were regarded by 
sorne as "mindless diversions from real piety.,,235 This reinterpretation ofreligious 
behaviour accompanied a new emphasis on behavioural and emotional discipline. 
Civilizing society became the focus of many religious reforms. Taylor explains that this 
shi ft in focus was influenced by a new vision of nature as created by God to function 
according to instrumentallaws,z36 He writes: "The world is God's creature. Moreover, it is 
an ordered whole [ ... ] a vast field ofmutually affecting parts. This has been designed to 
230 Taylor, A Secular Age, 64-66. 
231 Ibid., 73. 
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work in certain ways, that is, to produce certain results," such as the flourishing of aU 
fonns oflife.237 Ultimately, the Refonnation posited God's purposes as unknowable: what 
little human beings could leam ofthem, they argued, must come from studying God's 
creation, rather than looking for miraculous signs. Interpreting nature's implicit design and 
living in reciprocity with it as "agents of instrumental reason" becomes the goal ofhuman 
existence.238 To live in hannony with God's design means imposing new ethical standards 
of civility and moral order on society. 
Locating the human-divine relationship in the interpretation of design initiated a 
shift in the understanding of ethics away from the notion of divine law and towards the 
notion ofa naturallaw, or moral order. Taylor cites Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and John 
Locke (1632-1704) as the originators ofthis idea in Europe. Allliving things, they argue, 
are designed for self-preservation; this was God's intention in creating nature and human 
beings.239 Human beings are naturaUy inc1ined towards lawlessness and disorder, which 
distances them from God's goal. To correct this flaw, human beings must strive to civilize 
society and act according to the principle ofmutual benefit.240 This understanding of moral 
order considers aU actions intended towards meeting God's purposes for humanity -living 
an ordinary life - as having significance and meaning. As Taylor explains, "God wants us 
to be productive, and this means that we should give ourselves energeticaUy and 
intelligently to sorne useful task.,,241 The Grotian-Lockian view proposes that human beings 
are moral agents, not because things matter to them, as Taylor argues, but because they are 
blessed with reason and therefore are capable ofrecognizing God's intentions for 
humankind. 
Taylor explains that unlike pre-modem idea of an immutable, etemallaw, or the 
Indian concept of an inscribed social hierarchy, the Grotian-Lockian understanding of 
moral order is "a feature about us humans, rather than one touching God or the cosmos.,,242 
The new view of the hum an agent was atomist: "the human agent was no longer to be 
237 Taylor A Secular Age, 98 
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understood as an element in a larger, meaningful order. His paradigm purposes are to be 
discovered within. He is on his own.,,243 In abstracting morality from the divine and 
relocating it in human nature, the notion of moral order prompts what Taylor calls the 
"anthropocentric shift". He argues that this shi ft towards thinking ofmorality in purely 
human terms ec1ipses certain fundamental Christian ideas and eventually allows for 
seculari ti44 to arise.245 
3.3.2 The Deist Movement 
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Taylor labels the Locke-inspired conception of God "Lokean Deism," which 
understands God as sovereign and God's purposes as knowable only through reason, this 
movement made the hum an subject its central focus and "sidelined" 246 the notion of grace. 
Locke himself acknowledges God as significant for having graced humankind with reason, 
though his philosophy was concemed less with theology than human nature. Lockean 
Deism further proposes that only through applying reason and living according to natural 
laws of preservation and mutual benefit could humanity hope to be saved. 
The Deist Movement, founded during the 17th century by Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 
Third Earl ofShaftsbury (1671-1713)247 and Francis Hutchenson (1694-1746),248 diverges 
from the earlier "Lockean Deism" with Shaftsbury' s rejection of the notion of God as 
wholly sovereign to nature and humanity. Taylor describes Shaftesbury's argument as 
follows: "The highest good doesn't repose in any arbitrary will, but in the nature of the 
cosmos itself; and our love for it isn't commanded under threat of punishment, but cornes 
spontaneously from our being.,,249 Shaftesbury contends that to be a moral agent, human 
beings do not need to understand God's law; "right and wrong are just as fixed to standards 
in nature as are harmony and dissonance.,,250 Human beings are moral agents because their 
243 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 193. 
244 Taylor, A Secu/ar Age, 295. 
245 Ibid., 295. 
246 Ibid., 251. 
247 Taylor simply refers to him as "Shaftesbury" or "the third earl of Shaftesbury" throughout Sources of the 
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sense ofmorality is innate; they respond to good when they perceive it.251 For 
Shaftesbury, "the key to goodness" 252 is human benevolence, which human beings pursue 
regardless of Divine edict. Morality is determined by love, not justice or discipline. 
Taylor credits Hutchenson with elevating human benevolence to the highest moral 
good. Hutchenson states that God designed the universe "for the mutual good and 
happiness of its inhabitants," 253 and intended human beings to be predisposed to 
benevolence.254 Human beings are the very embodiment of the good. They need only rely 
on their natural moral inclination to be good; God's grace is irrelevant to human morality. 
During the eighteenth century developed what Taylor caUs "Providential Deism,,,255 
a religious and theological movement that reflected the influence of Shaftesbury' sand 
Hutchenson' s moral theory on the conception of God. Their moral theory projects the 
source of morality within the hum an agent, thus rendering God "subordinate to a 
conception ofhappiness which is defined purely in creaturely terms.,,256 Providential Deism 
proposes that human beings need not strive to understand the purposes of God, who is 
whoUy unknowable, to be saved. God does not demand any more ofhumanity than "the 
proper fuI filment of our own nature;" 257 therefore, human beings need only examine 
themselves to understand how to fulfil God's plan. 
Providential Deism further proposes that God does not intervene miraculously in 
nature or human history. God designed the universe to function as an autonomous whole. 
To claim that God intervenes in the universe is to question the perfection of God's creation, 
and to question God' s own perfection. Taylor explains: "the design of an order for the good 
of instrumentally rational creatures leaves God no choice, as it were, but to establish laws . 
251 Taylor writes: "It is the nature of rational beings to love rational order when they see it. The problem is 
their inability to see it. They are blinded by their foeus on sensible things; or they have false opinions 
(dogmata) whieh take the form of passions. [ ... ] As we were made by God, we love the good; but as we have 
beeome, we are drawn to evil." Taylor, Sources of the Self, 256. 
252 Ibid., 258. 
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feel benevolently towards others or even to take delight in their torments." Ibid., 260. 
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which he willleave to operate without interference. He shows his goodness in refraining 
from mirac1es.,,258 Providential Deism maintains that the relationship between God and 
humanity ought to be one of gratitude and love, rather than awe or devotion. Worshiping 
God requires only the demonstration ofproper appreciation for God's perfect design. 
72 
The Deist movement partially "ec1ipses" 259 the significance of God by recognizing 
human nature as the source of morality, however, the movement is not exc1usively , 
humanist. Deists still maintain that God is greater than humanity because God is capable of 
"disinterested love" 260_ a goodness that human beings may only aspire to realize. Taylor 
explains that hum an beings love God because "he's good to us," 261 whereas God loves 
humanity for no distinguishable reason: "God's greatness exists precisely in his not needing 
us, but being disposed nevertheless to think exc1usively for our goOd.,,262 Providential 
Deism proposes that God designed human beings with the capacity for instrumental reason, 
which God intends them to use to order their environment and manipulate the world. 
Though God is no longer conceived as the "guarantor that good will triumph ... in a world 
of spirits and meaningful forces,,,263 God is still credited with saving humanity. The 
disenchantment, which, according to Deism, liberated Western civilization from misguided, 
oppressive and illusory moral theories, and led human beings to repossess instrumental 
reason, is energized by God's providential design. In having foreseen the necessity of 
instrumental reason, God is responsible for human salvation through enlightenment. 
3.3.3 Naturalism 
Not all 18th century philosophers and theologians supported the Deist perspective of 
the world as perfect and harmonious. Radical utilitarians, such as Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron 
d'Holbach (1723-1789), 264 contend that Deism ignores the irrefutable presence of 
suffering. These philosophers argue that adhering to the idea of a transcendent good - such 
258 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 273. 
259 Taylor, A Secular Age, 222-224 
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as God' s instrumental design - strips human beings of any real responsibilitl65 . 
Utilitarians propose that the only goods worthy of recognition are the pursuit ofhuman 
pleasure and the avoidance of suffering266. Human life, they maintain, has meaning in the 
fuI filment of ordinary, physical pleasure and the experience ofpain,267 which Deists 
dismiss as a consequence of deviating from God's plan. 
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Ordinary life eventually becomes coterminous with nature, and the Utilitarian 
notion of the pursuit of meaning in physical pleasure is transmuted into the quest for 
significance in the natural world. Rational disengagement, as proposed by Locke, is 
supplanted by expressivist forms of naturalism, which attempt to articulate the reflection of 
human experience in nature. The Naturalist movement emphasizes the central theme of an 
essential unit y between nature and humankind. Naturalists, such as Rousseau, propose that 
"nature is fundamentally good, and the estrangement which depraves us is one which 
separates us from it.,,268 Instrumentalism and objectification of the natural world alienate 
human beings from goodness. Nature supplants God as the source of moral order. 
The Naturalist view ofmorality is similar to that of Locke, although Naturalism 
denies that human moral instincts were designed by God. Taylor explains that Naturalism 
proposes that "We must open ourselves up to the élan of nature within, as we had to open 
ourselves to God's grace on the orthodox theory.,,269 According to the Naturalist conception 
ofGod, however, God's goodness is not sovereign to nature.270 Nature's goodness is 
fundamental and supersedes that of the divine. Naturalism proposes that alienation from 
nature is the cause ofhuman malaise; suffering has meaning as an indication of the 
transgression of the essential unit y between humanity and nature. Many Naturalists, such as 
Holbach, rejected religion as the instigator ofhumankind's alienation from the natural 
world, and were drawn instead to atheism. 
265 Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self, 322-323 
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Taylor wams that it would be a mistake to assume that naturalism contributed 
directly to modem secularization. The naturalist assertion that human beings must find the 
élan ofnature within themselves is also the source oftheistic re-interpretations ofthe 
concept of God. Taylor sees in Hegel (1770-1831) an attempt to reconcile a traditional 
theistic conception of God with a naturalist perspective. He writes: 
"Like the theist, he wants to see the world as designed, as existing in order to fulfil a certain 
prospectus, the requirements of embodiment for Geist. But like the naturalists, he cannot allow 
a God who could design this world from the outside, who could exist before and independently 
of the world. His idea is therefore that of a God who eternally makes the conditions of his own 
existence. ,,271 
Hegel proposes that God and God's creation are mutually contingent on one another, 
though in different ways.272 His conception of God is a critique of the idea of disengaged 
reason. Similarly to proponents ofNaturalism, Hegel contends that the human spirit is not 
distinct from nature. Human salvation lies in re-discovering the essential unit y between 
God, humanity, and the physical world, not in the interpretation of an extemal design. 
The notion of an essential unit y between all of creation and God inspired other 
romantic philosophers, including Spinoza (1632-1677) and Goethe (1749-1832). These 
philosophers conceive of God as an impersonal cosmic force, ever-present in the universe. 
Naturalism was supplanted as a popular spiritual movement by the end of the 19th century 
due primarily to the spread of the Theory of Evolution. However, the conception ofGod as 
an impersonal cosmic force remains prevalent in many contemporary forms of popular 
spirituality.273 Taylor presents two reasons for the decline ofNaturalism. First, Darwin's 
proposaI that a species' survival is determined by competitive fitness undermined the idea 
of nature as a benevolent force. 274 Secondly, the debate over evolution, which mostly 
involved fervent Exclusive Humanists and ardent, orthodox Theists, overshadowed the 
ideas of Deists and N aturalists, whose moral visions represented a compromise between the 
recognition of immanent and transcendent goods. 
271 Taylor, Charles. Hegel and Modern society .. 39 
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3.3.4 Exclusive Humanism 
According to Taylor, Exclusive Humanism developed in 1 9th century Britain, where 
the ethic of individual freedom and mutual benefit were prevalent features of 
contemporary, moral frameworks. 275 Exclusive Humanism emerged from a move to further 
"immanentize" these goods by dissociating them from nature and GOd,276 and attributing all 
morality to disengaged reason. 277. Humanist thought does not represent an innovation in 
moral theory, so much as a re-interpretation ofNaturalist and Deist conceptions ofmoral 
order andnaturallaw in uniquely human terms.278 
Humanist thinkers, such as Leslie Stephen (1832-1904) and John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873, claim that human beings recognize and desire to aspire to altruism because "they see 
it to be a higher, more evolved way ofbeing.,,279 To attribute the capacity for benevolence 
to God's grace is to misplace the true source of our goodness.280 Taylor contends that: 
"Exclusive hurnanisrn closes the transcendent window, as though there were nothing beyond. 
More, as though it weren't an irrepressible need of the hurnan heart to open that window, and 
first look, then go beyond. As though feeling this need were the result of a rnistake, an 
erroneous world-view, bad conditioning, or worse, sorne pathology.,,281 
According to Exclusive Humanism, religious beliefhas the capacity to render human 
benevolence base. Humanists maintain that acts motivated by faith are selfish: they stem 
from a desire to please or satisfy God, and cannot be qualified as altruistic. Belief corrupts 
humanity by preventing individuals from fully achieving an ethic ofhuman benevolence. 
For Taylor, the development of Exclusive Humanism in the late 19th century marks 
the beginning of the secular age. The rise in popularity ofthis ideology in mainstream 
society is indicative of the acceptance of a closed, immanent moral framework. Taylor 
contends that earlier humanist philosophies were only held by small portions of the elite 
classes. Moreover, the moral frameworks of these philosophies were not exclusively 
275 Taylor, A Secular Age, 394. 
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immanent - ancient, humanist philosophers maintained transcendent moral ideals.282 
Exclusive Humanism, however, does not admit the possibility of a transcendent good, 
power, or reality. It posits strictly immanent moral goods, and views the world through a 
scientific, instrumental, and empiricallens. 
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Taylor reveals that, though Exclusive Humanism began with the intent of 
dissociating morality from religion and transcendence, it nevertheless articulates a 
conception of God. He explains that Exclusive Humanism fails to escape God-references 
for two reasons: "on one hand, unbelief and exclusive humanism defined itself in relation to 
earlier modes ofbelief [ ... ] On the other hand, later-arising forms ofunbelief, as well as all 
attempts to redefine and recover belief, define themselves in relation to this first path-
breaking humanism offreedom, discipline, and order.,,283 Exclusive Humanism defines 
itselfas a rejection of the beliefin God. To demonstrate the impossibility ofbelief, it must 
posit an understanding of the content ofbelief, thus producing a negative God-reference. 
Moreover, modem forms ofreligious beliefhave developed, which are highly influenced 
by Exclusive Humanism's ideals. This association connects Exclusive Humanism, albeit 
unintentionally, to further, positive God-references. Consequently, Exclusive Humanism 
avoids neither positive, nor negative God-references and is thus, paradoxically, ontically 
dependent on that which it claims to be both impossible and corrupting ofhuman morality. 
According to Exclusive Humanism, God is a being who defies all instrumental, 
scientific, and empirical understandings of the physical universe, and, therefore, does not 
exist. The Exclusive Humanist portrayal ofGod is largely a caricature of the Old 
Testament God. God is not only the creator of the universe, but a constant manipulator of 
human history and the natural world. God's power renders human freewill inconsequential; 
God's guidance is necessary for human beings to behave morally. Exclusive Humanism 
relies on this description of an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God to accentuate 
the ethical problem oftheodicy. Taylor writes: 
"The idea of blaming God gets a clearer sense and becomes much more salient in the modern 
era where people begin to think they know just what God was purposing in creating the world, 
282 Taylor, A Secular Age, 245-246. 
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and can check the results against the intention. The issue as proposed in an atheist context inherits 
this ciarity; only now it is we who are setting the standards, while assuming that what we know 
and can discern about human fate is ail there is to know ... God is set up to flunk the atheist 
exam, as surely, as He was set up to pass that ofProvidential Deism with flying colours.,,284 
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The Exclusive Humanist representation of God is negative because it only seeks to define 
God in terms of impossibilities. Exclusive Humanism thus delegitimizes the belief in God 
in three ways: (1) utilizing theodicy to construct a moral case against God; (2) drawing on 
science to discredit the plausibility of a Supreme Being or a creator; (3) defending the 
dignity ofhuman freewill to present the very idea ofGod as an insult to the tradition of 
secular ethic and moral reasoning. 285 
3.4 The Modern Buffered Self 
Taylor contends that the changes to the concept of God and nature initiated by the 
Protestant Reformation, the Deist Movement, Naturalism, and Exclusive Humanism have 
contributed to the creation of "the buffered self". 286 This term refers to the way in which 
modern persons inhabit social, temporal, and moral space as though there were sorne kind 
ofbuffer between them and everything else. Taylor writes: "As a bounded self! can see the 
boundary as a buffer, such that the things beyond don't need to 'get to me', to use the 
contemporary expression. That's the sense to my use of the term 'buffered' here. This self 
can see itself as invulnerable, as master of the meanings of things for it.,,287 The buffered 
self is a uni quel y modern form of identity, which is entirely contingent on the condition of 
secularity; however, this identity is frequently represented in Naturalist theory and anti-
religious negative narratives as the natural, or basic, human condition. 
Taylor explains that the buffered selfis characterized by a sense ofbeing 
disengaged from the external environment. Disengagement refers to the buffered selfs 
capacity to distance itself from its surroundings. Taylor writes: "For the modern, buffered 
self, the possibility exists oftaking a distance from, disengaging from everything outside 
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the mind.,,288 Disengagement allows the selfto ignore, or isolate itselffrom, the 
meaning, or significance, of other objects or persons. The disengaged self is capable of 
"objectifying" its surroundings and other agents. For the buffered self, Taylor writes, 
"objectification brackets the meanings and sets them aside. They no longer animate our 
enquiry. We as agents-living-meaning withdraw, as it were from this enquiry.,,289 Taylor 
explains that the modem preoccupation with the first-person stance, "our use of the 'l'and 
the 'ego"', is a function of our disengaged perspective which attributes the most value to 
individual experiences, sentiments, and thoughts?90 Disengagement presupposes a division 
between the mind and body. This division allows for the buffered selfto consider his own 
experience subjectively, as interiOf and unique, and objectively, by adopting a third-person 
perspective.291 Disengagement thus transforms the self into an object that is not only 
worthy of scientific study, but one which needs rational contemplation and reflection to be 
adequately understood. According to Taylor, this idea has contributed to a negative 
impression of meaning and subjectivity within the human sciences. 
3.4.1 Disengagement and the Buffered Self 
The notion of dis engagement presupposes a division between the body and the 
mind, in which resides the mysterious inner depths of individuals?92 This idea is frequently 
accompanied by the presumption that reason and logic are superior attribut es ofthe human 
agent. 293 In modemity, agents are expected to demonstrate possession and mastery of these 
attributes through self-control and discipline. 
According to Taylor, the valorisation of reason and freedom has resulted in 
modemity with the view that dignity, "our sense of ourselves as commanding (attitudinal) 
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respect,,,294 resides in the capacity for rational self-control. Taylor explains that modern 
persons interact with others through a persona. They protect their personal feelings and 
emotions, which are considered weakness, by projecting an air of rational discipline. Taylor 
writes: "in this mutual projection we help each other to see ourselves as having attained this 
rational distance, and hence help each other to live up to this exalted ideal.,,295 Modern 
social interaction requires the mutual projection of rational self-control; those who do not 
adhere to this convention elicit a sense of embarrassment and shock in others. 
The concept of disengagement presupposes that hum an agents possess absolute 
freedom, or freewill, over their actions. This freedom is what enables the buffered self to 
exercise rational control over their behaviour, emotions, and, supposedly, their sense of 
morality. As Taylor explains, freedom accompanies "a sense of power, of capacity, in being 
able to order our world and ourselves.,,296 The concept of absolute freedom is an integral 
aspect of the modern identity. 
In modern society, the freedom of the human agent is taken for granted in our 
conception of society, as founded by the collective agency of a sovereign people.297 In this 
sense, Taylor states, "freedom as a central good is overdeterrnined in the modern moral 
order: it is both one of the central properties of the humans who consent to and thus 
constitute society, and it is inscribed in their condition as the artificers who build their own 
social world.,,298 The modern human identity presupposes that human beings construct their 
social reality, and can therefore exercise complete control over the moral order. However, 
Taylor maintains the modern interpretations of free will are incorrect: human beings do not 
deterrnine morality for and by themselves. Morality is transmitted through moral 
frameworks of meaning. The buffered self accesses both open and closed interpretations of 
the immanent frame and therefore this self is capable of rendering both positive and 
negative conceptions of God. 
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3.4.2 Gad and the Buffered Self 
Taylor' s description of the buffered self s conception of God lacks articulation. He 
does, however, imply the plurality of conceptions of God in modemity through his use of 
the term 'transcendence'. Taylor suggests that, in modemity, conceptions of God may 
involve any or all of the dimensions oftranscendence: higher good, higher power, or higher 
reality. This multiplicity is evident in the plethora of new spiritual and religious traditions 
that developed after the Victorian era. Taylor writes: 
"the gamut of intermediate position greatly widens: many people drop out of active practice while 
still declaring themselves as belonging to sorne confession, or believing in God. On another 
dimension, the gamut of belief in: something beyond widens, fewer declaring belief in a personal 
God, while more hold to something like an impersonal force; in other words a wider range of people 
express religious beliefs which move outside Christian orthodoxy. Following in this line is the 
growth of non-Christian religions, particularly those originating in the Orient, and the proliferation of 
New Age modes of practice, of view which bridge the humanistJspiritual boundary, of practices 
which link spirituality and therapy. On top ofthis more and more people adopt what would earlier 
have been seen as untenable positions, e.g., they consider themselves Catholic while not accepting 
crucial dogmas, or they combine Christianity with Buddhism, or they pray while not being certain 
they believe.,,299 
Due to the plurality of moral frameworks, the influx of non-Christian religions, and the 
atomism of the buffered self, the possibilities of the conception of God in modemity are 
multiple, as Taylor's example illustrates. 
The conceptions of God in modemity are limited only by the conception of the 
hum an agent. For this reason, Taylor contends that traditional religious practices and 
attitudes are waning, though belief in the transcendent remains relative1y undiminished.30o 
The idea that human beings naturally possess the features of disengaged freedom and 
instrumental reason has implications for a positive conception of God. Modem persons 
have di ffi cult y conceiving of a God who contradicts the laws of nature or physics, or who 
imposes his absolute will upon human kind. A positive conception of God must therefore 
correspond to a modem comprehension ofhuman agency and selfhood. 
The features of the buffered selfhave consequences for the conception ofGod in 
modemity. The buffered self approaches the world from a distance, confident in their 
299 Taylor, A Secular Age, 513. 
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ability to disengage from his surroundings and impose order on the world while 
possessing a sense of invulnerability rooted in their sense of absolute freedom. 301 As Taylor 
writes, "the buffered self can form the ambition of disengaging from whatever is beyond 
the boundary, and of giving its own autonomous order to its life. The absence offear can be 
not just enjoyed, but seen as an opportunity for self-control or self-direction.,,302 The notion 
of the mind as the primary location of the human-divine relationship, 303 which has been 
prevalent since Augustine (354-430), also affects the conception oftranscendence in 
modernity. 
The mind-centric focus of the buffered selfis combined with a tendency to 
rationalize and objectif y human exp eri ence. The combination ofthese features results in a 
"'rationalized' conception ofGod, similar to that of Exclusive Humanism, as the 
manifestation of the childish need for comfort. 304 Locating religious life within 
psychological behaviour, Taylor contends, is a common trend within the hum an sciences. 
For instance, Martha Nussbaum portrays the aspiration to transcend the immanent frame as 
a psychological phenomenon, which presents sorne problems for the modem persons. 
Taylor writes: "she sees the roots of our desire to transcend our ordinary condition in the 
unease and fear we experience in our finitude, our limitations, our neediness, our 
vulnerability.,,305 Nussbaum argues that the goal oftranscendence detracts for the actual 
hum an condition, rendering persons incapable of enjoying ordinary life. 306 Evidently, 
Nussbaum locates the aspiration for transcendence within the self. She presents this 
aspiration as a psychological phenomenon, which should be reoriented towards overcoming 
the fears and concerns that are the source of this desire: "what we need is 'transcendence ... 
ofan internaI and human sort.",307 Nussbaum's argument resembles that of Exc1usive 
Humanism, with the exception that she recognizes transcendence as a goal compatible with 
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modemity and the buffered self. Nussbaum's argument is an example of the multiple 
conceptions and interpretations of transcendence available to modem persons. 
3.5 Conclusion: The Perpetuation of Reform 
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For Taylor, modemity begins with the radical alterations to the common moral 
framework brought on by the Protestant Reformation. The new understandings of society, 
nature, and God introduced during this period resonate today. -It is necessary to study the 
Reform to understand the conditions that initiated re-interpretation of the constitutive good. 
The Reform also initiated the conditions for the re-interpretation ofmorality. Morgan 
writes: 
"To understand ourselves fully and properly, we need to uncover what these sources are for us, how 
they arose, and how they function. In the modem world, after the eighteenth century, they are three: 
nature; reason and God, and the three occur in various modes and shapes and in various 
interrelationships. God, conceived in different ways and in a variety of relationships with the self, 
has been and continues to be an influential moral source for modem agents.,,308 
The ec1ipse of God as a moral source cannot be considered accidentaI. At several points in 
history, there have been conscious attempts to replace God with nature or reason. The 
significance of the concept of God, however, has not abated. Modem persons continue to 
conceive of God as a reality because the idea of God as a constitutive good remains 
comprehensible, despite the displacement of God from mainstream moral frameworks. 
Taylor's narrative represents an attempt to correct the historical account of anti-
religious negative narratives; however, his description of the past is equally limited. 
Taylor's narrative focuses on the historical continuation ofthree goods introduced during 
the Reformation: the ethic of mutual benefit, the affirmation of ordinary life, and human 
benevolence. This emphasis often results in the portrayal of two distinct goods as 
equivalent or in the conflation of multiple goods. Taylor equates the ethic of mutual benefit 
with the ethic offreedom and the principle of equity and represents sexualliberation as a 
form of the affirmation of ordinary life. 309 Furthermore, Taylor ignores or insufficiently 
308 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the philosophy of 
Charles Taylor in question, 55. 
309 Taylor writes: "Summing up, we can say that the order ofmutual benefit holds (1) between individuals [ ... ] 
The benefits (2) crucially include life and the me ans to life [ ... ]; it is meant (3) to secure freedom, and easily 
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addresses many significant ethical debates and moral movements that do not directly 
involve these four goods, including women's suffrage, abortion, and racial and gender 
equality. His focus suggests that the only significant moral goods to affect modemity and 
secularity are the three highlighted above. Consequently, Taylor's narrative may be as 
ethically limited as the anti-religious negative narratives Unlike the anti-religious negative 
narratives, however, Taylor does not presume to have addressed the whole picture, only to 
have more accurately represented the historical genesis of the modemity's immanent frame. 
More significantly, Taylor's narrative suggests that the Reformation's greatest 
influence on modemity was the introduction of the idea of society as an imperfect project. 
Awareness ofthis idea is absent in many negative narratives, as at the very basis of 
negative narrative is the assumption that societies are continuously focused on refinement 
and in the pro cess slough off whatever ideas or constructs that prevent them from this goal. 
Each philosophical movement that followed reform - Deism, Naturalism, and Exclusive 
Humanism - expounds upon the notion that society needs reform. The anti-religious 
negative narratives suggestions for reform are potentially dangerous, in Taylor's estimation, 
because they deny the significance of the transcendent for the understanding ofhuman 
agency. The following section will explore Taylor's objections to the secular humanist 
plans for reform, and reveal the details of Taylor's solution for modemity. 
finds expression in terms of rights [ ... ] (4) these rights, this freedom, this mutual benefit is to be secured to ail 
participants equally." Taylor, A Secular Age, 171. 
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CHAPTER4 
Dilemmas and Solutions for Modernity 
Taylor's definition of secularity refers to the unavoidable presence of plurality in 
the lives of modern persons. In modernity, belief in the transcendent is optional, and no 
longer obvious or unquestionable. This change in the condition ofbeliefhas equalized 
unbelieving and believing frameworks of meaning. In A Secular Age, Taylor explains that 
the reality of plurality interacts with our view of modern society as homogeneous, ordered 
by univers al and impersonal ideals, to pro duce a "fragilizing effect.,,3Io Fragilization refers 
to the weakening of aIl moral and spiritual positions in modemity, such that modern 
persons have difficulty articulating their position on any issue of moral significance. 
In A Secular Age, Taylor proposes a solution to the problem of fragilization, which 
also resolves the ethical dilemmas of violence and suffering. Secular humanist, anti-
religious, negative narratives attribute these ills to religion; they argue that religion prevents 
the realization ofhuman goods, and causes violence and suffering. Taylor argues that their 
interpretation of religion is incorrect. He suggests a re-interpretation of Christianity that 
resolves aIl three modern problems. 
This chapter will explore and analyze Taylor's solution for modernity. 1 will 
examine the axes of rebellion within the buffered self, which perpetuate tension between 
open and closed interpretations of the modern moral order, and 1 will explore the affect of 
fragilization on the modern condition ofbelief. 1 will then describe the forms of critique 
employed in the conflict between open and closed interpretations, and the parties involved, 
situating Taylor's perspective within this landscape. Finally, 1 will explain how Taylor's 
solution for modernity constitutes a re-interpretation of Christian faith, which is reflective 
of Taylor' s lived experiences. 
310 Taylor, A Secular Age, 304. 
4.1 Rebellions of the Buffered Self 
According to Taylor, the buffered self is caught between open and c10sed 
interpretations of the modem moral order and is attracted to both positions. Taylor writes: 
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"The whole culture experiences cross pressures, between the draw of the narratives of 
c10sed immanence on one si de, and the sense oftheir inadequacy on the other, strengthened 
by encounter with existing milieu ofreligious practice, or just by sorne intimations of the 
transcendent. ,,311 Furthennore, the common moral framework of modemity is polarized by 
goods that emphasize the intemality of moral sources, and goods that require locating 
meaning beyond the self. Modem persons feel compelled to choose between adopting a 
c10sed world structure perspective, and confinn their spiritual intuition, which demands 
sorne recognition of the transcendent. The tension between open and c10sed interpretations 
of the modem moral order thus heightens the fragilizing effect of plurality, such that the 
presence of multiple moral frameworks reduces the ability of modem persons to conduct 
strong evaluation, as opposed to simply offering a greater array of choices. 
4.1.1 Closed Immanent frameworks and the Buffered Self 
The modem buffered self holds disengagement and rational self-control as goods, 
which are inherent capacities ofhuman agency. The inward projection of the constitutive 
good has resulted in the immanentization of modem moral frameworks. This 
immanentization is evidenced in a number of modem practices, specifically the economy 
and the justice system. According to Taylor, these practices reflect the embedding of the 
ethic of mutual benefit and human benevolence in an exc1usively immanent frame. 312 
Taylor identifies the immanentization ofthese goods as contributing to the appeal of anti-
religious negative narratives in modemity. 
Taylor proposes that the economy is driven by the notion that individuals need 
access to the means to sustain life, and a system of production, exchange, and consumption 
is the best way to guarantee such access. As Taylor writes: 
31l Taylor A Secular Age, 595; see Morgan's discussion of epiphany: Morgan, "Religion, history, moral 
discourse". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the philosophy of Charles Taylor in question, 56-61. 
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"[ ... ] the economic now defines a way we are linked together, a sphere of coexistence that in 
princip le could suffice to itself, if only disorder and conflict didn't threaten. Conceiving of the 
economy as a system is an achievement of eighteenth century theory, [ ... ] but coming to see the 
most important purpose and agenda of society as economic collaboration and ex change is a drift 
in our social imaginary that [ ... ] continues to this day.,,313 
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The economy is representative of the idea that mutual benefit is an ideal that society should 
uphold. Moreover, the economy reinforces the notion that achieving the ideal of mutual 
benefit requires the participation of free, disengaged individuals. The existence of mutual 
benefit is presented as contingent on human social interactions; and thus conceived as an 
exc1usively human good. The recognition ofthis good as one of the highest aspirations of 
modem human society is evidence of the immanentization of moral frameworks. 
The broad acceptance ofhuman benevolence as a good is evident in the widespread 
insistence on the necessity of social justice and hum an rights. Taylor states that this ethic is 
virtually undeniable in modemity: "we agree surprisingly well, across great differences of 
theological and metaphysical belief, about the demands of justice and benevolence, and 
their importance.,,314 In modemity, human benevolence is considered a necessary good that 
cannot be entrusted to voluntary action; the ethic ofhuman benevolence is therefore 
enshrined in various civil constitutions, charters of rights, and institutions, such as the Red 
Cross and the United Nations. Taylor explains that the modem interpretation of hum an 
benevolence suggests that this good is contingent on disengagement and the rational control 
ofhuman agency. He writes: "disengagement itself, by freeing us from the confused, 
perturbed mass of personal desires, cravings, envy, librates a univers al benevolence in 
US.,,315 Human benevolence flourishes through the exercise of rational control over 
sentiment and the bracketing off of personal prejudices. 
Unlike the 18th century N aturalist perspective, which posited human benevolence as 
a constitutive good that originates in nature, the modem perspective maintains reason and 
disengagement as constitutive goods, which allow for the good of hum an benevolence to 
exist. Both the source and the means of achieving human benevolence are thus projected as 
within the agent. The immanentization ofhuman benevolence is further reinforced in the 
313 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 76. 
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modem era by its association with purely human ends. The popularization of hum an 
benevolence by secular organizations suggests that terminating suffering, curing disease 
and eliminating poverty are the only authentic goals of hum an benevolence. 
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Taylor contends that the immanentization of the buffered selfs moral framework 
and ec1ipse of transcendent goals has contributed to the appeal of anti-religious negative 
narratives. Modem persons are compelled to accept the anti-religious negative narratives' 
representation ofmodemity because it coincides with their understanding ofhuman agency 
and morality as contingent on the exercise of disengaged freedom and rational contro1.316 
For those same reasons, many individuals agree with the anti-religious negative narratives 
suggestion that religion and transcendence are damaging to human society. Taylor writes: 
"From the eighteenth century, [ ... ] we see the reaction which identifies in a strongly transcendent 
vision ofChristianity a danger for the goods of the modem moral order. Strong Christianity will 
demand allegiance to certain theological beliefs or ecclesiastical structures, and this will split a 
society which should be intent simply on securing mutual benefit.,,317 
The belief in the transcendent is an issue of contention because there is concem that it will 
detract from the modem moral vision; or worse, result in a regression of society and social 
norms, ec1ipsing freedom and beneficence.318 Taylor contends that unbeliefrepresents a 
more justifiable option for many modem persons, as it provides an affirmation of hum an 
agency, se1f-determining freedom and the ethic of mutual benefit. 
4.1.2 Moral axes ofrebellion against closedframeworks 
Taylor maintains that although the modem understanding ofhuman agency and 
selfhood are compatible with a c10sed world structure perspective, there are sorne aspects of 
the modem identity and moral order that serve as axes of rebellion against a c10sed 
interpretation of the immanent frame. Taylor writes: 
"what we share is what 1 have been calling the 'immanent frame'; the different structures we 
live in: scientific, social, technical, and so on, constitute such a frame in that they are part of a 
'natural', or 'this-worldly' order which can be understood in its own terms, without reference to 
the supematural or transcendent. But this order itself leaves open whether, for purposes of 
316 Taylor, A Secular Age, 560. 
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ultimate explanation, or spiritual transformation, or final sense-making, we might have to invoke 
something transcendent. It is only when the order is "spun" in a certain way that it seems to 
dictate a "closed" interpretation.,,319 
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The modem buffered identity, on its own, does not determine this interpretation; a c10sed 
interpretation of the immanent frame requires the influence of a secularist spin. According 
to Taylor, the ethic of authenticity and the ethic of human benevolence, when considered 
independently of the ethic ofmutual benefit, represent two axe ofrebellion against the 
c10sed interpretation of the immanent frame. 
4.1.3 The Ethic of Authenticity 
Taylor identifies the ethic of authenticity as a moral vision that originates from the 
same philosophical background as the buffered self, and is the most recent addition to the 
modem moral order, having become normative in society only after the Second World War. 
The ethic of authenticity refers to the idea that to be "true and full human beings", 
individuals must listen to their inner voice and follow their own path in life;32o meaning and 
fulfilment can only be found through discovering the true, authentic self. The ethic 
proposes that a person's inner depths are meaningful, and their significance is revealed 
through emotions, desirés and feelings321 . In this sense, the ethic of authenticity is 
contingent on the notion of disengagement; it presupposes that selfhood is bounded, un-
porous, and unique to each individual agent. The ethic's valorisation of the expression of 
human emotion, however, conflicts with the buffered selfs understanding of dignity as 
merited through self-control and rational discipline.322 
Taylor credits Herder, who "put forward the idea that each ofus has an original way 
ofbeing human," with the origination of the ethic of authenticity.323 According to Herder, 
the originality ofhuman ontology means that "1 am called upon to live my life in [my] way, 
and not in imitation of anyone else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to 
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myself. If! am not, 1 miss the point ofmy life, 1 miss what is being human for me.,,324 
The modern ethic of authenticity requires that individuals view life as a quest for deeper 
meaning, which may be discovered through self-discovery and the pursuit of self-
knowledge. 
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Taylor identifies within the ethic of authenticity a strong axis of rebellion against 
the closed interpretation of the immanent frame. The ethic maintains that meaning and 
significance are attainable through immanent means -i.e. self-discovery. The content ofthis 
search, however, is not forcibly self-referential. 325 Following a unique and authentic path 
may direct individuals to sources of meaning that reside outside of the self, and even 
outside of the immanent frame. For instance: individuals may pursue self-investigation in 
the hopes of a more direct, personal and passionate relationship with GOd.326 Taylor 
explains that when the ethic of authenticity is merely self-referential, meaning is located 
exclusively within the individual self, and the ideal of authenticity is trivialized. For an idea 
or object to have meaning, its significance must be intelligible to others. Meaning is a 
shared phenomenon. A purely self-referential ethic ignores the necessity of the external 
sources of recognition, and affirrns the singular power of the individual to deterrnine what 
matters to them. Taylor writes: 
"In a flattened world, where the horizons of meaning become fainter, the ideal of self-determining 
freedom cornes to exercise a more powerful attraction. It seems that significance can be conferred by 
choice, by making my life an exercise in freedom, even when ail other sources fail. Self-determining 
freedom is in part of the default solution of the culture of authenticity, while at the same time it is its 
bane, [ ... ] this sets up a vicious circle that heads us towards a point where our major remaining value 
is choice itself. But this [ ... ] deeply subverts both the ideal of authenticity and the associated ethic of 
recognizing difference.,,327 
A self-referential ethic of authenticity threatens the modern selfwith the abyss of 
meaninglessness. Taylor maintains that the act of deterrnining goods is not significant 
without the mutual recognition that those chosen goods possess meaning. The ethic requires 
that human beings locate meaning outside ofthe self, in shared objects or concepts. The 
ethic of authenticity is thus a site of rebellion against closed immanent moral frameworks, 
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because it requires that human beings look beyond themselves to find meaning. 
Moreover, this ethic demands that modem individuals ignore the claims of external 
authorities and follow their intuition. This demand encourages modem persons to avoid 
secularist spin; thus preventing a closed interpretation of the immanent frame from 
becoming mandatory in modernity.328 
4.1.4 Human Benevolence 
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The second site of rebellion can be found in the Romantic understanding ofhuman 
benevolence as the natural inclination to love and sympathize with others. Taylor explains 
that the buffered self s disengaged stance to suffering, stands as an anathema to the 
Romantic conception ofbenevolence. He writes: 
"[ ... ] a too benign picture of the hurnan condition leaves sornething crucial out, sornething that 
rnatters to us. There is a dark side to creation [ ... ] even where a voice of faith wants to deny that 
this is the last word, as with Christianity, we cannot set aside the fact that this is what we live, 
that we regularly experience this as ultirnate. Ali great religions recognize this, and place their 
hopes in a beyond which doesn't sirnply deny this, which takes its reality seriously,,329. The 
Rornantic view ofhurnan benevolence chafes against the buffered selfs disengaged persona, it 
dernands the recognition of suffering as rneaningful and significant. To sirnply bracket off the 
experience of pain is in sorne way to cheapen life, to render it shallow.,,330 
Taylor argues this understanding of the ethic ofhuman benevolence requires the 
recognition of suffering as a meaningful experience, which need not be eliminated, but 
transcended. Human benevolence, therefore, is a site of rebellion against the closed 
interpretation of the immanent frame because it recognizes the significance of a 
transcendent reality, which goes beyond suffering and pleasure. 
4.1.5 Tensions in the interpretation of the immanent frame 
Taylor's portrayal of the buffered self demonstrates the tension between closed and 
open interpretations of the immanent frame in modernity, and the appeal of anti-religious 
negative narratives, which present the former interpretation as normative. Taylor writes: 
328 Taylor, A Secular Age, 509 
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"So deeply has the narrative ofhurnan progress becorne ernbedded in our world that it would indeed 
be a frightening day in which ail faith in it was lost. Its ernbedding is attested in rnuch everyday 
vocabulary, in which sorne ideas are described as 'progressive', others as 'backwards'; sorne 
views are those oftoday, others are positively 'rnediaeval'; sorne thinkers are 'ahead oftheir 
. , h '11 .. ,,331 brne , ot ers are sb III a prevlOus century, etc. 
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While much of the narrative content of the anti-religious negative narratives is already 
embedded in modem culture, Taylor explains that the anti-religious sentiment ofthis 
perspective is not. He argues that a purely immanent frame can result in a sense of malaise; 
modem persons may feel a "sense of fragility of meaning, the search for an over-arching 
significance", or they might perceive the "flatness of our attempts to solemnize the crucial 
moments of passage in our lives, and [ ... ] the utter flatness, emptiness of the ordinary.,,332 
Taylor maintains that remaining open to the transcendent is advantageous to modem 
society, as finding sources of significance and meaning within a c10sed immanent frame is 
too difficult for many persons. Forcing such an interpretation on modem society, he warns, 
will have negative consequences for future generations. 
4.1.6 Fragilization and belief 
Taylor explains that the tension between c10sed and open interpretations of the 
immanent frame has resulted in the fragilization ofbelief. The diversity and religious 
plurality of modem western societies is an aggravator, and not the catalyst, of the 
fragilization effect. Taylor writes: "The fact is that this kind of multiplicity of faiths has 
little effect as long as it is neutralized by the sense that being like them is not really an 
option for me. As long as the alternative is strange and other, perhaps despised, but perhaps 
just too different [ ... ] becoming that isn't really conceivable for me.,,333 Religious and 
spiritual traditions normally resist dissolution into one another. 
Modem society, however, encourages "maximum homogeneity" through the 
demand for rational discipline and the insistence on universalized values, such as the ethic 
ofmutual benefit.334 Taylor writes: "what is the new framework? [ ... ] Human beings, 
forming societies under the normative provisions of the Modem Moral Order, and fulfilling 
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their purposes by using what Nature provides, through the aid of accurate knowledge of 
this Nature, and [ ... ] Technology.,,335 In combination with the notion that society can be 
ordered and structured to fit instrumental purposes this new framework fosters a sense that 
there is only one way to achieve moral goals. In this context, radical plurality becomes a 
source of fragilization. Faced with the pressure of universal goals that demand a certain 
degree of conformity and the altemate pressure of the ethic of authenticity to avoid 
anything that hints at convention, including the inherited traditions of previous generations, 
the multiplicity of moral frameworks intensifies. Modem society thus becomes "prone to 
change.,,336 Taylor writes: 
"It is a pluralist world, in which many forms of belief and unbelief jostle, and hence fragilize each 
other. It is a world in which beliefhas lost many of the social matrices which made it seem 'obvious' 
and unchallengeable. [ ... ] We could say that this is a world in which the fate ofbelief depends much 
more than before on powerful intuitions ofindividuals, radiating out to others.,,337 
When belief is no longer obvious, the decision to believe or not to believe is subjected to 
the same discriminatory process used in determining aIl other meaningfullife choices: that 
of strong evaluation. 
According to Taylor, William Clifford first articulated the idea that belief is an 
ethical choice in 1877. He proposed that persons should not believe in God without 
sufficient evidence.338 Taylor contends that Clifford's thesis is evidence of a change in the 
interpretation ofbelief; this change "is being passed off as a simple discovery, which in fact 
is much more like a new construction.,,339 The anti-religious negative narrative account of 
this shift attributes the change in the understanding ofbelief, and the subsequent 
development of atheism, to science; but according to Taylor this attribution is a false and 
"ill-grounded view,,340. The change in the interpretation ofbelief, Taylor argues, is the 
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result of the shift to an immanent moral framework and the introduction of the buffered 
selë41 . 
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Taylor explains that in the context of secularity, a person's sense of morality and 
identity influences their decision to believe. The theory expounded by the anti-religious 
negative narratives - that science has disproven the existence of God and has led to a 
decline and regression offaith - is evidence of the immanent moral framework underlying 
the buffered self. This framework, in combination with an understanding of religion as 
authoritative, supematural and superstitious, Taylor expects that: 
"sorne people see no place in this kind of world for belief in God. A faith of this kind would have to 
rnake one an outsider, an enerny ofthis world, in unrelenting combat with it. Thus, one is either 
thoroughly in this world, living by its prernises, and then one cannot really believe in God; or one 
believes, and one is in sorne sense living like a resident alien in rnodemity.,,342 
The restricted interpretation of religion and morality in modemity produces the appearance 
that religion and modemity are incompatible. Religion is portrayed as incongruent with 
exclusively hum an goals and this view influences the modem person's decision to believe. 
According to Taylor, those who argue that their choice is determined by science are 
in actuality expressing a belief that science and instrumental reason are higher goods than 
faith, and it is therefore better to be an atheist. 343 Similarly, the sentiment that be1ief is 
childish is an expression of the valorisation of disengaged freedom and autonomy to which 
the beliefin a supematural power is an affront.344 Taylor maintains that studies ofmodem 
theists reveal that scientific arguments do not diminish their faith. He writes: "what 
emerges from all this is that we can either see the transcendent as a threat, a dangerous 
temptation, a distraction, or an obstacle to our greatest good. Or we can read it as answering 
to our deepest craving, need, fulfi1ment of the goOd.,,345 The challenge for many individuals 
lies in striking a balance between the recognition of transcendent goods and immanent 
341 1 1 Tay or, A Secu ar Age, 566. 
342 Ibid., 569. 
343 Ibid., 571. 
344 Ibid., 561. 
345 Ibid., 548. 
goods, leading them ~o perhaps deny the existence of God while affirming a sense of a 
higher power, or basing their lives around a vision of a higher goOd.346 
The belief in God, or the transcendent, Taylor suggests, is an affirmation of our 
moral values and results from the process of strong evaluation. 34 7 He maintains that few 
people consider their opinion on beliefmeaningless or insignificant.348 Taylor writes: 
"The debate between metaphysico-religious positions is driven mainly by people's sense of 
their ethical predicament in this sense. It is this which largely determines the positions they 
adopt, those they tum away from, the conversions they undergo from one to another; the cross-
pressure they feel between two which are both unacceptable, which pushes them to devise a 
new position, and which drives the Nova. Even when it seems to be driven by something else, 
and perhaps partIy is, an important mIe is being pIayed by this debate.,,349 
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Taylor reveals morality as the motivation and foundation for belief in modemity, though he 
recognizes that other "alien motivations are always intervening as we struggle with these 
issues, but not in a massive and organized way as they do where identities are at stake.,,350 
Taylor contends that religious belief is almost uniquely a moral issue, and that most modem 
persons are not swayed by other factors. The belief in God, therefore, involves much 
greater issues than the question ofGod's existence. As Morgan writes: "This is not, as 
Taylor wams, a matter ofproving God's existence from facts about the world; rather God is 
'accepted' as a constitutive good or moral source only when we see what is gained by doing 
so and when we are thereby 'moved by our relation to God. ",351 In this light, belief can be 
understood as a good that is evaluated in the same way as any other moral goal. 352 
4.2 Critiques of Belief 
Taylor identifies two forms of critique which are common in the debate between 
closed and open interpretations of the immanent frame. These critiques are moral 
346 Taylor, A Secular Age, 550-566. 
347 Ibid 544 
348 Ibid" 600' 
349 Ibid:: 603: 
350 Ibid., 604. 
351 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age ofPluralism: the philosophy of 
Charles Taylor in question, 64. 
352 For sorne belief is a hypergood, it is incomparably higher than other goods. Secular, modem moral 
frameworks, however, do not portray belief as a good. In modemity, belief sits firmly within the scope and 
breadth of strong evaluation, is frequently ranked below other goods. 
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evaluations; however, they are often presented by their proponents as 10gical and rational 
arguments. The tirst critique states: "1 see a genuine fullness here, that is, something which 
is deeper, solider than the run of ordinary life, but 1 want to point out that there are things 
which yield a still higher, deeper, more powerful fullness; you shouldn't be making your 
present fullness the whole goal of your life.,,353 This sort of critique recognizes the 
legitimacy and value of the other's point ofview. 
In contrast, the second critique views the other points of view as inherently flawed. 
The second critique states: "1 see the kind offullness you're supposing, and 1 also see that 
you are getting sorne kick out of this, but the two are not the same. You think you're 
getting fulfilment, but you're fooling yourself, passing yourself offwith a simulacrum.,,354 
The latter critique supposes that there is only one correct moral vision, whereas the former 
recognizes the merits of other frameworks. 
Taylor's discussion of the aesthetics and epiphanic art in Sources of the Selfis 
representative ofboth critiques. Taylor suggests that sorne modem ideals such as the 
aesthetic sensibility are contingent on the recognition of transcendence. He contends that 
the aesthetic sensibility is only partly satistied by a purely immanent frame, as there 
remains the question ofwhether or not a richer experience ofbeauty may be found in a 
religious register. Furthermore, Taylor proposes that there is something epiphanic in art that 
requires the recognition of transcendent or external moral sources to be grasped. 355 Taylor 
thus contends that human beings will al ways be dissatistied with a purely immanent frame, 
as it limits human experience to existing reality, and ignores the historical influence of 
spiritualityand religion in Western art. 
Taylor's suggestion that a more profound experience of art and beauty may lie in a 
transcendent frame is an example of the tirst critique. His suggestion do es not devalue the 
immanent experience of aesthetics; however, he presupposes that a transcendent experience 
of art is qualitatively higher than the immanent experience of art. In contrast, his assertion 
353 Taylor A Secular Age, 601 
354 Ibid., 601. 
355Taylor writes: "The something which the epiphanic art brings to presence is a source of meaning it is a 
constitutive good -and it is brought to presence in a unique and non-reducible way". Ibid., 607. 
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that artistic epiphanies are inaccessible in a purely immanent frame356 presupposes is an 
example of the second form of critique. Taylor' s critique suggests that the immanent 
observer is incapable of finding epiphanic meaning in art, and that their experience of art is 
qualitatively lower than that of a transcendent observer. 
4.2.1 Parties involved in the debate over belief 
Taylor is not the only party engaged in the debate between transcendence and 
immanence in modemity. He explains that the greater debate in intellectual cirdes 
generally involves three -or four parties: secular humanist, anti-humanist, and a third 
party that supports transcendence.357 Taylor further divides the latter party in two; 
differentiating advocates of transcendence that recognize the merits of the immanent frame, 
from those who are dismissive of the immanent frame. For the purposes ofthis paper 1 shall 
refer to the former position as an "open transcendent perspective," and the latter as a 
"closed transcendent perspective." 
Secular humanists daim that religion, particularly Christianity, is an instigator of 
social violence and aggression, and causes human suffering. Moreover, they contend that 
Christianity forces human beings to sacrifice pleasure and hum an goods for salvation. This 
rejection, they argue, is contrary to human nature. 
In contrast, anti-humanists maintain that violence and aggression are rooted in 
human nature and that death is as much a part oflife as birth: "the beHef in untroubled 
happiness is not only a childish illusion, but also involves a truncation ofhuman nature, 
tuming our backs on much ofwhat we are.,,358 Anti-humanists daim that secular humanists 
demean the experience ofhuman suffering by considering malaise and depression 
psychological pathologies, which require treatment and elimination.359 Religion, they 
356 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 218. 
357 Taylor, A Secular Age, 637. 
358 Ibid., 635. 
359 Ibid., 636. 
argue, portrays suffering inaccurately, as an element of the human condition which only 
has meaning in being overcome or transcended.360 
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Proponents of the c10sed transcendent perspective contend that "the whole move to 
secular humanism was just a mistake, which needs to be undone.,,361 The emphasis of 
ordinary pleasures and human goods, they maintain, has only detracted from morality. They 
argue that "the denial oftranscendence is bound to lead to a crumbling and eventual break-
down ofall moral standards.,,362 The proponents oftranscendence thus recommend a retum 
to traditional theistic religion as the solution to all modem ethical dilemmas. 
4.2.2 Taylor's critique ofbelief 
Taylor's position is representative of an "open transcendent" perspective: he believes 
in transcendence, sees value in the immanent frame, and accepts part of the Enlightenrnent 
narrative. He writes: 
"Others, in which 1 place myself, think that the primacy of life has been a great gain for human 
kind, and that there is sorne truth in the self-narrative of the Enlightenment: this gain was in fact 
unlikely to come about without sorne breach with established religion. [ ... ] But we nevertheless 
think that the metaphysical primacy of life espoused by exclusive humanism is wrong, and 
stifling, and that its continued dominance puts in danger the practical primacy.,,363 
In c1arifying his position, Taylor uses the first form of critique against the other three 
perspectives. He agrees with both secular humanists and anti-humanists that the shift to an 
immanent perspective represents a moral, epistemic gain for human society; however he 
contests the anti-religious negative narratives account, c1aiming that the initial rupture 
between society and traditional religion was instigated by the Reformation. Religion broke 
away from its own traditions. Taylor also recognizes the value inherent in the concept of 
the primacy ofhuman life espoused by secular humanists. 364 He insists however - as other 
advocates oftranscendence - that there are greater goals than the flourishing ofhumankind. 
360 Taylor, A Secu/ar Age, 663. 
361 Ibid., 637. 
362 Ibid., 638. 
363 Ibid., 637. 
364 By "the primacy of life" Taylor is referring to the valorization of ordinary human life and good, and to the 
ethic of mutual benefit, which sees hannony as the natural inclination of an uncorrupted society. The 
metaphysical interpretation of the primacy of life sees no point to life beyond the fulfillment of these goals. 
Moreover, Taylor contends that violence and suffering are unavoidable features of 
human life that have meaning, although he contends that such experiences should not be 
valorised, but transformed. 
98 
Taylor maintains that the ethical dilemmas of modernity cannot be resolved by 
adopting one ofthese perspectives. Modern western culture is a pluralist society; multiple 
moral frameworks must be recognized as legitimate and valid for this society to remain 
defined by its diversity. Taylor proposes that the solution is to articulate a moral framework 
which balances the respective demands of immanence and transcendence, thereby 
liberating the modern self from a continuous sense of dissatisfaction. 365 He questions: "how 
to define our highest spiritual or moral aspirations for human beings, while showing a path 
to the transformation which doesn't crush, mutilate or deny what is essential to our 
humanity?,,366 Taylor's solution blends sorne elements of aIl three perspectives - secular 
humanism, anti-humanism, and transcendence - within a Christian, predominantly Catholic 
perspective. 
4.3 A Catholic Solution 
In A Secular Age, Taylor proposes that violence and aggression are part of the 
religious behaviour ofhuman beings, and therefore, require a religious solution. He writes: 
"[ ... ] we might be tempted to speculate further, and to suggest that the perennial human 
susceptibility to be fascinated by death and violence, is at base a manifestation of our nature 
as homo religiosus,:'367 Overcoming this behaviour cannot be accompli shed through 
negation or valorisation, as neither satisfies the perennial fascination human beings 
demonstrate towards suffering. He writes: "what it might mean, however, is that the only 
way fully to escape the draw towards violence lies somewhere in the turn to transcendence, 
that is, through the full-hearted love of sorne good beyond life.,,368 Taylor proposes that 
violence and suffering must be recognized by moral frameworks as meaningful experiences 
that can be transcended. The secular humanist portrayal of violence and aggression as 
365 Taylor, A Secular Age, 624. 
366 Ibid., 640. 
367 Taylor, " A Catholic Modernity?" A Catholic Modernity?, 28; Taylor, A Secular Age, 639 
368 Taylor, "A Catholic Modernity?" A Catholic Modernity?, 28; Taylor, A Secular Age, 639 
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deviant behaviour negates the moral implications behind these acts. Furthermore, the 
anti-humanist suggestion that human beings are incapable of avoiding such actions negates 
the hope for a peaceful future. Taylor proposes a reconciliation ofboth viewpoints within a 
Christian perspective. 
In Sources of the Self and A Secular Age, Taylor contends that a mediated path 
between proponents oftranscendence, secular humanism, and anti-humanism, can be 
developed within a Christian perspective, though he do es not insist that Christianity 
contains solutions for every modem problem.369 He maintains that recognizing 
transcendence as a moral source liberates human beings from the perennial problem of 
rationalizing violence and suffering. According to Morgan, Taylor "does not argue directly 
that God and religion should play a central role in our moral lives; he do es show how, 
subject to detailed clarification, they could do SO.,,370 Taylor does not advocate for a 
homogeneous, Christian solution to the ethical dilemmas of modernity. He states at 
numerous instances that there is a v ari et y ofpaths to GOd37l and solutions to the problems 
ofmodernity.372 
In A Catholic Modernity?, Taylor describes his solution for modernity as a Catholic; 
however, he maintains that his solution is applicable for all members of modem western 
culture, regardless oftheir religious heritage. (His understanding ofCatholicism is 
independent of the institution of the Catholic Church. Taylor rejects the project of 
Christendom as advocated by the Catholic Church. He explains that the fusion offaith with 
culture and society is a project highly susceptible to coercion, which, history has proven, 
nearly always involves attempts to homogenize society.373 According to Taylor, the 
369 Taylor writes: "Christianity looks to a much fuller transformation of human life, such that it becomes 
possible to conceive of transfiguring even the most purblind, self-absorbed and violent. But this is a 
transformation which cannot be completed in history. In the nature of things, Christianity offers no global 
solution, no general organization ofthings here and now which will fully resolve the dilemma, and meet the 
maximal demand. It can only show ways in which we can, as individuals, and as churches, hold open the path 
to the fullness of the kingdom." Taylor A Secular Age, 643. 
370 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse"Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the ph ilosophy of Charles 
Taylor in question, 51. 
371 Taylor, A Secular Age, 765 -766. 
372 Ibid., 708-709. 
373 Taylor, "A Catholic Modemity?" A Catholic Modernity?, 17. 
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imposition ofhomogeneity has mutilated the Christian message. 374 Taylor contends that 
he is not advocating for a modification of Catholicism nor for "a new, better higher 
Catholicism, meant to replace all those outmoded varieties that c1utter up our past" as "to 
search for this would be to chase a chimera, a monster that cannot exist in the nature of 
things.,,375 Instead, in A Catholic Modernity?, Taylor presents a reinterpretation of existing 
Catholic theology with regards to the ethical dilemmas of modemity. 
George Marsden summarizes Taylor's suggestion as the following: that Catholics 
and other Christians approach modemity "on its own terms, as much as it is possible 
without violating the essentials of our traditions.,,376 This approach entails finding a balance 
between the demands of tradition and the reality of modemity, establishing grounds of 
commonality among diverse members of society, as well as assisting in the realization of 
the secular humanist moral vision. For William H. Shea, Taylor's suggestion is a reflection 
ofhis "mediating path: neither surrender, nor rejection, neither 'booster' nor 'knocker,' but 
participant, voice, critical engager.,,377 1 contend that Taylor's "mediating path" represents 
more than an assessment ofmodemity, or a "diagnostic goal," 378 as Smith and Shea 
propose; rather, Taylor's mediating path represents a practical solution to current and future 
ethical problems ofmodemity. 
4.3.1 Violence and Transformation 
The problem of the existence of suffering in modemity is greater than the issue of 
how to prevent, or end suffering in the world. The problem involves the interpretation of 
the meaning of suffering, and the consequences of this interpretation for the modem moral 
order. Taylor explains that biology cannot account for the violent impulses inherent in 
human society. Biological explanations do not consider the direction in which violence is 
374 Taylor writes, "[: .. ] our Christian life itselfhas suffered a mutilation to the extent that it imposes this kind 
ofhomogenization. The Church was rather meant to be the place in which hum an beings, in all their 
difference and disparate itineraries, come together; and in this regard, we are obviously falling far short." 
Taylor, A Seeular Age, 772. 
375 Taylor, "A Catholic Modemity?" A Catho/ie Modernity?, 14. 
376 Marsden, "Matteo Ricci and the Prodigal Culture". A Catho/ie Modernity?, 83. 
377 Shea, "A Vote of Thanks to Voltaire" A Catho/ie Modernity?, 54. 
378 Smith, Nicholas H. Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 224. 
oriented, nor do they consider the cultural justifications ofviolence.379 According to 
Taylor, human beings need a meta-biological explanation of violence. Taylor writes: 
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"That humans inflict pain and suffering on others is part of the very way of things, the way of the 
dark and inhuman in the universe resonates in us. To see this is to intuit the tragedy at the basis of 
human life. There is a certain beauty in this way, and a joy of seeing and assenting to il. The superior 
being can say 'yea' to this way, and this is his joy, in Nietzsche's view.,,38o 
The anti-humanist understanding of violence thus appeals to modem persons because it 
recognizes the meaning of these acts. The anti-humanist perspective, however, is hopeless; 
violence cannot be avoided, mitigated, or ended. In contrast, the secular humanists consider 
violence meaningless in abstraction, and in contradiction with the goal ofhuman 
flourishing. 
Taylor maintains that the solution to the ethical problems of suffering and violence 
requires revisiting the Christian concept of salvation through transformation and agape. 
Secular humanism has adopted an incomplete interpretation of Christian sai vat ion and 
transformation as associated with the renunciation of the human body and ordinary 
desires. 381 Taylor's interpretation ofChristianity posits that salvation occurs through 
transformation of the spirit. 382 This interpretation denies the legitimacy of acts of violence 
perpetrated in the name of God, as weIl as the project of Christendom. According to Taylor, 
"suffering can have transformative meaning."383 Associating personal suffering with the 
suffering of Christ transforms the experience into an opportunity for renewed contact with 
GOd.384 Contact with God offers humanity "full participation in divine life.,,385 Taylor 
contends that God loves humanity unconditionally and desires the same ofhuman beings; 
participation in divine life thus involves accepting the calI to love other human beings, 
regardless of difference or diversity. This calI to agape is the meaning of the expression 
unity-across difference. Accepting agape does not negate the experience of suffering, or the 
impulse of violence; rather, agape forces the human agent to confront their violent 
379 Taylor A Secu/ar Age, 659 
380 Ibid., 664. 
381 Ibid., 644. 
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reactions towards difference and the other, and to active1y transform this emotion into 
love. Through transformation of violence, the human agent transcends the human condition. 
The practical implication of the transformation of violence is the protection of the innocent 
bystanders in situations of war and aggression.386 
The cycle of violence is perpetuated by secular humanism and anti-humanism 
alike. Locating the source of morality within the human agent, Taylor suggests, has led to 
the veneration ofhuman nature. This veneration prevents secular humanism from 
recognising the meaning of violence, and has contributed to the appeal of anti-humanism. 
Taylor contends that modem society requires a transcendent ideal, if not a transcendent 
moral source, in order to resolve the ethical dilemma of violence. This suggests that Taylor 
considers the acknowledgement of agape as the highest goal of the modem moral order. 
4.3.2 Suffering and Sacrifice 
Secular humanists deny the recognition of suffering as a meaningful experience; 
they contend that suffering results from failing to respect the practical primacy of life. 
According to Taylor, the secular humanist notion of the primacy oflife originates from the 
Christian idea of salvation by design; or, the idea that God's only purpose is human 
flourishing. The Christian notion of salvation by design is prob1ematic in modemity 
because it negates the meaning of non-causal suffering. Taylor writes: 
"Suffering imposed by humans, particularly in the name of transcendent ideals, has a meaning: a 
negative one, as something we strive to get rid of. But extraneous suffering must be meaningless. We 
can't admit it has meaning without falling back into one ofthose views of suffering as right and 
necessary, as sent to try or punish or improve us. And that is one of the reasons why the modem age 
is so concemed about this issue ofmeaning.,,387 
Taylor explains that this Christian interpretation of suffering has been subsumed by modem 
secular humanism, and cannot be eliminated nor reversed. 388 Moreover, for any person that 
acknowledges the primacy oflife as a good, the anti-humanist response to suffering does 
not resolve the surrounding ethical issues. 
386 Taylor A Secular Age, 673. 
387 Ibid., 650. 
388 Ibid, 651. 
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In the Christian tradition, suffering and sacrifice are intimately connected 
concepts. The secular humanist interpretation of Christianity associates the concept of 
sacrifice with the renunciation ofhuman goods. 389 Taylor maintains, however, that 
suffering is not caused by the sacrifice ofhuman goods; rather, "our sin is in resisting 
God's initiative to make suffering reparative.,,390 Without understanding how suffering can 
benefit the human agent, proponents of secular humanism necessarily experience suffering 
and sacrifice as negative. 
According to Taylor, sacrifice also refers to the destruction ofvices/91 which 
prevent the realization of agape. Through transformation, violence may be channelled into 
sacrifice and used to generate agape. 392 Taylor maintains that the contemporary moral order 
is incompatible with an understanding of sacrifice as the rejection ofhuman flourishing, or 
of sacrifice as the vehicle for achieving hurrian flourishing. Christianity provides an 
interpretation of sacrifice as sharing the suffering of others and transforming their 
experience with love. Christ's sacrifice is to embrace the reparative aspect of suffering "to 
offer no counter-resistance, but to continue loving and offering. [ .... ] On the basis ofthis 
initiative, the incomprehensible healing power ofthis suffering, it becomes possible for 
human suffering, even of the most meaningless type, to become associated with Christ's 
act, and to become a locus for renewed contact with God, an act which heals the world.,,393 
Taylor' s understanding of sacrifice is thus a form of tikkum alam, the Hebrew expression 
for "healing the world.,,394 Modem pers ons can transform sacrifice into tikkun alam by 
confronting suffering without the comfort of disengagement. 395 Taylor writes: "one part of 
the solution is being there and praying, being there and affirming the good which is never 
absent. You see the good through the eyes of God.,,396 Following Christ's example, 
according to Taylor, means entering into a relationship of solidarity with the poor, sick, 
marginalized a).1d disenfranchised members of society. 
389 Taylor, A Secular Age, 645. 
390 Ibid., 655. 
391 Ibid., 647. 
392 Ibid., 668. 
393 Ibid., 654. 
394 Ibid., 681. 
395 Ibid., 682-683. 
396 Ibid, 685. 
104 
4.3.3 Plurality and Fragilization 
Taylor 10cates the meaning of the term Catholic in the Greek word katholou. The 
term katholou refers to both "universality and who1eness", and is the true essence of the 
Catholic religion. He writes: "This is the oneness of diverse beings who come to see that 
they cannot attain wholeness alone, that their complementarity is essential, rather than of 
beings who come to accept that they are ultimately identical.,,397 Taylor maintains that 
plurality and multiplicity can be a source of unit y - rather than fragilization - if interpreted 
correctly. 
According to Taylor, plurality is an essential feature ofhumanity that is expressed 
in the multiplicity of existing identities, cultures, and societies. He proposes that plurality is 
a reflection ofhuman beings having been made in the image of God. The Catholic 
conception of God understands God as a trinity: 398 three parts that are distinct, yet whole. 
Plurality is therefore an inherent feature of God. According to Taylor, the Catholic message 
ofuniversality and wholeness should be interpreted as "unity-across-difference,,,399 which 
signifies the recognition of othemess as a humanldivine constant. Taylor surmises that the 
common interpretation ofuniversality and wholeness is "unity-through-identity," 400 which 
supposes that wholeness is attained through homogeneity. 
Taylor maintains that recognizing the goodness of difference is one solution for 
preventing the fragilizing effect ofplurality, and the resulting discrediting ofreligious 
identity. Moreover, he suggests that the recognition ofplurality as a good has the potential 
to deepen agape because it encourages solidarity. Taylor writes: 
"[ ... ] the love is not conditional on the worth realized in you just as an individual or even in what is 
realizable in you alone. That's because being made in the image of God, as a feature of each human 
being, is not something that can be characterized just by reference to this being alone. Our being in 
the image of God is also our standing among others in the stream of love, which is that facet of 
God's life we try to grasp, very inadequately, in speaking of the Trinity.,,401 
397 Taylor, "A Catholic Modemity?" A Catholic Modernity?, 14. 
398 Ibid., 14. 
399 Ibid., 14. 
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401 Ibid., 35. 
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For Taylor, the source of plurality in hum an beings is God. God is the constitutive good 
of plurality and the recognition of the wholeness of difference in other human beings is 
tantamount to recognizing the divinity in others.402 As love for the constitutive good is the 
motivation for goodness, Taylor suggests that the recognition of divine difference deepens 
the love and solidarity between human beings. This interpretation ofplurality, as a source 
of goodness and meaning, prevents plurality from becoming a catalyst of the fragilizing 
effect. 
4.4 Living the solution 
Taylor announces his Catholic solution for modemity late in his career, and though 
his solution is partly explained in Sources of the Self, few scholars noted its significance. 
In regards to Taylor's work priOf to 1994, Morgan comments: "Perhaps Taylor's 
achievement on behalf of religion and its moral role, guarded and yet provocative, succeeds 
at too steep a cost, for ultimately there may be too little substance in the divine-human 
relation to support any serious practical moral reasoning about the religious option. Taylor 
may have carved out a route of access to the religious life, only to eliminate any good 
reasons for taking it.,,403 Taylor's conclusion of Sources of the Selfalludes to the reparative 
potential of Christianity and the necessity of re-interpreting Christian faith for the modem 
age.404 As Marsden remarks: "the substance [of Sources of the Seij], however, is clearly 
controlled by questions shaped by a Christian agenda, and few clues are provided to allow 
the reader to surmise that is what is going on. At least one can tell that the agenda is Judeo-
Christian and theistic. Only the most acute readers might surmise that the author is 
Catholic, ifthey did not know that already.,,405 Marsden suggests that with his Marianist 
award lecture, A Catholic Modernity?, Taylor adopts the guise of a Christian apologetic406; 
402 Morgan notes the similarity between Taylor's project in Sources of the Self and Martin Buber. Morgan, 
"Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the philosophy of Charles Taylor in 
question, 62. 
403 Ibid., 62. 
404 Taylor, A Secular Age, 520-521. 
405 Morgan, "Religion, history, moral discourse". Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: the philosophy of 
Charles Taylor in question, 87. 
406 Marsden, "Matteo Ricci and the Prodigal Culture". A Catholic Modernity?, 84. 
Taylor, however, distances himself from this guise in A Secular Age, by representing 
the solution laid out in A Catholic Modemity without reference to Catholicism. 
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Marsden applauds Taylor for his modem interpretation of Christianity, encouraging 
other scholars to follow in his example.407 ln addition, 1 contend that Taylor's interpretation 
represents more than a theoretical solution; he lives this solution. Taylor has applied his 
understanding ofplurality, sacrifice, and transformation in his personallife. 
Smith describes Taylor as a twelfth-generation Quebecker, who was raised in a 
bilingual family. He notes that Taylor's early experiences lead him to recognize the 
significance oflanguage and identity, which influenced his later philosophy and inspired 
"the notion ofplural identity, ofidentity constituted or expressed in multiple ways.,,408 
Taylor's appraisal ofplurality as a significant - even sacred - aspect of the human identity 
is reflected in his strong opposition ofhomogeneity in Quebec society: Smith notes that 
Taylor opposed extraneous French Language laws, designed to encourage a more 
homogenous culture,409 and critiqued the leader of the Parti Québécois Jacque Parizeau's 
anti-minority comments made after the 1995 referendum. Taylor's notion ofunity-across-
difference is arguably drawn from his many personal experiences with diversity. Smith 
further reveals that in 1956, during his studies at Oxford University, Taylor spent six 
months in Vienna visiting Hungarian student refugees.4lO Little is mentioned of Taylor's 
experiences in Vienna, however, one might surmise that Taylor's proposition ofliving in 
solidarity with the suffering of others is based on more than theory. Furthermore, 
throughout Taylor's studies in Britain, he was an outspoken opponent ofnuc1ear arms 
research and proliferation. He protested the bomb on the basis that "the bomb was 'morally 
wrong' and 'banning it would reduce tension between east and west and could be a 
practical first step towards total disarmament. ",411 Taylor's collaboration with multiple 
organizations against nuc1ear arms412 is reflective ofhis assertion, inA Secular Age, that 
violence can be transformed through sacrifice - solidarity - into human benevolence. Smith 
407 Marsden, "Matteo Ricci and the Prodigal Culture" A Catho/ic Modernity?, 87-88. 
408 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 12. 
409 Ibid., 16. 
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remarks, however, that wh en Taylor left Britain "few of the movement's goals had been 
achieved.,,413 Upon retuming to Canada in 1961, Taylor joined the New Democrat Party in 
Quebec, which shared his leftist leanings and collaborated with the Quebec govemment on 
projects addressing issues ofplurality and multiplicity. Most recently, Taylor co-chaired the 
Bouchard Taylor "Consular Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural 
Differences" from 2007 to 2008.414 
Taylor explains in A Catholic Modernity? that his solution for modemity cannot be 
realized through belief alone. He writes: 
"[ ... ] just having appropriate beliefs is no solution to these dilemmas, and the transformation ofhigh 
ideals into brutal practice was demonstrated lavishly in Christendom, weIl before modem humanism 
came on the scene. [ ... ] This cannot be a matter of guarantee, only offaith. But it is c1ear that 
Christian spirituality points to one. It can be described in two ways: either as a love or compassion 
that is unconditional- that is, not based on what you the recipient have made ofyourself - or as one 
based on what you are mostprofoundly, a being in the image ofGod.,,415 
The briefbiography of Taylor's life - which highlights his defence of the significance of 
the plurality ofhuman identity, his performance ofreparative sacrifice by sharing the 
suffering of others, and his efforts to transform violence through benevolence - suggests 
that Taylor not only believes in his solution as an abstract concept; he adheres to this path 
as an article of faith. 
4.5 The Future of Religion in Western Culture 
Taylor's solution for modemity proposes the interpretation of violence, sacrifice, 
and suffering as reparative opportunities to develop and sustain agape. His solution 
constitutes a modem re-interpretation ofChristianity in conti nuit y with many foundational 
precepts. Taylor proposes that for religious traditions to remain relevant, they must be 
subject to continuaI innovation and reinvention. This idea is in continuity with the 
definition of religion, as capable of changing in significance, and the demonstration of the 
evolving concept of God. 
413 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morais and Modernity, 14 
414 Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles. Ed. 
Gouvernement du Québec. 18 June 2008, 15 June 2009 <http://www.accommodements.qc.calindex-en.html> 
415 Taylor, "A Catholic Modernity?" A Catho/ic Modernity, 35. 
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Taylor maintains that the stagnation of religious innovation damages faith, as 
"something is lost wh en we take the way ofliving together that the Gospel points us to and 
make ofit a code ofrules enforced by organizations erected for this purpose.,,416 Taylor 
considers re-interpretation a form of maintaining the Christian and Catholic faith. He 
recognizes that sustaining religion frequently requires significant changes to tradition; 
however the purpose of such changes "is not to return to an earlier formula, inspiring as 
many ofthese will undoubtedly be; [ ... ] inevitably and rightly Christian life today will look 
for and discover new ways ofmoving beyond the present orders to God.,,417 Discovering 
new ways ofbeing Christian in the modem world requires uncovering the ways in which 
Christian faith is already in harmony with modem goals; abandoning the tenets of Christian 
faith is unnecessary as the path is already contained within the tradition. Taylor's solution 
for modernity is an example ofhow a new path may be created in continuity with religious 
tradition.418 
As a reflection of the relationship between God and humanity, Taylor argues that 
the Catholic Church provides multiple paths towards the divine. Taylor argues for the 
recognition ofChristianity and religion as human constants, and perennial features of the 
cultural, moral and sociallandscape of Western culture.419 He writes: 
"what reaUy matters is the continuity, and not the new paths broken. [ .... ] the rich variety of paths to 
God [ ... ] can orny come to light ifwe adopt the other framework, and see the unit y of the church as 
stretching into eternity across aU time, such that the paradigm itineraries that it gathers can't be 
identified with those of any one age.,,420 
According to Taylor the ultimate promise of the Christian church - salvation through faith 
- is continuous through history, though the de1ivery ofthis message adapts to the changing 
understanding of hum an agency and selfhood. 
According to Taylor, the positive evaluation oftranscendence has never waned in 
Western culture. Exclusive Humanists and proponents of mainstream secularization theory 
416 Taylor, A Secular Age, 737. 
417 Ibid., 755. 
418 Marsden, "Matteo Ricci and the Prodigal Culture" A Catho/ic Modern ity ? 87; Shea, "A Vote of Thanks to 
Voltaire" A Catho/ic Modernity?, 44-46; Elshtain "Augustine and Diversity" A Catho/ic Modernity?, 85; 
419 Ibid., 766. 
420 Ibid., 765 -766. 
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have mistakenly interpreted transcendence as contrary to human flourishing; however, 
Taylor maintains that this meaning is erroneous. Taylor firmly states that transcendence is a 
reality inherent to the morallife of aIl human beings. He writes: 
"In our religious lives we are responding to a transcendent reality. We ail have sorne sense ofthis, 
which emerges in our identifying and recognizing sorne mode of what 1 have called fullness, and 
seeking to attain it. Modes of fullness recognized by exclusive humanisms, and others that remain 
within the immanent frame, are therefore responding to a transcendent reality, but misrecognizing 
it." 421 
The embedding of transcendence in the human moral ontology has rendered the conception 
of God innate in the articulation of vision of the human agent. Taylor therefore argues that, 
contrary to the claims of anti-religious negative narratives, the transcendent perspective is 
unlikely to diminish in the future. 
Taylor theorizes that in societies in which the struggle between open and closed 
interpretations of immanence favours the former, religion is likely to experience a positive 
revival. He writes: 
"[ ... ] the dominant secularization narrative, which tends to blame our religious past for many of the 
woes of our world, will become less plausible over time. This will happen in part because it will be 
clear that other societies are not following suit, and thus that this mas ter narrative isn't about 
universal humanity; and also because many of the ills for which 'religion' was supposedly 
responsible aren't going away.,,422 
Taylor proposes that religion will remain a constant feature in the future of Western culture, 
because the anti-religious, secularist spun story is a false prophet. Moreover, he contends 
that secular humanism cannot survive without religion, as it is inspired by Christian moral 
ideals.423 For Taylor, the negation ofChristianity threatens the negation of aIl modem 
moral frameworks, which willlead to an abyss of meaninglessness. 424 Christianity and 
secular humanism can thus be seen as interdependent in the modem West. 
421 Taylor, A Secular Age, 768. 
422 Ibid., 770. 
423 Ibid., 517. 
424 Ibid., 719. 
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4.6 Conclusion: Tradition and Innovation 
The secular humanist critique of religion proposes that religion is an instigator of 
violence and suffering in the world. This critique recommends the elimination of 
transcendent goals and religious behaviour as a means of resolving modern dilemmas. 
According to Taylor, this perspective "scapegoats violence," and blames religion for 
society's iIIs and ignoring the meaning and significance of such acts in human life, in 
addition to their continued presence in the secular age.425 
Taylor contends that none of the three parties typically involved in the debate about 
belief - secular humanists, anti-humanists, and orthodox theists - provide a solution to the 
problem offragilization, suffering, or violence. Taylor offers a fourth perspective, intended 
to bridge the divide between the three parties. He advocates for a transcendent solution to 
the problem of suffering, fragilization, and violence, which begins with the recognition of 
pluralityas a transcendent, constitutive good. Taylor states that "sanctified violence goes 
along more easily with non-universalis~;,,426 restoring universalism unity-across-
difference thereby removes justifications for religious violence intended to eliminate 
otherness.427 Suffering, like violence, is an inescapable feature of the human experience. 
Taylor proposes, however, that suffering can be transcended through participation in God's 
plan for humanity the fostering of agape. In sum, Taylor's solution demands conversion 
from a c10sed interpretation of the immanent frame to an open interpretation of immanence, 
in addition to the partial adoption of a transcendent moral framework, in which 
transcendent love is portrayed as a moral ideal. 
Taylor's solution is both a critique ofthe CUITent secular, moral orientation of 
modem western society, and a defence of aU religious moral frameworks. Throughout his 
explanation of the modem ethical dilemmas, Taylor employs the first fonn of critique 
mentioned above: he defends the legitimacy of secular humanism and anti-humanism's 
perspectives, though maintaining that they have each failed to adequately address the 
problems of the contemporary condition ofbelief. Taylor's prediction of the future 
425 Taylor, A Secu/ar Age, 772. 
426 Ibid., 670. 
427 Ibid., 673-674. 
111 
condition offaith and religion in Western culture, however, verges on the second fonn 
of critique, which Taylor finnly disavows. He maintains that the fullness oflife is located 
in a transcendent reality that is misunderstood by those in the immanent frame; implying 
that only individuals disembedded from existing reality are able to accede to fullness and 
assent to goodness. Taylor, however, resists the second fonn of critique, which is 
characterized by the affinnation of a singular legitimate moral framework, by prefacing his 
solution with the acknowledgement that irreligious solutions might be equally as effective 
as his own. Taylor's narrative ofmodernity represents a carefully mediated solution for the 
ethical dilemmas of modernity. His plan incorporates circumspectly the perspectives of 
secular humanism, anti-humanism, and transcendence. This path also avoids an overiy 
generous portrayal of religion. Taylor navigates between the two religious extremes in 
modernity - new age spirituality and revivalist orthodoxy - without swaying in either 
direction. Taylor's specifie solution for modernity, however, is detenninably Christian. 
Despite his attempts to use Judeo-Christian-centric language, the concepts of salvation and 
transfonnation are not as universal as the notion of transcendence. Though a wide and 
diverse audience may assent to his narrative explanation of modernity, it is probable that 
the religious themes ofTaylor's solution wi11limit his solution's appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
5.1 General Conclusion 
A Secular Age represents the product of Taylor' s near fifty-year advancement of 
Philosophical Anthropology. This project, which began with the demonstration of the 
inherent meaning of human actions and identification of moral biases in the explanation of 
human practices, has since evolved into a complex narrative explanation of the modem 
condition ofbe1ief. As Smith writes: "It is not always c1ear where Taylor's Philosophical 
Anthropology ends and where his philosophical history begins. ,,428 The contention of this 
paper is that both exercises must be considered in relation to one another. 
The definitions of secularization, secular, secularity, and religion presented in A 
Secular Age demonstrate the continuation of Taylor's hermeneutical analysis of the human 
sciences. Taylor's discussion reveals the biases and suppositions inherent in the common, 
academic understandings of these terms. He offers alternative definitions, which consider 
the historical origins of these words, as well as their substantive and functional 
significance. Following a rigorous analysis, Taylor posits multiple definitions of secularity 
and religion, highlighting the plurality of the modem condition ofbelief. 
Taylor attributes the modem condition ofbelief to the shi ft in moral values initiated 
by the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century, which first diminished and later ec1ipsed 
the significance of God as a moral source and altered the understanding of human agency 
and selfhood. This shift in values fundamentally altered the Western conception ofGod. 
Subsequent theological and philosophical movements further exaggerated the moral ec1ipse 
of the divine. Taylor's description of the historical origins of the modem identity, however, 
reveals the continued significance and necessity of the transcendent for the comprehension 
ofhuman agency. 
Taylor demonstrates that the modem buffered self is under continuous pressure to 
refute the significance of the transcendent in morallife, and to adopt a singular, exc1usively 
428 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Marals and Modernity, 8. 
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immanent, moral framework. The plurality of hum an morality and religious experience 
is denied by this framework. Taylor contends that this denial, in addition to the perennial 
issues of suffering and violence, are the leading ethical dilemmas of modernity. He 
therefore proposes a solution to these dilemmas, which balances between immanence and 
transcendence, through a re-interpretation of Christianity. 
5.2 Observations 
Taylor's narrative ofmodernity is symbolic of the author's progression from 
observer to participant. Taylor maintains that all explanations of hum an practices are 
subjective; they assume that certain facts and statements are immutable. People are drawn 
to these explanations, in part because they affirm the existing vision of the human agent. 
Taylor asserts that without a shared framework ofunderstanding, theories ofhuman 
practices are unintelligible. In positing a narrative, which offers an alternative explanation 
of modernity than the mainstream account, Taylor is acknowledging the plurality of 
frameworks in Western culture. 
For Taylor to offer an explanation ofmodernity without reference to his own 
religious beliefs would be in contradiction with his observations. Taylor's framework is 
theistic, and, consequently, Taylor's narrative of modernity reflects his religious 
orientation. The embedded suggestion that God - or transcendence - is necessary for moral 
life is undoubtedly a reflection of Taylor's religious framework. Taylor is very much aware 
of the reflection ofhis religious beliefs in his work. He writes: 
"1 believe in God, because 1 sense something which 1 want to describe as God's love and affirmation 
of the world, and human beings. [ ... ] What 1 believe in is what figures in my best account ofthis 
world, history, and my experiences as a moral and spiritual being, but what figures in this account 
are experience-transcendent things. The God who figures in my account is not a function of my 
experience, although of course my belief in him, access to him, is. [ .... ] when 1 speak of 'my' best 
account, 1 don't mean one that 1 would identify as totally self-generated. 1 just me an the one which in 
fact makes most sense to me. My community, my history, exceptional models, and my own 
reflection, have all combined to offer me a language in which 1 make sense of all this. 1 will almost 
certainly become aware, in our world, that there are other languages [ ... ]"429 
429 Taylor, "Reply and re-articulation" Philosophy in an age ofpluralism: the philosophy of Charles Taylor in 
question, 226-227. 
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As this quotation demonstrates, Taylor is unapo10getic for the influence oftheism in his 
work. He recognizes that persona1 influences are unavoidab1e. Any exp1anation of 
modernity is ultimate1y nothing more than the author's "best account" oftheir experiences, 
observations, and intuitions. Taylor states that God is not a function ofhis experience, God 
is an independent reality. His beliefin God, however, is a reflection ofhis experiences in 
the world, and necessari1y figures in his exp1anations ofhumanity; however, the conception 
of God as an independent reality is not a universa1 truth, and he revea1s that through 
encountering the world this point is made all the more evident. 
The inclusion of religious e1ements in A Secular Age is not a mistake, or an 
oversight. The stated purpose ofTay10r's narrative is to provide an alternative account to 
the mainstream stories ofmodernity, which are dismissive ofbe1iefand hostile towards 
religion. A large majority of modern society affirms sorne form ofre1igious be1ief. Tay10r's 
narrative is directed towards those individua1s who fee1 a1ienated by mainstream theories of 
modernity, and cannot engage in the traditiona1, or orthodox, religious perspective of 
modern culture. Tay10r's solution for modernity is written specifically for this audience, as 
well as those who espouse a humanist, anti-humanist, or closed world structure. 
5.3 Summary of Contributions 
The primary contribution of this paper is in the advancement of the academic study of 
A Secular Age. As of the deposition ofthis project, significant research ofthis text has yet 
to be pub1ished. This paper a1so contributes to the understanding of Taylor's termino10gy 
and definitions of secularity and religion presented in A Secular Age, Modern Social 
Imaginaries, Varieties of Religion Today, and Sources of the Self. Additionally, this paper 
provides a comprehensive ana1ysis ofTay10r's solution for modernity, considered against 
the background of his phi10sophy of identity, mora1ity, and interpretation of Catho1icism. 
5.4 Clarifications 
The conclusion of Chapter 4 ends with the suggestion that the re1igious themes in 
Tay10r's solution for modernity are a limitation to the appea1 ofhis solution. 1 propose that 
the Christian message renders his solution untenable to many persons. This proposition 
requires further clarification to avoid misinterpretation. 
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1 maintain that Taylor's religious perspective do es not prec1ude the applicability of 
his solution for non-Christians, agnostics, or even atheists. The plurality of moral 
frameworks proposed by Taylor allows for unbelieving and be1ieving frameworks to co-
exist, provided that they respect each other's difference. He writes: 
"What does this cali for? Everybody has to put it in their own language [ ... ]. And part ofrespecting 
it is coming as best as 1 can to understand il. But that means precisely not trying to reduce it to sorne 
common denominator [ ... ]. We have to come to be able to understand and therefore also admire 
spiritualities which are nevertheless not ourS.,,430 
Taylor's solution is to present plurality as a constitutive good, which makes the love and 
respect of plurality unavoidable. His suggestion is for others to do the same in their own 
moral languages. 
Taylor do es not promote a singular, theistic moral vision, as sorne commentators 
have c1aimed.431 According to Taylor, the conception ofhuman agency is connected to the 
conception of God, or the transcendent. Transcendence is part of the modem moral 
ontology. Transcendence, reason, and nature must aIl be permitted to exist as realities in 
Western culture for hum an beings to articulate a vision of the agent. Consequently, Taylor 
contends that the widespread denial of the reality oftranscendence threatens the meaning of 
human ontology. This threat is avoided so long as belief exists in modem society, and the 
shared moral frameworks remain open to transcendence. Conversion to a theistic frame is 
entirely unnecessary. Taylor equates the belief in God, and religious practice, with the 
recognition of any dimension oftranscendence as a constitutive good. The existence of 
such belief in modem society, he proposes, is a moral necessity. For individuals, however, 
religious faith remains optional. 
430 Taylor, "Reply and re-articulation" Philosophy in an age ofpluralism: the philosophy of Charles Taylor in 
question,. 229. 
431 Lane, "God or Orienteering? A Critical Study of Taylor's Sources of the Self".56; Fraser, Dialectics of the 
Self: Transcending Charles Taylor. 59. 
Taylor's proposed moral path, his Catholic solution for modemity, is merely a 
recommendation. (The ethical dilemmas of violence and suffering are problematic for 
modemity; however, they do not threaten human ontology. Taylor's interpretation of 
Catholicism demonstrates the flexibility of religious tradition, which contradicts the 
secularist caricature of religion as rigid and patemalistic. His Catholic solution should 
therefore be interpreted as a competing portrait of religion, designed to re-establish a 
positive view of religious belief. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
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Taylor's personal religious beliefs are evident in his work. They influence his moral 
theory and philosophy of identity, and exercise a determining effect over his narrative of 
modemity. Taylor readily acknowledges the influence ofhis faith, and the limitations ofhis 
own subjectivity. The challenge for scholars, and interpreters, of Taylor's work is to 
recognize the presence of religion in his Philosophical Anthropology project without 
passing overt judgement. As his subject, the modem West, is one that touches us all in 
deeply personal ways, this challenge is indeed difficult, but not insurmountable. 
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